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Abstract
Global indicators of democracy and civil liberties have continually decreased
over the past twelve years. Trust in democracy as a form of government is at
a low. With democracy being an important driver of economic development,
this trend also stirs concerns about future economic prosperity. Scholars have
identified weak public policy-making as an origin for low levels of trust in
democratic governance. In three essays, this dissertation studies two reform
options to improve policy-making, namely decentralization and privatization.
The first essay examines whether the decentralization of public employment
services (PES) increases job placements among the unemployed. Decentralizing
PES has been a widely applied reform used by governments aiming to enhance
their efficacy. However, economic theory is ambiguous about its effects, and
empirical evidence has been scarce. Using a difference-in-differences design, I
exploit unique within-country variation in decentralization provided by the
partial devolution of German job centers in 2012. I find that decentraliza-
tion reduces job placements by approximately 10%. Decentralized providers
expand the use of public job creation schemes which diminish job seekers’
reemployment prospects but shift costs to higher levels of government.
Essay two explores fiscal interactions in Colombia, a developing country
which shifted the responsibility for a large share of public spending from
the central to local governments. I analyze whether public expenditures in
neighboring municipalities influence local spending decisions of Colombian
mayors. I offer a quasi-experimental identification strategy exploiting exoge-
nous variation in municipalities’ exposure to changes in the world market
price of oil, depending on the municipalities’ endowment with oil resources,
and controlling for municipality fixed effects. I find evidence of strong spatial
autocorrelation of local public spending. However, the quasi-experimental
instrumental variable approach reveals that there are no significant causal
fiscal interaction effects between municipalities. This highlights the importance
of using additional sources of exogenous variation for the identification of
fiscal interactions. In the developing country context, our findings suggest
that fiscal decentralization policies in Colombia did not lead to a “race to the
bottom” in local public expenditures.
The third essay studies whether governments incorporate economic effi-
ciency considerations when choosing which firms they select for privatization.
Analyzing mass privatizations following the Fall of the Berlin Wall in Germany,
I employ previously unavailable firm data on more than 6,000 privatization
and liquidation decisions. Within a descriptive analysis, I consistently find
that privatization decisions indeed occurred in line with economic efficiency
considerations, although not to a large degree. I do not detect evidence for
influence exerted through political patronage, close elections, or lobby group
size. The analysis suggests that privatization decisions are less politicized
and more efficiency-oriented than found in previous studies, highlighting the
importance of institutional environments.
Keywords:
Public policy provision; decentralization; public employment services; fiscal
spillovers; privatization.
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Zusammenfassung
Über die letzten zwölf Jahre sind globale Indikatoren für Demokratie- und
Freiheitsrechte kontinuierlich gesunken. Das Vertrauen in die Demokratie als
Regierungsform ist an einem Tiefpunkt angelangt. Demokratie ist eine wichtige
Triebkraft für wirtschaftliche Entwicklung, daher folgen aus diesem Vertrau-
ensverlust auch Sorgen über die Zukunft des ökonomischen Wohlstandes.
Als Ursache für diesen Vertrauensverlust haben Politikwissenschaftler unter
anderem unwirksame politische Entscheidungsprozesse sowie eine schwache
Politikgestaltung identifiziert. Diese Dissertation besteht aus drei Essays und
untersucht zwei mögliche Reformen für effektivere politische Gestaltungsmög-
lichkeiten: Dezentralisierung und Privatisierung.
Das erste Essay überprüft, ob durch Dezentralisierung der öffentlichen Ar-
beitsvermittlung mehr Arbeitslose in freie Stellen vermittelt werden können.
Dezentralisierung ist ein weit verbreitetes Instrument, welches Regierungen
dabei unterstützen kann, die Wirksamkeit des staatlichen Handelns zu erhö-
hen. Allerdings sind mögliche Auswirkungen aus Sicht der ökonomischen
Theorie uneindeutig und empirische Evidenz ist nur vereinzelt vorhanden.
Durch die Kommunalisierung deutscher Jobcenter im Jahr 2012 entstanden
innerstaatliche Unterschiede im Ausmaß der Dezentralisierung der Arbeitslo-
senvermittlung. Diese Unterschiede analysiere ich mit Hilfe eines Differenzen-
von-Differenzen-Ansatzes. Dabei stelle ich fest, dass durch Dezentralisierung
die Neuanstellung von Arbeitslosen um rund 10% reduziert wird. Es zeigt
sich, dass dezentralisierte Arbeitsvermittlungen vermehrt öffentlich geförderte
Arbeitsbeschaffungsmaßnahmen nutzen. Hierdurch wird die Aussicht auf
Wiederbeschäftigung von Arbeitssuchenden gesenkt und zusätzliche Kosten
für die zentralstaatlichen Kassen verursacht.
Das zweite Essay beschäftigt sich mit finanzpolitischen Wechselwirkungenn
zwischen Gemeinden in Kolumbien. Hier wurde die Verantwortlichkeit für
einen großen Teil des Staatsbudgets an die kommunale Regierungsebene über-
tragen. Ich überprüfe dabei, ob kommunale Ausgaben in benachbarten Gemein-
den das Ausgabeverhalten kolumbianischer Bürgermeister beeinflussen. Dabei
nutze ich eine quasi-experimentelle Identifikationsstrategie, welche Unterschie-
de zwischen den Gemeinden in Bezug auf das Vorhandensein von Boden-
schätzen mit der Variation aus zeitlichen Schwankungen des Ölpreises an den
Weltmärkten kombiniert. Es ergeben sich starke räumliche Autokorrelationen
im lokalen Ausgabeverhalten. Allerdings zeigt sich im quasi-experimentelle
Instrumentalvariablenansatz, dass es keine kausalen fiskalischen Interakti-
onseffekte zwischen den Gemeinden gibt. Für die Identifikation von echten
fiskalischen Wechselwirkungen ist daher die Nutzung zusätzlicher Quellen
exogener Variationen von höchster Bedeutung. Im Kontext der Entwicklungs-
forschung zeigen diese Ergebnisse, dass Dezentralisierung in Kolumbien nicht
zu einem Unterbietungswettlauf in den kommunalen (Sozial-)Ausgaben ge-
führt hat.
Das dritte Essay analysiert, ob Regierungen ökonomischen Effizienzüber-
legungen folgen, wenn sie entscheiden, welche staatlichen Firmen für eine
Privatisierung ausgewählt werden. Basierend auf der Massenprivatisierung
in Folge des Falls der Berliner Mauer, untersuche ich Firmendaten, welche
mehr als 6.000 Privatisierungs- und Liquidationsentscheidungen umfassen.
Durch deskriptive Analysen zeige ich, dass Privatisierungsentscheidungen mit
ökonomischen Effizienzüberlegungen zu vereinbaren sind. Ich finde hinge-
gen keine Evidenz für politische Beeinflussung durch Klientelismus, knappe
Wahlausgänge oder der Größe von potentiellen Lobbygruppen. Die Ergebnisse
legen nahe, dass Privatisierungsentscheidungen weniger politisch, sondern
stärker ökonomisch orientiert sind, als dies durch bisherige Studien bekannt
ist.
Schlagwörter:
Politikgestaltung; Dezentralisierung; öffentliche Arbeitsvermittlung; fiskalische
Ausstrahlungseffekte; Privatisierung.
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1 Introduction
Democracy is on the retreat. After decades of expanding political freedom, numer-
ous countries across the globe have entered a period of reversal. According to the
Freedom House indicators, global political rights and civil liberties in 2017 sank
to the lowest levels of the past twelve years (Freedom House, 2018). Even within
established democracies, disillusion about their form of government looms large.
Surveying more than 125,000 citizens in 50 countries, the Democracy Perception
Index finds that 64% of the respondents living in democracies do not believe that
their government is acting in their interest (Dalia Research, 2018). Stanford Univer-
sity’s Larry Diamond (2015) coined the term “democratic recession” to characterize
these trends.
Following Diamond’s dissection of the Freedom House indicators, the prime
reason for the crisis of democracy is bad governance, that is the process of policy
making. Similarly, Fukuyama (2015) concludes that the legitimacy of democracies
“depends less on the deepening of their democratic institutions than on their ability
to provide high-quality governance”. This conclusion is also consistent with the
observation that, on average, authoritarian governments enjoy higher approval
rates than democratic states, according to the Democracy Perception Index (Dalia
Research, 2018). Hence, governments should be in search of reform options to
restore the confidence of their citizens.
From an economics perspective, a democratic recession is alarming as democracy
has been found to drive economic development (Persson and Tabellini, 2008). Even
though a direct effect of democracy on economic growth is controversial, it is
well-established that freely elected governments and civil liberties allow for higher
levels of economic freedom and less political instability (for example refer to the
meta-study by Doucouliagos and Ulubas¸og˘lu, 2008). In return, these conditions
spur private investment and increase the capacity of governments (Acemoglu et al.,
2014). Thus, a crisis of democracy may ultimately turn into a crisis of economies.
In this dissertation, I assess two policy responses addressing growing discontent
with democracy. These responses promise to improve the institutional environment
of public policy making and thereby increase the citizens’ approval of democratic
governments. The first policy response is decentralization, which denotes the
delegation of responsibilities to lower levels of government. I study decentralization
reforms in chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis. The second type of policy response is
privatization. Privatization implies transferring government activities to the private
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sector and is at the core of my final chapter.1
Decentralization is an attractive idea to bring public policy making closer to
the population. It enables tailoring public policies to local needs more directly,
reaps local information advantages, spurs competition among local jurisdictions,
and facilitates voting politicians out of office for bad policies. Such reforms have
therefore been a widespread policy prescription by the World Bank and other
international policy consultants. Bardhan (2002) even goes as far as to note that
“around the world in matters of governance, decentralization is the rage”. However,
decentralization may also entail serious drawbacks. These include the capture of
local governments by special interest groups, a lack of professionalism within local
administrations, or “races to the bottom” in the case of social policies.
The economics literature studying decentralizations has been pioneered by Mus-
grave (1959) who coined the term “fiscal federalism”. This literature has been
centered around Oates’ (1972) model of the decentralization theorem. The theorem
essentially states that a decentralized public good provision is superior if horizontal
spillovers do not exist and local preferences for the public good vary across regions.
While initial models in this strand of the literature assumed a benevolent gov-
ernment, fiscal federalism subsequently evolved to model more realistic political
behaviors, including self-interested governments (Besley and Coate, 2003). Further
models have been built which stress the importance of spillovers or the possibility
that central governments adjust public good provisions to local preferences them-
selves. The variety of available models and assumptions from economic theory
signify the difficulty of establishing an efficient task assignment across different
levels of government. Consequently, careful empirical assessments of actual policy
outcomes are required to complement the theoretical arguments and to get a better
understanding of how decentralization may improve policy-making.
Embedded in this literature, chapter 2 studies the decentralization of public
employment services (PES) in Germany. In 2012, 41 German local districts became
the sole providers of job placement services and social assistance. This setting is
particularly well-suited for an analysis as the majority of districts maintained a
joint provision with the Federal Employment Agency (FEA), a government agency
supervised by the Federal Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs. Public employ-
ment services are an important policy domain as the federal government spends
more than 10% of its budget on these services.2 While the decentralization litera-
ture commonly relies on cross-country comparisons, this setting allows studying
decentralization within a common institutional environment and clearly defined
treatment and control groups. Based on monthly district-level data provided by the
1Further policy responses are available but beyond the scope of this dissertation, such as imple-
menting more direct-democratic procedures.
2Own calculations. Includes all spending items of the budget section 11, chapter 12, group 1 (”Leis-
tungen der Grundsicherung für Arbeitssuchende”). Budget year 2011. Source: bundeshaushalt.de
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FEA, I employ a difference-in-differences model to estimate the effect of decentral-
ization on new job placements of unemployed persons. Consequently, I compare
decentralizing districts as the treatment group with centralized districts as a control
group in the period from five years before to five years after the introduction of
the reform. I find that transferring the provision of public employment services to
district governments decreases job placements of unemployed by about 10%. This
finding is stable across a diverse set of alternative specifications and robustness
checks. In addition to providing clean evidence on the impacts of decentraliza-
tion, the study contributes an explorative analysis of potential channels which
may explain the unexpected decrease of job placements. The analysis rules out
that diffing monitoring strategies or disparate caseworker quantities and qualities
explain the finding. Unemployed persons in decentralized regions also do not
stop being placed in jobs outside their home district. However, I detect differential
uses of active labor market policies, with decentralized providers assigning public
job creation schemes to the unemployed more frequently. This program type is
known to generate few job placements but may be attractive for local governments
as program participants may support the production of local public goods and
services. I conclude that decentralization of public employment services within the
2012 reform of German job centers did not improve public policy provision.
In chapter 3, I examine fiscal spillovers in spending behavior among neigh-
boring local governments. Such spillovers may arise as a consequence of fiscal
decentralization. Fiscal decentralization implies shifting fiscal resources and cor-
responding expenditure policies to local governments. More specifically, I study
expenditure policy interactions among municipal governments in Colombia, a state
which transferred the expenditure authority over a substantial budget share to
the municipal level. Thereby, Colombia followed a trend which is common among
numerous other developing countries. A major concern regarding this type of
decentralization is that local governments may engage in a “race to the bottom” in
social spending to avoid attracting people in need (Figlio et al., 1999). Measuring
expenditure interactions has been challenging as actual policy interactions need
to be separated from other spatially correlated factors driving spending decisions
(Gibbons and Overman, 2012). In this paper, I propose a new strategy to deter-
mine the extent of spatial expenditure interactions by exploiting the Colombian
allocation rules for fiscal resources. In particular, revenues from the exploitation of
natural resources are a major budget component. The allocation rules assign them
according to municipalities’ endowments with commodities and current world
market prices of the respective good. With oil being an important natural resource
for Colombia, I combine variation in oil endowments across municipalities and
inter-temporal variation in global oil market prices to build a novel instrument for
municipalities’ expenditure levels. Employing highly disaggregated spending data
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for Colombian municipalities between 2000 and 2010 does not provide evidence
for the “race to the bottom”-hypothesis or other forms of expenditure interactions.
However, I demonstrate that traditionally used spatial econometric techniques, not
relying on plausibly quasi-experimental variation, would yield strong evidence
in favor of expenditure interactions among neighboring municipalities. My find-
ings thus alleviate a common objection against decentralization as a policy option
and underscore the need for credible identification strategies for measuring fiscal
spillovers.
Chapter 4 deals with privatization as an alternative policy response to improve
public policies and, if successful, to restore confidence in governments. Transferring
government activities to the private sector may be beneficial as private enterprises
have a larger incentive to increase the efficiency of policy provision. Profit mo-
tives and competition provide an environment which favors improvement and
innovation. Privatization also formally makes policy provision less susceptible to
potentially counterproductive political influences. However, the process of privati-
zation is political itself and may determine privatization outcomes endogenously.
Privatization literature is vast regarding studies of post-privatization effects while
very few papers address the decision process leading up to privatization (Estrin
et al., 2009). In chapter 4, I investigate the mass privatizations in East Germany
following the Fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and analyze which firms were selected
for privatization by the responsible government agency. After reunification there
was a broad consensus within the government that the entirely state-owned East
German manufacturing sector ought to be privatized. The highly uncompetitive
conditions of East German firms and the corresponding need for restructuring
made it infeasible to distribute sales subsidies on a scale such that all companies
could be privatized successfully (Akerlof et al., 1991). Hence, the Treuhandanstalt,
being the responsible government agency, had to decide which firms to privatize
and which ones to liquidate. Using firm-level data on more than 4,000 firms I assess
whether economic efficiency based on firms’ initial productivity mattered for the
decision of which firms to privatize. I find a modest but highly robust link between
productivity and privatization. I do not detect evidence for political patronage,
close elections or lobby sizes to play a role in these decisions.
In sum, this dissertation underscores the challenges in improving the provision of
public policies. Decentralization and privatization raise high expectations. Nonethe-
less, to be effective, they depend upon careful implementation and adaptation to
the specific institutional context. Unintended side effects may still arise making
continuous monitoring and evaluation efforts indispensable. Otherwise, the cure
might be worse than the disease.
The following three chapters are self-contained and may be read independently.
Chapter 2 has been invited for resubmission to the Journal of Public Economics. It
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is joint work with Michael Weber, though based on an earlier single-authored
BDPEMS Working Paper. Chapter 3 is co-authored with Frank Fossen and Nicolas
Pardo and published in the peer-reviewed International Tax and Public Finance
journal. Chapter 4 is single-authored.
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2 Public Employment Services Under
Decentralization: Evidence from a
Natural Experiment
2.1 Introduction
Governments commonly maintain public employment services that match job
seekers with employers to increase reemployment rates. To improve the efficacy of
these services, several countries, including Canada, Denmark, Germany, Italy, and
Sweden, initiated reforms decentralizing responsibilities for public employment
services to sub-national levels of government. These initiatives follow the classic
theoretical argument that decentralized public employment offices are better in-
formed about local economic conditions and preferences compared to a central
agency. Hence, providing local governments with the autonomy to tailor labor
market policies to these needs should result in superior policy outcomes (Oates,
1972; Faguet, 2004).
However, economic theory suggests at least three arguments why local poli-
cymakers could utilize their additional power for other objectives than reducing
unemployment. First, they may aim to maximize their constituency’s tax base by
strictly focusing on job placements within their own region. This strategy would
come at the cost of lower labor market mobility across regions and lead to fis-
cal externalities by creating a geographical lock-in of job seekers (Wildasin, 1991;
Lundin and Skedinger, 2006). Second, local policymakers could strive to shift fiscal
costs to other levels of government (Weingast et al., 1981; Besley and Coate, 2003).
Thus, they might favor certain active labor market policies (ALMP) or monitoring
strategies even if these policies are less effective in facilitating reemployment as long
as they result in fiscal gains for the local constituency, for example because costs
are covered by the national budget. Third, local policymakers seeking reelection
may pressure decentralized employment services to ease welfare recipients’ job
search obligations (Brollo et al., 2015). This could also reduce the job-finding rate
if public employment services at the local level are more susceptible to political
influences than at the national level.
As economic theory is ambiguous, it is an empirical question whether centralized
or decentralized regimes produce better employment services. This question has
7
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remained unanswered due to empirical constraints, most importantly a lack of
suitable control groups as the degree of decentralization usually varies between
countries but not within them. If control groups were available, short program
durations or simultaneous reforms obstructed the identification of causal effects
(see Lundin and Skedinger, 2006; Boockmann et al., 2015).
In this paper, we address these challenges by exploiting a large-scale German
policy experiment. This policy induced permanent within-country variation in
the centralization of public employment services unimpaired by simultaneous
reforms. The setting enables us to make two major contributions. For one, we
provide clean evidence on the effect of decentralization on job finding. We thereby
uncover important transition dynamics while tracking the decentralization effect
over a period of four years. For another, we examine channels for this finding
by analyzing changes in the main underlying activities of employment offices.
These are providing job seekers and firms with placement services, managing
active labor market programs (ALMPs), and monitoring job search efforts. In so
doing, we provide an exploratory analysis to determine whether our findings are
compatible with local governments following other idiosyncratic incentives that
are not beneficial to job seekers.
Implemented in 2012, the German policy reform involved the devolution of
public employment offices – referred to as ‘job centers’ hereafter – to the district
level within 41 of Germany’s 402 districts.1 Job centers typically serve the long-
term unemployed or people with very low earnings. For these groups, job centers
play a crucial role in matching job seekers with potential vacancies (Pissarides,
1979; Graversen and van Ours, 2008; Fougère et al., 2009). Before the 2012 reform,
individual job center policies were determined under the guidelines, directives,
and supervision of the Federal Employment Agency (FEA), in cooperation with
local authorities. After 2012, authorities of the 41 treated districts were free to
independently manage and stipulate these policies. The financing of job centers
remained unaffected by the reform. For all job centers, the federal government
covered welfare benefits and costs for active labor market programs while local
authorities funded accommodation costs.
We use this German policy reform to identify the causal effect of decentralizing
job centers in a difference-in-differences framework. We implement the approach
by estimating an aggregate stock-flow matching function using job centers that
remained centralized as a control group (see Coles and Smith, 1998; Ebrahimy
and Shimer, 2010). Our analysis employs an aggregate administrative dataset
comprising the monthly stocks and gross flows of unemployed welfare recipients
and vacancies in German districts from 2007 to 2016. The data further provides
detailed information on ALMP inflows, enforcement of job-search requirements,
1German districts (Kreise und kreisfreie Städte) are an administrative subdivision similar to counties
in the US. Job centers are organized at the district level.
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and job quality indicators. We find that decentralization decreases the number
of new job matches by roughly 17% in the first year and up to 10% during the
second to fourth post-reform years. This effect is equivalent to an increased average
unemployment duration of three months. We run a battery of robustness checks
including placebo tests and triple-difference models that all support our results
being driven by decentralization rather than confounding factors.
Having established this robust negative effect on job finding, we explore whether
decentralization caused a geographical lock-in of job seekers or other changes in
the job centers’ placement, ALMP, and monitoring strategies that could account for
these losses. Most importantly, we identify an immediate and permanent shift to-
wards public job creation programs that are ineffective in increasing reemployment
rates compared to other measures (see, for instance, Card et al., 2017). Decentralized
job centers also temporarily reduced the enforcement of job seeker obligations,
possibly reflecting transition processes rather than actual strategic changes. We do
not find evidence for geographical lock-in effects. Moreover, we find no evidence
that decentralization altered their placement strategies which would have altered
placement quality in terms of job stability. Due to legal restrictions, we also rule out
job centers having increased their employees’ caseloads or employed caseworkers
with different backgrounds and skills.
We conclude that job seekers did not benefit from decentralization. Decentralized
job centers adjust labor market policies but in a way that does not improve job
seekers’ reemployment prospects as exemplified by the increase in ineffective job
creation programs. Decentralized job centers potentially favored these schemes
because they generate local public goods whereas the federal government covers
most of the associated costs. Our findings have important consequences for public
budgets. Via the lower job finding rate alone, our estimates imply that the 2012
decentralization caused additional fiscal costs of about 500 million euros. Hence,
our study emphasizes that decentralization reforms necessitate a careful assess-
ment of potential incentive problems and fiscal externalities to avoid unintended
consequences.
This paper speaks to two strands of literature. First, it contributes to fiscal feder-
alism research that has analyzed whether states should provide public goods and
services at a centralized or decentralized level (see Geys and Konrad, 2010, for a
review). Thus far, this literature has almost exclusively investigated decentraliza-
tion with respect to public finances, education policies, environmental policies or
political institutions.2 Little attention has been paid to labor market institutions
(Martinez-Vazquez et al., 2017). This gap is surprising given that policymakers
2See, for example, Baicker and Gordon (2006); Neyapti (2010); Baicker et al. (2012) for public
finance, Barankay and Lockwood (2007); Ahlin and Mörk (2008); Galiani et al. (2008) for education
policies, Sigman (2002); Banzhaf and Chupp (2012); Lipscomb and Mobarak (2017) for environmental
policies, and Blanchard and Shleifer (2001); Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2007); Fan et al. (2009) for
political institutions.
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worldwide have pressed ahead promoting the decentralization of labor market
institutions on a large scale. Second, we address the labor economics literature
dealing with individual job matching instruments. This literature has made great
progress in credibly identifying causal effects of active labor market policies (e.g.
Black et al., 2003; Blundell et al., 2004; Card et al., 2010; Crépon et al., 2013) but re-
mained agnostic about the institutional environment. In particular, it has remained
silent on the question under which level of centralization such services should be
delivered.3
Two studies have started to address these problems. Lundin and Skedinger (2006)
study a Swedish pilot reform that granted municipal authorities a voting majority in
the local employment committees, the bodies responsible for designing local labor
market policies. The authors find that municipalities subsequently organized more
ALMP projects and hard-to-place job seekers more likely enrolled in municipal
projects. Remarkably, the official program period lasted only for three months,
which was too short for employment outcomes and longer-lasting effects to be
studied. Boockmann et al. (2015) examine a partial decentralization of German
public employment offices from 2005 (see also Holzner and Munz, 2013) and find a
negative effect of decentralization on the job-finding rate of men. Unfortunately,
the empirical setting was constrained by a landmark unemployment benefit reform
that directly coincided with the decentralization process. In contrast to these papers,
our study has the following advantages. We observe the decentralization effect
over a period of five years, are able to examine employment as well as local labor
market policies, and our setting is not impaired by simultaneous reforms.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 provides details on the German
system of public employment services and its 2012 reform. Section 2.3 describes
the data and our empirical strategy. Section 2.4 presents the estimated effects of
decentralization, and section 2.5 explores underlying channels. Section 2.6 examines
the validity of these results and Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Policy Background
2.2.1 German Job Centers
German job centers are one-stop local employment offices that play a central role
in the German welfare system. As of January 2012, they have served 2 million
long-term unemployed job seekers and 2.4 million employed workers with very low
3A small number of papers have compared public to private provision regimes , finding mixed
results for job seeker-outcomes (see, for instance Heinze et al., 2006; Bennmarker et al., 2013; Behaghel
et al., 2014).
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labor incomes, or 8% of the Germany’s working age population.4 Their clients’ poor
labor market prospects give job centers a major role in welfare-to-work transitions
(see, for instance, Fougère et al., 2009). Job centers engage in job counseling and
assign clients to jobs or ALMP measures. They also monitor their clients’ job
search efforts and may temporarily impose cuts on unemployment benefits if a job
seeker does not comply with their job-seeker obligations. These include actively
searching for a new job, meeting with their caseworkers, participating in assigned
ALMP measures, and accepting appropriate job offers. According to the social
security code, the aim is to allow clients a life in dignity and integrate them into
employment.
Unique to Germany, two types of job centers exist that vary in their degree of local
autonomy as portrayed in Table 2.1. The first column introduces centralized job
centers (gemeinsame Einrichtungen), which are governed by the Federal Employment
Agency (FEA) in cooperation with the respective district authority. In charge
of all labor market integration tasks, the FEA supervises the local employment
offices using target agreements, directives, and technical supervision such that
the provision of public employment services is comparatively standardized across
centralized job centers. In particular, placement, ALMP, and sanction policies follow
nationwide guidelines with limited strategic leeway for local adjustments. The
district administration mainly provides social inclusion services, for instance in the
case of drug addiction or psychological problems.
Centralized Decentralized
Task responsibilities
Placement services FEA District
Social inclusion services District District
ALMP assignments FEA District
Monitoring & sanctions FEA District
Governance
Affiliation FEA & district District
Target agreements With FEA With state authorities
Technical supervision FEA Customized
Financing
Unemployment benefits Federal government Federal government
ALMP measures Federal government Federal government
Accommodation costs District District
Notes.– FEA: Federal employment agency. ALMP: Active labor market programs.
Sources.– Ruschmeier and Oschmiansky (2010); Boockmann et al. (2015).
Table 2.1: Job Centers by Type of Organization
4Job centers serve the residents of their district. Six job centers serve multiple districts, covering
16 districts in total.
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The second type of job center is decentralized with district administrations as-
suming responsibility for all employment services (zugelassene kommunale Träger,
second column of Table 2.1). Unlike their centralized counterparts, these job centers
operate completely independently of the FEA except for the exchange of unem-
ployment registration data. Decentralized job centers constitute a regular part of
the district administration led by the district mayor. There is no general technical
supervision by the FEA. District governments only sign target agreements with
their respective state governments, their sole de-jure supervisors.
Both job center types share a common legal framework and financing rules.
The federal government covers unemployment benefits and expenditures for labor
market programs of job-center clients while the local administrations finance
their accommodation. The autonomy of decentralized job centers with regard to
placement, ALMP, and sanction strategies potentially allows for a better adjustment
to local labor market conditions which could improve job finding. However, the
financing structure could incentivize local decision makers to implement strategies
that are primarily beneficial for local budgets rather than job seekers.
Beyond job centers, the government runs an unemployment insurance scheme
managed by the federal employment agency and financed by contributions of
employers and employees. Benefits are available to previous contributors for a
period of 12 months at most. For further support, insurance recipients will be
redirected to job centers. Thus, job centers are responsible for about two thirds of
all unemployed persons in Germany.
2.2.2 The 2012 Decentralization
Decentralized job centers were established in two waves. The first wave, in 2005,
established job centers as one-stop employment offices for the first time into the
welfare system whereby decentralized job centers were set up in 67 districts of
Germany’s 402 districts. This wave also coincided with a large-scale reform of
long-term unemployment benefits (Hartz reform, see Dustmann et al., 2014; Nagl
and Weber, 2016).5 The second wave, in 2012, devolved job centers in 41 other
districts. This decentralization provides a pre-reform period and took place without
other simultaneous labor market reforms. For these reasons, we focus our analysis
entirely on the second wave of reform.
The districts to be reformed in 2012 were determined within a state-quota
system. Districts willing to decentralize first had to apply to their respective state
governments. The application period started on 3 August 2010 and ended on
31 December 2010. Local councils were required to back the application with a
5An official evaluation of this decentralization wave led to inconclusive results (Deutscher
Bundestag, 2008; Holzner and Munz, 2013; Boockmann et al., 2015), such that no political consensus
was reached about the preferred regime. As a compromise, the co-existence of centralized and
decentralized job centers was continued.
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two thirds majority vote. Then, the state governments nominated those applicants
allowed to decentralize. The number of nominations was subject to a quota specific
to each state, proportional to the state’s number of delegates in the upper house of
parliament. The total quota for Germany as a whole was 41 districts. 75 districts
applied. If the number of applying districts fell short of the available spots in one
state, remaining places were filled by districts from other states. Those districts
allowed to decentralize their job centers were officially announced on 14 April 2011.
Decentralization took place on 1 January 2012.
Thanks to the state-quota system, job centers were decentralized in districts all
across Germany (see Figure 2.1). They do not cluster in regions with particularly
poor or strong labor market conditions, nor are they disproportionally located in
cities or rural areas. They also resemble one another in more general economic
indicators. Table 2.2 presents major district characteristics by job center type for
the pre-application year 2010. As shown in the comparison of means, both groups
exhibited on average the same gross domestic product, fiscal situation, population
size, sectoral structure, and unemployment composition. A difference arises only
for the monthly job-finding rate. As we use job finding solely as an outcome
variable in our framework, district fixed-effects will account for these differences in
our estimations. In sum, these results supply first evidence that the two groups of
districts are observationally equivalent.
2.3 Data and Empirical Strategy
2.3.1 Data
We utilize a rich administrative dataset at the district level to examine the effects of
decentralization on job finding and other labor market outcomes. The data stem
from the job centers’ operational processes and are subsequently compiled into
monthly reports (Arbeitsmarkt in Zahlen) by the FEA’s statistical office. The reports
provide monthly observations on unemployment, vacancies, ALMP participation,
benefit sanctions, and employment quality indicators. For all variables, we readily
observe stocks as well as gross flows and thus do not have to deal with time
aggregation issues.
The data cover the universe of German districts and effectively consider all
relevant unemployed job seekers because unemployment registration is mandatory
for receiving unemployment benefits. From this sample, we omit 11 districts in
which centralized and decentralized job centers co-existed due to administrative
reforms. This also includes one district which was part of the 2012-reform, leaving
us with a total of 40 treated districts. Finally, we omit districts that decentralized
job centers in 2005 although their inclusion as an additional control group does
13
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Group means P-Value
Decentralized Remained for equality
Variable in 2012 centralized of means
GDP per capita (in 1,000 euros) 29.670 29.085 0.766
(14.831) (11.196)
Public debt p.c. (in 1,000 euros) 1.725 1.587 0.518
(1.403) (1.248)
Urban district (dummy) 0.225 0.313 0.257
(0.423) (0.464)
East Germany (dummy) 0.200 0.173 0.681
(0.405) (0.379)
Civil labor force (in 1,000) 154.230 131.493 0.432
(96.583) (179.278)
Employment rate 0.724 0.763 0.269
(0.170) (0.216)
Share: Agriculture 0.021 0.023 0.527
(0.019) (0.021)
Share: Mining and energy 0.014 0.013 0.904
(0.008) (0.009)
Share: Manufacturing 0.204 0.195 0.535
(0.086) (0.087)
Share: Construction 0.066 0.066 0.926
(0.024) (0.025)
Share: Trade, transp., comm. 0.254 0.251 0.632
(0.042) (0.039)
Share: Finance and real estate 0.142 0.141 0.824
(0.045) (0.046)
Share: Public and priv. services 0.299 0.310 0.285
(0.056) (0.065)
Job-center unemployment rate 0.048 0.047 0.812
(0.025) (0.029)
Share: Young (15–24 years) 0.080 0.078 0.426
(0.016) (0.020)
Share: Old (55–64 years) 0.123 0.124 0.843
(0.028) (0.022)
Share: Foreign nationals 0.190 0.165 0.139
(0.130) (0.093)
Monthly job-finding rate 0.042 0.047 0.041**
(0.011) (0.014)
Monthly flow rate into ALMP 0.148 0.162 0.105
(0.043) (0.051)
Monthly sanctioning rate 0.018 0.019 0.197
(0.006) (0.006)
Observations 40 294
Notes.– Sample as described in section 2.3.1. Standard deviations in parentheses. P-values
given for t-test of mean equality. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
Source.– German Statistical Office and Federal Employment Agency.
Table 2.2: Major District Characteristics in 2010 by Job Center Type
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Figure 2.1: German Districts by Job Center Type
Notes.– Mixed types refer to districts where decentralized and central-
ized job centers coexist e.g. due to district mergers.
Sources.– Geodata: GeoBasis-DE / BKG 2014.
not alter our results. The sample period ranges from January 2007 to December
2016, i.e. from five years before to five years after the decentralization. Due to
partially missing observations, we remove the first three post-reform months from
our sample.
The data allow us to study the effect of decentralization on a wide range of
labor market outcomes. With job placements being the primary task of job centers,
we consider the monthly outflow from unemployment into employment as our
main outcome of interest. To investigate channels explaining potential changes in
unemployment outflows, we analyze several additional outcomes. These include the
monthly flows of unemployed into different types of ALMP measures, the number
of sanctions issued in a month on non-compliant job seekers, and the outflow
into permanent jobs. The latter refers to jobs lasting for at least three months. Our
main covariates are stocks and flows of unemployed and vacancies, respectively.
In additional specifications, we also consider the demographic composition of
local unemployment, such as the share of foreign nationals, people younger than
25 years, and older than 55. Table 2.3 presents descriptive statistics of our main
variables in the resulting sample; Table A.1 in the appendix provides respective
variable descriptions.
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Variable Mean SD Min. Max.
Monthly job-finding 4.67 0.89 1.61 8.95
Vacancies, inflow 5.75 0.76 3.09 9.65
Vacancies, stock 6.71 0.81 2.94 10.47
Unemployed, inflow 6.30 0.89 3.64 10.68
Unemployed, stock 7.96 1.02 5.48 12.29
Share: Unemployed <25 yr 7.74 2.13 0.06 30.58
Share: Unemployed >55 yr 14.59 4.08 3.44 31.21
Share: Foreign nationals 18.32 10.49 0.34 59.43
Flow into ALMP 5.90 1.03 2.20 10.22
Into short-term training 5.40 1.04 0.41 9.47
Into subsidized employment 2.85 1.18 0.41 7.51
Into medium-term training 3.16 1.51 0.41 8.78
Into public job creation s 3.66 1.47 0.41 9.22
New sanctions 4.20 0.99 0.41 8.97
Stock of sanctions 4.81 0.98 0.41 9.48
Stock of benefit sanctions 4.76 0.99 0.41 9.45
Stock of accomodation sanc 2.64 1.03 0.41 6.95
Outflow out of welfare 5.68 0.86 2.08 9.86
Permanent outflow out of w 5.33 0.87 1.61 9.59
Share: Permanent outflow 70.63 6.31 31.90 94.38
Notes.– Monthly district-level data. All level-variables are in logs. N = 39,018.
Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics of Main Regression Variables
2.3.2 Econometric Model
The functional form of our econometric model is motivated by a stock-flow match-
ing model with Cobb-Douglas technology (Coles and Smith, 1998; Ebrahimy and
Shimer, 2010).6 Analogous to a production function, the stock-flow matching func-
tion models the gross flow from unemployment into jobs (‘matches’) as an output
produced by the stocks of vacancies and unemployed as well as their respective
inflows. We interpret the total factor productivity of the matching function as an
indicator for the efficiency of the local job center in bringing unemployed back to
work. The decentralization status of a job center then constitutes one component of
this indicator.
To identify the causal effects of decentralization, we employ a difference-in-
differences framework at the district level. Our treatment group comprises 40
districts whose job centers were decentralized in 2012, while our control group
contains 294 districts whose job centers remained centralized throughout the sample
period.
6The stock-flow matching function has received empirical support both at the micro and the macro
level (Gregg and Petrongolo, 2005; Andrews et al., 2013) with strong evidence for a Cobb-Douglas
functional form (see Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001, for a survey).
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Log-linearizing the stock-flow matching function, our estimation equation then
reads
Mit = δDit + β1Uit + β2Vit + β3U˜it + β4V˜it + αi + µt + ε it (2.1)
where Mit denotes matches defined as transitions from unemployment into jobs for
district (i.e. job center) i and month t, our main outcome. The dummy variable Dit
indicates whether a job center is decentralized or not. Uit and Vit denote the stocks
of unemployed and vacancies, whereas U˜it and V˜it denote their respective inflows
in this month. We include district-specific effects αi to account for time-invariant
differences in matches across districts and month-fixed effects µt to capture business
cycle and seasonal fluctuations. Our parameter of interest is δ, which provides the
treatment effect of decentralization on the conditional outflow from unemployment
to employment. Standard errors are clustered by district and month to account for
unobserved correlation within these dimensions (Bertrand et al., 2004).
Our empirical approach relies on two main identifying assumptions.7 First,
centralized and decentralized job centers experience the same fundamental labor
market trends in the absence of the policy change. Second, decentralization has no
effect on job finding in unreformed districts (stable unit treatment value assumption,
SUTVA). We find descriptive support for common trends in the following section
and more formal support for both assumptions in Section 2.6.
2.4 The Effects of Decentralization on Job
Finding
This section presents descriptive, static parametric, and dynamic parametric results
for the effect of decentralization on job finding. Illustrating the effect of decentraliza-
tion descriptively, Figure 2.2 shows the evolution of the seasonally adjusted average
aggregate monthly job-finding rates by job center type over time. The job-finding
rate is calculated as the outflow out of unemployment over the unemployment
stock at the beginning of the month. The figure illustrates that in the five years
before the reform, the job-finding rates’ evolution was remarkably similar in both
groups of job centers. This lends credibility to the common trends assumption and
affirms that the reform did not target districts with particularly bright pre-treatment
trends. We plot descriptive graphs for further labor market outcomes in Figures A.1
and A.2 in Appendix A.2, again confirming parallel pre-reform trends. However,
after the decentralization in January 2012, the job-finding rate of decentralized job
centers sharply dropped relative to centralized job centers. It declined from about
4.5% to roughly 3% in treated districts and from approximately 5% to around 4%
7We have already discussed in Section 2.2 that the 2012 decentralization did not coincide with
other reforms that could have affected the two groups of districts systematically differently.
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in non-treated districts. The gap slightly narrows during the following years, but
does not return to its pre-reform size. This points to permanent negative effects of
decentralization on job finding.
Figure 2.2: Average Aggregate Monthly Job-finding Rates by Job Center Type
Notes.– The figure depicts the seasonally adjusted average aggregate
monthly job-finding rate. It is calculated as the monthly outflow out of
unemployment into employment over the unemployment stock at the
beginning of the month. The time-labels (x-axis) refer to January of a
given year.
We now investigate whether parametric estimates will support our descriptive
findings. Table 2.4 reports the difference-in-differences estimates from equation (2.1)
for the outflow from unemployment into employment. Each column represents a
regression of log transitions into jobs on a decentralization indicator, district and
month fixed effects, as well as subsequently introduced covariates. Column 1 gives
the average treatment effect of decentralizing job centers while controlling only for
fixed effects. The estimate implies that average monthly flows into jobs decreased by
roughly 11% due to decentralization. Columns 2 to 4 refine the model’s precision
by adding a set of local labor market characteristics that remove cross-district
differences. In particular, column 2 adds the monthly stocks of vacancies and
unemployed. Building on column 2, column 3 includes the respective inflows,
completing the basic stock-flow model. The coefficients of the stock-flow variables
are in line with the concept of stock-flow matching. Job finding is more elastic with
respect to the inflows of new vacancies rather than its stock, while it is more elastic
with respect to the stock of unemployed rather than its inflow. The decentralization
effect remains robust and stable. Column 4 additionally controls for shares of
three demographic groups that are typically hard to place into jobs, i.e. the share
of unemployed below the age of 25, the share of unemployed above the age of
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55, and the share of foreign unemployed. As expected, higher shares of these
hard-to-place job seekers in the group of unemployed ceteris paribus reduce the
unemployment outflow into employment. Yet, controlling for these groups does
not alter our decentralization estimate. Our finding is also robust to including
linear district-specific trends into the empirical model and using alternative sample
periods (see Tables A.2 and A.3 in Appendix A.3).
Hence, we conclude that decentralization reduced the monthly flow into jobs
on average by about 10% within five years following the reform. This effect size is
equivalent to an increase in the average unemployment duration by about three
months.8
Variable (1)
Fixed
Effects
(2)
Stocks
(3)
Stock-
Flow
(4)
Controls
Decentralized −0.119 *** −0.124 *** −0.096 *** −0.100 ***
(0.028) (0.025) (0.021) (0.021)
Vacancies, stock 0.029 ** −0.027 ** −0.025 **
(0.013) (0.011) (0.011)
Unemployed, stock 0.562 *** 0.372 *** 0.383 ***
(0.036) (0.031) (0.031)
Vacancies, inflow 0.110 *** 0.111 ***
(0.012) (0.012)
Unemployed, inflow 0.331 *** 0.327 ***
(0.021) (0.021)
Unemployed <25 ys −0.004 **
(0.002)
Unemployed >50 ys −0.005 ***
(0.002)
JC unemployed: foreign −0.004 **
citizens (0.002)
R-squared 0.951 0.955 0.958 0.958
Districts 334 334 334 334
Observations 39018 39018 39018 39018
Notes.– * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Each column presents a different estimation of
equation (2.1). Decentralized is a dummy equaling 1 for districts with decentralized job
centers and 0 otherwise. All continuous variables in logs. Regressions include a full set of
dummies for districts and months. Standard errors given in parentheses are clustered at
the job center and the month level.
Table 2.4: Difference-in-Differences: Average Effect of Decentralization on
Monthly Log Flows Into Jobs
8The average aggregate monthly job-finding rate in centralized districts amounts to 3.8%. Assum-
ing a constant job-finding probability over the duration in unemployment, this implies an average
unemployment duration of about 26 months. A 10% decrease of job finding, therefore, implies an
increase in average unemployment duration by almost 3 months.
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Next, we investigate whether the negative effect of decentralization is declining
over time, as Figure 2.2 may suggest. We therefore modify the stock-flow matching
model from equation (1). Adding a full series of annual leads and lags of the
reform, the regression equation now reads
Mit =
2016
∑
τ=2007
(τ 6=2011)
δτ Diτ + β1Uit + β2Vit + β3U˜it + β4V˜it + αi + µt + ε it (2.2)
where τ denotes years and δτ are yearly coefficients. As anticipatory treatment ef-
fects could have occurred already when the decentralizing districts were announced
in April 2011, all treatment effects are estimated relative to the pre-treatment base
year 2011. Estimating quarterly effects leads to qualitatively similar but less precise
results.
Figure 2.3 depicts the resulting evolution of the decentralization effect on job
finding from five years before to five years after the reform. During the pre-
reform period, all coefficients are statistically insignificant. This finding rules out
anticipatory decentralization effects and supports the common trends assump-
tion underlying our identification strategy. In the first year after decentralization,
monthly unemployment outflows were strongly reduced by about 17%. During the
following three years, this effect weakens over time but still amounts to almost 10%
in the fifth year after decentralization. Seven expert interviews with division heads
of state and federal ministries as well as job center directors suggest that the first
year after the reform was influenced by the organizational transition. Employees
had to adapt to new IT systems and practices. Moreover, some functions that used
to be centrally provided by the FEA before had to be built up in decentralized job
centers. We thus conclude that decentralization initiates a transition phase with a
particularly pronounced drop in the job finding rate during the first year but also
induces a more permanent and economically relevant negative effect in subsequent
years that requires explanation.
2.5 Policy Adjustments
We now explore channels that might explain the negative effect of job center
decentralization on job finding. As argued above, decentralization may lead to (i) a
geographical lock-in of job seekers; (ii) changes in the inflows into ALMP measures;
(iii) changes in the monitoring and sanctioning of job seekers or (iv) changes in
the placement strategy. Finally, we will briefly discuss additional features of public
employment services playing a potential role in the decentralization process.
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Figure 2.3: Dynamic Treatment Effects of Decentralization on Monthly Flows Into
Jobs
Notes.– The figure depicts coefficients and their 95%-confidence intervals
of yearly leads and lags of the decentralization indicator from a stock-flow
regression of the log monthly flow from unemployment into jobs, as given
by equation (2.2). The year 2011 is the baseline category. The regression
includes a full set of dummies for job centers and months. Standard errors
are clustered at the job center and the month level.
2.5.1 Geographical Lock-in of Job Seekers
If local decision makers aim to maximize the tax base of their constituency, they
have an incentive to match job seekers only with vacancies in their own district.
This would lead to a lower mobility of job seekers across districts and could explain
a lower job finding rate under decentralization (Lundin and Skedinger, 2006). This
phenomenon has been termed as ‘geographical lock-in’ of job seekers and could
create an uncoordinated fiscal externality among districts (Wildasin, 1991).
To examine whether decentralization induces geographical lock-in, we analyze
whether the elasticity of job finding with respect to vacancies from surrounding
districts has decreased after decentralization. Therefore, we extend our previous
model (2.1) by adding spatial lags of all variables as well as interaction terms of
the spatial lags with the decentralization dummy as covariates. This gives rise to a
spatial cross-regressive model (Halleck Vega and Elhorst, 2015). Hence, we estimate
models of the form
Mit = δDit + Qitβ+ WQ−itγ+ WD−itη + DitWQ−itθ + αi + µt + ε it (2.3)
where D is the decentralization indicator, Q is a vector collecting the stock and flow
variables for unemployed as well as vacancies, and W represents a spatial weights
matrix based on row-normalized inverse distances. The remaining variables are
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defined as before. Our coefficient vector of interest now becomes θ, in particular its
elements with respect to vacancies. The index i denotes the focal district, whereas
−i refers to the ‘neighbors’ of district i. To provide a meaningful interpretation
of the decentralization coefficient δ in the face of interaction terms, we center all
continuous variables around their mean and standardize them by their standard
deviation.
Variable (1)
Baseline
(2)
Spatial
lags I
(3)
Spatial
lags II
(4)
Spatial
lags full
Decentralized (D) −.096 *** −.107 *** −.103 *** −.097 ***
(.021) (.021) (.024) (.022)
W×Vacancies, inflow .074 *** .074 *** .077 ***
(.024) (.024) (.024)
W×Vacancies, stock −.025 −.025 −.023
(.031) (.031) (.030)
D×W×Vacancies, inflow −.000 −.014
(.013) (.017)
D×W×Vacancies, stock −.005 −.004
(.015) (.020)
R-squared .958 .959 .959 .959
Districts 334 334 334 334
Observations 39018 39018 39018 39018
Notes.– * p< 0.1; ** p< 0.05; *** p< 0.01. Each column presents a separate estimation of
equation 2.3. Decentralized (D) is a dummy equaling 1 for districts with decentralized
job centers and 0 otherwise. W represents a spatial weights matrix with row-normalized
inverse distances as weights. Regressions include the stocks and flows of unemployed
and vacancies as well as a full set of dummies for job centers and months. All continuous
variables in logs, centered and standardized. Standard errors given in parentheses are
clustered at the job center and the month level.
Table 2.5: Difference-in-Differences: Average Effect of Decentralization on Flows
Into Jobs Accounting for Vacancies in Surrounding Job Centers
Table 2.5 presents our results. The first column repeats our baseline estimation
using the centered and standardized variables, demonstrating that the decentraliza-
tion effect remains unaffected by this transformation. Column 2 adds the spatially
lagged variables as well as an interaction of the spatially lagged vacancy inflow
with the decentralization indicator. Column 3 substitutes this interaction with that
of the spatially lagged vacancy stock with decentralization. Column 4 includes a
full set of interactions of spatially lagged stock and flow variables with the decen-
tralization indicator. In all models, the resulting mean decentralization effect is very
similar to our previous estimates. Job finding increases with additional vacancy
inflows in surrounding districts but not with vacancy stocks. None of the models
indicates a statistically significant decrease of the job finding elasticity with respect
to the neighboring stock or inflow of vacancies after decentralization. Confirming
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the results by Lundin and Skedinger (2006), we conclude that decentralization
did not increase the geographical lock-in of job seekers. Instead, decentralization
appears to have reduced the overall efficiency of the job matching process.
2.5.2 Active Labor Market Policies
Changes in the assignment of job seekers into ALMP measures constitute a second
potential channel explaining the reductions in job finding. Decentralized job centers
could use their autonomy to better tailor ALMP strategies to local economic
conditions. Yet they may also promote program types that provide additional
gains for the local constituency such as local public goods. Similarly, Lundin and
Skedinger (2006) point out that decentralized job centers might prefer ALMP
measures that help to maximize the local tax base, even if they came at the cost
of higher geographical lock-in. However, an ALMP strategy that does not focus
on the most effective programs for increasing reemployment rates will reduce the
aggregate job-finding rate.
For German job centers, the four most common ALMP categories are short-term
classroom and on-the-job training of up to 3 months (Aktivierung und berufliche
Eingliederung), medium-term vocational training and re-training (Berufliche Weiter-
bildung), wage subsidies (Aufnahme einer Erwerbstätigkeit), and public job creation
schemes (Beschäftigung schaffende Maßnahmen). For all these measures, the federal
government bears the cost of program participation.9 Yet only public job-creation
schemes offer the additional advantage of participants providing local public goods,
such as cleaning streets, gardening parks or supporting local facilities’ management.
A shift towards public job-creation schemes could therefore reduce the districts’
own expenditures for these goods. Unfortunately, public job-creation schemes are
also very ineffective in increasing reemployment rates compared to other mea-
sures (for large-scale meta-studies, see Heckman et al., 1999; Kluve, 2010; Card
et al., 2017). Wapler et al. (2018) even show this program type to reduce the re-
gional matching efficiency between job seekers and vacancies. Simple ordinary
least squares estimates using our sample indeed confirm that job finding is not
or only vaguely correlated with previous inflows into public job-creation schemes
(see Figure A.3 in Appendix A.4). Conversely, previous inflows into short-term
training and wage subsidy programs exhibit strong positive correlations with job
placements.
To assess whether decentralization caused a shift toward less effective ALMP
measures, we employ the stock-flow model from equation (2.1) but use outflows
from unemployment into the different ALMP programs as the outcome variables.
Table 2.6 presents the respective results. The first column indicates that decentral-
ized job centers do not assign their clients more or less often to ALMP measures
9District authorities mainly pay for accommodation costs of job seekers, see Section 2.2.
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Variable (1)
All
ALMPs
(2)
Short-
term
trainings
(3)
Medium-
term
trainings
(4)
Wage
subsidies
(5)
Job
creation
schemes
Decentralized 0.033 −0.068 −0.060 −0.047 0.299 ***
(0.064) (0.096) (0.069) (0.073) (0.080)
R-squared 0.939 0.860 0.810 0.845 0.825
Districts 316 316 316 316 316
Observations 36972 36967 35318 36422 35575
Notes.– * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Each column presents a different estimation of
equation 2.1. The dependent variables are inflows of unemployed into the respective ALMP
categories. Decentralized is a dummy equaling 1 for districts with decentralized job centers
and 0 otherwise. Regressions include the stocks and flows of unemployed and vacancies as
well as a full set of dummies for job centers and months. All continuous variables in logs.
Sample sizes vary due to missing observations. Standard errors given in parenthesis are
clustered at the job center and the month level.
Table 2.6: Difference-in-Differences: Average Effect of Decentralization on
Monthly Log Flows Into Active Labor Market Policies (ALMPs)
in general compared to centralized job centers. Thus, we can rule out changes in
the overall use of ALMP measures accounting for the reductions in job finding.
Columns 2, 3, and 4 indicate that the job center types do not differ with respect to
their use of short-term training, medium-term training, and wage subsidies in a
statistically significant way, although decentralized job centers tend to use these
ALMP measures less intensively. Column 5 reveals that decentralized job centers
sent about 30% more unemployed job seekers into job creation schemes. The lower
effectiveness of this program type indicates that this policy change contributes to
the observed loss in job finding. In fact, decentralization increased the average
inflow rate into job creation schemes by a similar magnitude as it decreased the
average aggregate job-finding rate.10 If job seekers start a new position within
the program duration in the regular labor market, they may not be counted as a
job placement of an unemployed person in the official statistics. The differences
in job placements between provider types then could also arise due to statistical
recordings. However, according to the official statistical reports of the FEA, only
about 10% of job creation scheme participants are in employment six months after
leaving the program (Bundesagentur für Arbeit, 2012). Hence, job entry during
program participation is an improbable explanation of the decentralization effect.
To ensure we do not overlook any underlying dynamic changes, we employ
10In the post-reform period, the average aggregate monthly job-finding rate of decentralized
districts was 3.1% and the average monthly inflow rate into job creation schemes was 1.2%. With
treatment effects of –10% and +30% respectively, the job-finding rate changed by 3.1% · −0.11−0.1 =
−0.34 percentage points and the job-creation inflow rate increased by 1.2% · 0.31+0.3 = 0.23 percentage
points.
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equation (2.2) to estimate the year-specific impacts of decentralization on the inflows
into the different ALMP programs. Figure 2.4 presents the results for our four most
important program types. For short-term training, medium-term training, and wage
subsidies, we do not observe systematic or permanent changes that are statistically
significant at the 95%-confidence level. Inflows into medium-term training appear
to be slightly reduced in the long run. For job-creation schemes, in contrast, inflows
increase directly after decentralization and remain at a permanently higher level.
Figure 2.4: Dynamic Treatment Effects of Decentralization on Monthly Entries Into
ALMP Measures
Notes.– The figure depicts coefficients and their 95%-confidence intervals
of yearly leads and lags of the decentralization indicator from a stock-flow
regression of the monthly inflow into different ALMP measures as given
by equation (2.2). The year 2011 is the baseline category. The regressions
include a full set of dummies for job centers and months. Standard errors
are clustered at the job center and the month level.
Possibly, some local authorities used the decentralization of their job centers to
shift fiscal costs from their own to the federal budget. The incentive to do so is
inherent to a system where the national government covers the costs of program
participation and subsequent unemployment while not being able to influence the
local job centers’ ALMP strategy. The political component is also supported by the
auxiliary analysis in Appendix A.5, showing that decentralized providers rely on
job creation schemes more heavily ahead of communal elections.
2.5.3 Monitoring and Sanction Strategies
Changes in the sanction strategy of local job centers constitute another potential
channel that might explain lower job finding after decentralization. Sanctions
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are temporary reductions in unemployment benefits when job seekers do not
comply with their job seeker obligations, such as search and meeting duties. Ample
empirical evidence confirms that stricter sanction regimes and even the credible
threat of being sanctioned increase the job-finding rate (see van den Berg et al., 2004;
Abbring et al., 2005; Lalive et al., 2005; Boone et al., 2009) although van den Berg
et al. (2014); Arni et al. (2013) imply that sanctions should not be set discouragingly
high to achieve the desired outcome. We confirm this notion for our sample within
a simple exploratory analysis where we regress contemporaneous job finding
on previous sanction activities (see Figure A.4 in Appendix A.4). The resulting
correlations show that job finding is increasing with sanctions issued in previous
months. This effect is driven by the lower benefit sanctions rather than the higher
sanctions which also cut accommodation costs. In sum, we expect fewer but stricter
sanctions to reduce job finding.
Decentralized job centers could prefer to sanction welfare recipients less inten-
sively as laxer enforcement may affect the job-center clients’ voting behavior and
increase the re-election prospects of incumbent local politicians (see Mechtel and
Potrafke, 2013; Brollo et al., 2015). Centralized job centers do not encounter this
incentive as the FEA is a federal institution not relying on local constituents. In
addition, decentralized job centers may emphasize sanctions that lower local public
expenditures due to the financing structure of welfare support in Germany. Minor
non-compliance to job seeker duties will first reduce federally financed benefit
payments. Severe or repeated failures to comply will lead to higher sanctions that
also include reductions of the accommodation costs financed by local governments.
Hence, decentralized job centers could reduce local welfare expenses by imposing
stricter sanctions affecting accommodation costs more often.
We employ our baseline model from equation (2.1) to explore whether decen-
tralization leads to changes in the monitoring strategies. Table 2.7 presents our
estimates for the total number of sanctions imposed, sanctions in place, and sanc-
tion types used. There is a weak indication for a negative decentralization effect:
According to column 1, the number of sanctions newly imposed in a given month
decreased by about 6%. Column 2 suggests that the monthly stock of sanctions also
decreased by 6%. Larger effects on the sanctions’ stock than on the flow reflects
that some sanctions endure several weeks, exacerbating the effect on the stock
variable. We continue with the stock of sanctions because it is only possible to
distinguish benefit from accommodation sanctions for this variable. The final two
columns then reveal that decentralization lowered the number of benefit sanctions
imposed but slightly increased the level of reductions in accommodation payments.
All of these effects are not distinguishable from zero in a statistical sense. Hence,
the potential conclusion that decentralized job centers imposed on average fewer
sanctions overall but with a relatively higher strength among those that remained
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should be treated with caution. It also rests on the assumption that job seeker
compliance did not change due to the reform. Fewer but stricter sanctions might
be in the interest of localized job centers for the political and fiscal considerations
outlined before.
Variable (1)
New
sanctions
(2)
Stock of all
sanctions
(3)
Stock of
benefit
sanctions
(4)
Stock of
accommoda-
tion
sanctions
Decentralized −0.063 −0.066 −0.077 0.090
(0.062) (0.054) (0.055) (0.079)
R-squared 0.896 0.943 0.943 0.814
Districts 316 316 316 316
Observations 36804 36903 36903 36515
Notes.– * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Each column presents a different estimation of
equation 2.1. The dependent variables are inflows of unemployed into the respective ALMP
categories. Decentralized is a dummy equaling 1 for districts with decentralized job centers and
0 otherwise. Regressions include the stocks and flows of unemployed and vacancies as well as a
full set of dummies for job centers and months. All continuous variables in logs. Sample sizes
vary due to missing observations. Standard errors given in parenthesis are clustered at the job
center and the month level.
Table 2.7: Difference-in-Differences: Average Effect of Decentralization on
Monthly Sanctions of Unemployed
To explore the permanency of these effects, we move again to the dynamic
specification of our model as given by equation (2.2). Figure 2.5 summarizes the
impact of decentralization on our four sanction outcomes. The graphs exhibit at
least one significant pre-treatment effect per outcome variable, indicating a violation
of the difference-in-differences assumption for sanctions. Nevertheless, the simple
time pattern indicate a drastic reduction in new sanctions during the first year
following the reform of about 50 log points but none in the following years. The
stock of all sanctions as well as the stock of benefit sanctions followed a very similar
pattern. If the graphs are interpretable at all, the results signal that decentralized job
centers do not treat their clients more generously on a permanent basis. Therefore,
it is unlikely that the permanently lower job finding is due to a laxer sanctioning
regime. Moreover, the time pattern may help to explain the particularly pronounced
drop in job finding during 2012. Caseworkers might have been busy coping with
new procedures rather than actively monitoring and sanctioning job seekers at that
time. Finally, there is a weak indication that decentralized job centers could have
shifted their sanctions policy to include more cuts in accommodation costs of job
seekers. Such a sanction strategy brings relief to local budgets but likely does not
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lead to additional job placements due to its discouraging effect on job seekers.
Figure 2.5: Dynamic Treatment Effects of Decentralization on Sanctioning of Unem-
ployed
Notes.– The figure depicts coefficients and their 95%-confidence intervals
of yearly leads and lags of the decentralization indicator from a stock-
flow regression on the log monthly number of new sanctions as given
by equation (2.2). The year 2011 is the baseline category. The regression
includes a full set of dummies for job centers and months. Standard errors
are clustered at the job center and the month level.
2.5.4 Placement Strategies
Decentralizing job centers may provide gains other than higher job finding, such
as improved job quality. In particular, job centers may accept a lower placement
rate if they emphasize the quality rather than the quantity of their placements. In
Germany, decentralized job centers may focus on stable, higher-paying placements
because the districts bear the accommodation costs for households on welfare,
irrespective of the employment status. In contrast, centralized job centers have an
incentive to focus on the number of placements regardless of job quality as any
person exiting unemployment reduces FEA expenditures.
We assess the effect of decentralization on the placements’ quality using out-
flows from welfare rather than from unemployment. The welfare data consider
all people on welfare of which only about half are registered as unemployed. The
remaining welfare recipients are mainly ALMP participants, employed but earning
low incomes or unable to work due to familial or health reasons. Total outflows
from welfare are about two to three times larger than flows from unemployment
into jobs. People will exit welfare if their household income exceeds a subsistence
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threshold that varies according to household size and local costs of living. They
may also exit at the start of retirement. Therefore, our identification strategy rests
on the assumption that decentralization affected welfare outflows only via job
placements and that other components of welfare outflows remained unaffected by
this reform or simultaneous unobserved shocks.
Table 2.8 presents our estimation results. In all columns, we re-estimate equa-
tion (2.1) using vacancies, welfare stocks, and their inflows as control variables. We
again also include a full set of job center as well as month fixed effects. In column 1,
we focus on the total outflow out of welfare as a rough indicator for reemployment
wages. We do not observe a statistically significant effect of decentralization, im-
plying that decentralized job centers do not achieve more high-paying placements
than their centralized counterparts. However, they also do not perform signifi-
cantly worse. Apparently, the lower unemployment outflows observed above do
not translate into fewer welfare outflows after decentralization. Two explanations
can reconcile these findings. First, unemployment outflows are too small compared
to welfare outflows such that the negative effect on the former does not carry over
to a negative effect on the latter. Second, decentralized job centers were reluctant to
place their clients into low wage jobs while their placement efficiency for higher
paying jobs was not affected by decentralization. Further research using more
detailed data will be necessary to disentangle these two explanations.
Variable (1)
Outflows out of
welfare
(2)
Permanent
outflows out of
welfare
(3)
Share of
permanent
outflows
Decentralized−0.007 0.002 0.604
(0.015) (0.014) (0.705)
R-squared 0.981 0.975 0.438
Districts 334 334 334
Observations 38718 38718 38718
Notes.– * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Decentralized is a dummy equaling 1
for districts with decentralized job centers and 0 otherwise. Standard errors given
in parentheses are clustered at the job center and the month level. Regressions
include the stocks and flows of unemployed and vacancies as well as a full set of
dummies for job centers and months. Differing sample sizes are due to missing
data in few observations.
Table 2.8: Difference-in-Differences: Average Effect of Decentralization on
the Composition of Monthly Outflows and Unemployment
Stocks
In column 2, we narrow our analysis to welfare outflows without returns into
welfare during the next three months (‘permanent outflows’). We consider this as
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a rough measure of the placements’ stability. Again, we do not find a statistically
significant impact of decentralization. When using an alternative outcome measure,
the share of permanent placements in all outflows from welfare in column 3, we
observe a small positive, but not statistically significant impact of decentralization.
Figure 2.6 presents the respective dynamic treatment effects. These vary strongly
over time, with a drop in total welfare outflows around the decentralization period
and a trend towards more total and permanent welfare outflows in the medium
run. Yet, the treatment effects are often at the margin of statistical significance. The
share of permanent outflows increases up to post-reform year four before returning
to the baseline level in the final period of the sample window. We conclude that
decentralization had no overall impact on the placement quality in the five years
following the reform, although positive tendencies exist especially in later periods.
Increasing welfare outflows may take a longer time to materialize and require a
long-term analysis.
Figure 2.6: Dynamic Treatment Effects of Decentralization on Monthly Welfare
Outflows
Notes.– The figure depicts coefficients and their 95%-confidence intervals
of yearly leads and lags of the decentralization indicator from a stock-flow
regression of the monthly outflow out of welfare or the share of permanent
outflows as given by equation (2.2). The year 2011 is the baseline category.
The regressions include a full set of dummies for job centers and months.
Standard errors are clustered at the job center and the month level.
2.5.5 Further Considerations
Current literature is increasingly emphasizing the importance of caseworker char-
acteristics in the job matching process (see, for instance, Behncke et al., 2010;
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Hainmueller et al., 2016). Job placements will suffer from decentralization if de-
centralized job centers reduce the number of caseworkers or replace experienced
ones with less qualified employees. In our example, however, this is not the case.
Due to the law regulating decentralization reform, about 95% of the administrative
and caseworker staff in the decentralized job centers continued to work for the
communal job centers after their reform. The law (§6c SGBII) also prescribed that
employees and civil services should retain their prior wages and hierarchy levels.
A report for the German parliament confirmed that districts complied with the
provisions of the law. Consequently, changes in the job-center personnel cannot
explain permanently reduced job finding.
Moreover, differences in the controlling systems possibly contribute to lower job
finding through decentralized job centers. As described in Section 2.2, centralized
job centers are under the technical supervision of the FEA while decentralized job
centers are not. The FEA imposes a very rigorous target control system on cen-
tralized job centers that include target agreements, performance dialogs, ranking
comparisons, and strict monitoring by a federal institution (Vorstand der Bun-
desagentur für Arbeit, 2014). Decentralized job centers have to report to state
ministries but otherwise remain independent. They are members of a voluntary
benchmarking program organized by the Federation of German Cities and Com-
munes. Interview partners from ministries and job centers suggest that the FEA
controlling system has tighter requirements with a stronger emphasis on quantita-
tive outflow measures. Hence, it may partially explain why centralized job centers
generate more job placements.
2.6 Sensitivity Analyses
The results presented thus far suggest that decentralization decreased job finding
while increasing the inflows into job creation schemes. We now assess the validity of
these inferences in detail. There are three major concerns. First, the common trends
assumption might be invalid due to the state-quota system inducing a selection
problem or due to unobserved labor market shocks. Second, the SUTVA might
be violated if labor markets extend beyond district borders and spatial spillovers
between treated and non-treated districts arise. Third, our findings might rely on
overly restrictive functional form assumptions and other model specifications. In
the following paragraphs, we provide a battery of analyses to address each of these
concerns. We will focus on our main outcome, the outflow of unemployed into jobs,
and provide results for the other main outcomes in Appendix A.6.4 (Tables A.6,
A.7, and A.8).
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2.6.1 Selection and Unobserved Shocks
Table 2.9 summarizes the results of several checks regarding selection and the com-
mon trend assumption. The first column analyzes the districts’ decision to apply
for decentralization. Districts might have based this decision on some time-varying
characteristics that are unobserved in our data. If applicants and non-applicants
differ significantly from each other with respect to such characteristics, our de-
centralization estimates are biased. We control for this bias using two alternative
specifications. First, we restrict our control group to the non-successful applicants
and re-estimate equation (2.1). If this restriction drives our decentralization estimate
down to zero, our main specification has estimated an application rather than a
decentralization effect. However, column 1 of Table 2.9 demonstrates that our esti-
mated decentralization effect on job finding is still –9% using the restricted control
group. As this result is very similar to our initial estimate, we take this analysis
as initial evidence that applicants and non-applicants do not differ systematically
from each other.
Variable (1)
Denied
appli-
cants as
only
controls
(2)
Denied
appli-
cants as
treated
(3)
Over-
subscription
subsam-
ple
(4)
Conditional
DiD
(5)
Triple dif-
ferences
Decentralized −0.087 *** −0.006 −0.095 *** −0.095 *** −0.071 ***
(0.025) (0.017) (0.021) (0.020) (0.019)
R-squared 0.943 0.960 0.952 0.952 0.975
Districts 75 294 309 330 334
Observations 8722 34395 36093 38550 78096
Notes.– * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Decentralized is a dummy equaling 1
for districts with decentralized job centers and 0 otherwise. Standard errors given
in parentheses are clustered at the job center and the month level. Welfare data
from November and December 2011 excluded due to errors. Regressions include
the stocks and flows of welfare recipients and vacancies as well as a full set of
dummies for job centers and months.
Table 2.9: Effect of Decentralization on Log Monthly Flows Into Jobs for
Different Control and Treatment Groups
As an alternative control for self-selection at the district level, we define the
unsuccessful applicants as a placebo treatment group and compare their outcomes
to the districts that did not apply for decentralization, i.e. we estimate the effect of
being interested but not actually being decentralized. If this estimate is statistically
significant, applicants likely differ from non-applicants. As column 2 of Table 2.9
presents, the applicant status has no such effect on job finding. Thus, we conclude
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that applicants and non-applicants do not differ with respect to relevant unobserved,
time-varying characteristics.
Successful and non-successful applicants will differ from each other if state
governments in the state-quota process successfully chose those applicants for
decentralization that were most likely to reap the greatest benefit from decen-
tralization. Our estimated negative main decentralization effect would then be
biased upwards and the true effect was even more negative. We assess this kind
of selection by restricting our sample to states where the number of applicants
exceeded the state quota (‘oversubscription’) and governments had an actual choice
among applicants. Selection would be an issue if estimating equation (2.1) results
in less drastic reductions using the ‘oversubscription’ subsample than when using
the baseline sample. Column 3 of Table 2.9 shows that the decentralization effect
for the ‘oversubscription’ subsample is incredibly similar to our baseline estimate.
Hence, selection into decentralization at the state-level is also unlikely.
We now ask whether job centers of the treatment and the control group have ex-
perienced different labor market trends for reasons unrelated to the formal selection
process. If observable characteristics influence the unobserved trends, reweighing
our observations with regard to these characteristics should reinforce the validity
of common trends assumption and should affect our baseline decentralization
estimates significantly. Therefore, we employ a variant of the conditional difference-
in-differences estimator (see Heckman et al., 1997, 1998, and Appendix A.6.1 for
details). As column 4 of Table 2.9 indicates, our estimates of the decentralization
effect on job finding hardly change due to the balancing. This implies that labor
market trends of decentralized and centralized job centers did not depend on
observable characteristics.
Finally, districts from the treatment and the control group could have experienced
systematically different unobserved labor market shocks that affect our estimates.
The widespread geographical distribution of treated districts makes such an event
unlikely. Here it is important to note that the particular German institutional setup
allows for an explicit assessment. We exploit data available due to job seekers
usually receiving public employment services from local employment offices and
not from the job centers during their first 12 months of unemployment.11 These
local but federal employment offices are centrally organized throughout Germany
which were neither directly nor indirectly affected by the decentralization of job
centers. However, district-specific labor market shocks and trends should affect
the unemployed registered at local employment offices and job seekers registered
at job centers alike. We use the unemployed registered at the local employment
offices in the same district as an additional comparison group to control for time-
varying district-specific shocks in a triple differences estimation (see, for instance,
11This is because unemployed receive unemployment insurance benefits during this period.
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Gruber, 1994). As shown by column 5 in Table 2.9, the decentralization effect on
unemployment outflows from job centers is again estimated to be about –10%.
This result affirms that our preferred specification is not biased by unobserved
district-specific shocks, and that the common trend assumption is likely to hold.
2.6.2 Spatial Spillovers
We now address the second major concern to validity, potential spillovers among dis-
tricts. In particular, we worry about indirect treatment effects on non-decentralized
job centers and labor market regions extending beyond district borders. Table 2.10
summarizes the results for this analysis.
Variable (1)
Controls without
non-treated
neighbors
(2)
Spatial lag in X
(3)
X measured at
commuting zone
level
Decentralized −0.093 *** −0.100 *** −0.133 ***
(0.022) (0.021) (0.023)
R-squared 0.954 0.958 0.956
Districts 222 334 334
Observations 25915 39018 39018
Notes.– * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Each column presents a different estimation of
equation 2.1. The outcome variable is the monthly log outflow out of unemployment into
jobs. Decentralized is a dummy equaling 1 for districts with decentralized job centers and
0 otherwise. Standard errors given in parentheses are clustered at the job center and the
month level. Regressions include the stocks and flows of unemployed and vacancies as
well as a full set of dummies for job centers and months.
Table 2.10: Assessing SUTVA and Spatial Effects: Effect of Decentralization
on Monthly Log Flows Into Jobs for Different Model Specifica-
tions
Indirect treatment effects arise if job finding in decentralized job centers declines
and if centralized job centers in neighboring districts advise their clients on the
‘additional’ unmatched vacancies. This would increase job finding in centralized
districts bordering a treated region. Such spillovers would dilute the control group,
violate the SUTVA, and exaggerate our estimate of the true reduction in job
finding. To examine this problem, we drop all units from the control group that
border districts with decentralized job centers. If any spillover effects dilute our
baseline specification, this change to the control group should reduce the size of the
estimated treatment effects. However, column 1 of Table 2.10 confirms our baseline
estimate. Combining these results with our analysis on geographical lock-in in
section 2.5.1, we conclude that decentralization did not generate spillover effects
on non-decentralized districts.
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In spite of this finding, there might be more complex spatial patterns with
spillovers reaching beyond direct neighbors. For instance, job search competition
is larger if unemployment is large and vacancies are scarce in nearby districts. To
capture such effects, we estimate a standard spatial lag in X model (see LeSage
and Pace, 2009). We add spatial lags for each explanatory variable in our baseline
regression using row-normalized inverse distances between districts as respective
spatial weights. As column 2 of Table 2.10 shows, the inclusion of spatially lagged
covariates does not alter our results. To confirm this finding, we aggregate the stocks
and inflows of unemployed and vacancies on the commuting-zone level based
on the commuting zones definition by Kropp and Schwengler (2016). Column 3
presents our estimation of equation (2.1) employing the commuting-zone variables.
The result reveals that our decentralization effect remains very similar to previous
estimates, albeit with a slightly higher magnitude of about –12%. In summary, none
of the three spatial approaches used suggests that geographic spillovers invalidate
our main findings.
2.6.3 Model Misspecification
Finally, we analyze whether our model imposes improper functional form assump-
tions and whether standard errors are calculated correctly. To relax the functional
form assumption, we run a synthetic control approach following Abadie and
Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie et al. (2010). This method is purely data-driven and
non-parametric. Nevertheless, its results, described in Appendix A.6.2, are highly
similar to those derived from our stock-flow model in equation (2.1). We conclude
that our model does not impose improper functional form assumptions.
Next, we examine whether our standard errors are correctly sized and do not
overstate the significance of our findings. Serial correlation in particular, which we
deal with by two-way clustering standard errors at the district and month-level,
is a frequent concern in difference-in-differences studies (Bertrand et al., 2004).
Following Huber et al. (2013), we run an empirical Monte-Carlo simulation on
our subsample of non-treated districts. In each replication, we randomly assign a
placebo treatment status to 41 districts and then estimate the effect of the placebo
treatment as in our main model. With 5,000 replications, we find significant pseudo-
decentralization effects at the 5% level in less than 5.9% of all cases. Furthermore,
we inspect the distribution of the resulting t-statistics for the decentralization
coefficient to confirm it follows a normal distribution (Figure A.6 in Appendix A.6).
Both checks yield adequate results and ensure that the size of our standard errors
is correct.
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2.7 Conclusion
Few studies have examined the impact of decentralizing public employment ser-
vices although numerous countries have implemented such reforms. In this paper,
we provide the first comprehensive analysis of public employment services under
decentralization and their effect on job finding and labor market policies. Exploiting
a unique German policy experiment that transferred 41 federally-managed job
centers to the district level, we estimate that job-center decentralization reduced job
finding by approximately 10% within five years. Estimates from dynamic models
point to the existence of a reform transition period lasting for about one year.
Nevertheless, efficiency losses are still sizable even five years after decentralization.
We uncover that decentralization leads to a significant increase of inflows into job
creation schemes while leaving overall ALMP participation unchanged. Moreover,
decentralization temporarily reduced benefit sanctions in the first year after de-
centralization, likely reflecting a transitional process. In contrast, we do not find
evidence for higher quality placements or increased geographical lock-in of job
seekers. Finally, we can rule out a difference between the two provider types driven
by caseworker quality or quantity.
The persistent drop in job finding combined with the increased use of job creation
schemes indicates that local politicians possibly utilized decentralization to shift
fiscal costs from their own to the national budget. Local administrations have
tangible financial benefits from job creation scheme participants in the form of
public goods, while the federal government primarily bears the costs of program
participation and subsequent unemployment.
The decentralization reform had substantial impacts on public budgets. Assum-
ing outflows into non- or self-employment remained unaffected, average unem-
ployment duration in decentralizing job centers increased by about 3 months. Since
benefit and accommodation payments amount to about 820 euros per unemployed
person per month (see Weber et al., 2014, p. 4), these figures imply additional
costs of about 2,500 euros per unemployed. On average, 27,000 persons register as
new unemployed at the 41 decentralized job centers each year, not accounting for
re-entries after ALMP measures or very short employment spells (see Hofmann
and Stephan, 2016). Thus, a conservative estimate is that the 2012 decentralization
caused additional annual costs of at least 66 million euros. Further fiscal burdens
arise from prolonged job counseling, additional ALMP participations and foregone
tax revenues.
Our findings are informative for policy makers considering to reform and decen-
tralize public employment services. Canada, Denmark, Italy, and other countries
have undergone significant decentralizations in the past but cannot evaluate the
impact of their reforms because they lack a proper treatment-control-group design.
Other countries, including Germany, have been discussing whether to (further)
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decentralize their public employment services. Our findings imply that decen-
tralized job centers may fail to internalize the effects of their strategies on total
public budgets and individual reemployment rates. More generally, they strongly
suggest the importance of carefully studying the incentive effects arising from
decentralization, as ill-designed institutional structures may significantly reduce
the job centers’ matching efficiency.
Therefore, this analysis should serve as a starting point for further research
distinguishing the impacts of decentralization under alternative financing rules
and division of competences. Additional research is also necessary to study the
internal structures and strategies adopted by centralized and decentralized job
centers in more detail. Moreover, the interaction of localized provision modes with
the political sphere is clearly under-explored. Finally, long-term effects extending
beyond the temporal constraints of this paper, as well as alternative outcome mea-
sures, such as re-employment wages and match durations, will help to understand
the consequences of decentralization. The decentralization of public employment
services remains a crucial topic for future research.
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3 Fueling Fiscal Interactions: Commodity
Price Shocks and Local Government
Spending in Colombia
3.1 Introduction
In the past four decades, decentralization has been a focal point of policy reform
in many developing countries, including South American nations. Policy advisors
such as the World Bank and the OECD have advocated the delegation of more
fiscal autonomy concerning both public expenditures and revenues away from the
central government to local governments, including municipalities. More autonomy
of local governments opens up the possibility of local fiscal interactions.
To fully understand the consequences of decentralization, reliable estimates of the
extent of strategic fiscal interactions of local governments are crucial, because strong
interactions may imply externalities and therefore inefficiencies (e.g., Caldeira et al.,
2014). On the revenue side, tax competition has received considerable interest and
raised concerns that uncoordinated fiscal autonomy may lead to a race to the
bottom of tax revenues. Far less is known about local fiscal interactions on the
expenditure side, especially in a developing country context.1 Strategic competition
in expenditures may differ from strategic tax competition (e.g., Wildasin, 1988),
so existing empirical evidence on tax interactions does not necessarily carry over
to expenditure interactions. Despite the scarcity of evidence, local expenditure
spillovers are frequently discussed in policy debates. For example, local policy-
makers are often concerned that too generous local welfare spending will draw in
welfare migrants from surrounding regions (see Figlio et al. (1999) for an analysis
of welfare competition at the level of US states). Neighboring regions may then
save public funds at the expense of the local taxpayers of the focal jurisdiction.
Such considerations may lead to an underprovision of certain public goods if local
governments are responsible.
Expenditure interactions may also arise if local policymakers engage in yardstick
competition and mimicking of peers.2 Understanding the way local governments
1As an illustration, Google Scholar finds 30,000 papers for “tax competition” but only around 600
results each for “expenditure competition” or “spending competition” (September 2016).
2The website of the mid-sized municipality Fresno in Colombia suggests that policymakers
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interact in terms of public expenditures is key for implementing development
policies which aim to improve local public spending. If local policymakers mimick
their neighbors, it might be effective to roll out an innovative budget composition
in a local jurisdiction that is used as a benchmark, i.e. that is central in the spillover
network. Then the expectation is that the policy spreads out to other regions. If
public expenditures are strategic complements, decentralized foreign aid to one
municipality may entail fiscal efforts in connected regions and trigger a multiplier
effect (Caldeira et al., 2014; Glaeser et al., 2003). Public expenditure interactions
may be very different for different types of expenditures. Therefore, it is important
to distinguish between various categories of local expenditures.
In this paper, we analyze spatial interactions of different types of local public
expenditures among municipalities in Colombia. Our data covers the universe
of the more than 1000 Colombian municipalities over eleven years from 2000 to
2010 and distinguishes between the eleven most important expenditure categories.
Studying Colombia is highly informative because the country has undergone fiscal
decentralization reforms similar to those in many countries in South America and
the developing world. Colombia is also similar to many Latin American and other
developing countries in that they collect substantial royalties for the extraction of
natural resources and partly allocate them to subnational governments.
The methodological challenge in the literature on spatial spillovers in general and
local fiscal interactions in particular is the identification of causal spatial interaction
effects. These must be separated from spatial autocorrelation that is due to spatially
clustered unobservable factors (Manski, 1993; Gibbons and Overman, 2012; Revelli,
2015). For identification, we exploit the fact that Colombian municipalities receive
royalties that depend on revenues from local oil extraction by private companies.
Higher local oil revenues thus relax the budget constraint of a municipality and
allow an increase in local public spending. To identify expenditure spillovers, we
use exogenous variation in the exposure of municipalities to changing world market
prices for oil due to their endowments with oil resources (as measured before our
time period of analysis). With our spatial panel instrumental variable (IV) estimator,
we control for municipality fixed effects as well as department-specific time fixed
effects. This accounts for any cross-sectional differences between municipalities with
and without oil resources as well as regional business cycle effects while leaving
changes in world market prices of oil for exposed municipalities for identification.
World market prices for oil are arguably exogenous for Colombia as a relatively
small oil extracting country, which is not a member of OPEC, and certainly for
Colombian municipalities.
compete locally: “Municipalities [...] must develop integral systems to generate resources as well as
social and economic development based on three basic variables: competitiveness, productivity and
employment. Competitiveness is understood as the capacity of the municipality to differentiate itself
from the surrounding municipalities to attract investments.” http://fresnoposible.fresnodigital.info/
?page_id=56 (accessed 09/10/2016)
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Our results indicate that spatial interactions of total local public expenditures as
well as local spending in almost all categories are small and not significantly differ-
ent from zero when identifying the spillover effects based on quasi-experimental
variation. The only exception is public spending for sport and recreation, where we
detect significant spatial interactions that can be interpreted as causal. In contrast,
when we use a spatial panel estimator without our additional source of exogenous
variation, as done in most of the literature, the results suggest large and signif-
icant spatial autocorrelation in total local expenditures and almost all spending
categories, even when controlling for municipality and time fixed effects. However,
most of these effects are spurious, as we show by comparison to the consistent
estimation based on the quasi-experimental instrument. Thus, the main method-
ological insight from our analysis is that it is crucial to use additional sources of
exogenous variation for the identification of spatial fiscal interaction effects in a
quasi-experimental approach.3
As spatial interactions are insignificant for total local public spending and most
expenditure types, the main policy insight from our paper is that policymakers do
not need to be overly concerned about a race to the bottom regarding local public
expenditures when pursuing decentralization reform in a developing country.
On the other hand, one should also not expect that innovative local expenditure
policies spread out through mimicking in substantial ways. A potential caveat
is that transfers and royalties that municipalities in Colombia receive are partly
earmarked for spending in specific categories. This might limit the scope for
expenditure interactions in Colombia, although we discuss below that Colombian
local policymakers seem to have significant leeway.
Our approach and results contribute to a small body of emerging literature that
employs quasi-experimental sources of variation for identification in the context of
spatial fiscal interactions. Concerning expenditure spillovers, Baicker (2005) uses
variation in federally-mandated increases in Medicare spending at the state level
in the United States, and Isen (2014) employs referendum decisions in counties
and municipalities in Ohio. While the former author reports considerable spatial
spillovers, the latter does not find any significant interaction effects using his
identification strategy. We largely confirm the last result in a developing country
context and based on a very different source of exogenous variation, but also show
that causal fiscal interaction effects can be identified for the category of sport and
recreation.
In the context of tax competition, the literature using quasi-experimental ap-
proaches has developed more rapidly. Lyytikäinen (2012) uses changes in minimum
property tax rates in Finland for identification, and Baskaran (2014) a fiscal equaliza-
tion reform in Germany. Both authors report that seemingly large tax interactions
3Spatial discontinuity designs also fulfill this request.
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become insignificant when using quasi-experimental variation for identification,
similar to the result of Isen (2014) concerning public expenditures. Other papers
that identify fiscal effects at borders of higher level jurisdictions or language regions
report significant strategic tax interactions (Eugster and Parchet, 2013; Parchet, 2014;
Agrawal, 2015; Agrawal, 2016). It remains unclear whether the inconclusiveness in
the spatial tax interactions literature using additional exogenous variation is due
to the different institutional settings analyzed or whether it can be explained by
differences between the quasi-experimental and spatial discontinuity approaches.
Revelli (2015) mentions that by dropping municipalities with low tax rates from
his analysis, Lyytikäinen (2012) may have excluded the municipalities most likely
to respond to tax competition pressures, which could explain his finding of no
interactions.4
Most of the literature on spatial fiscal interactions does not use quasi-experimental
variation. While that literature is fairly large in the context of tax competition, not
many papers exist on public expenditure spillovers. Case et al. (1993) provide an
analysis at the level of US states. Analyzing spillovers at the municipality-level
provides a much larger policy variation compared to the state- or department-level
mostly employed in the literature (e.g., Baicker, 2005). Moreover, most papers only
analyze few expenditure categories or solely focus on single budgetary items such
as health expenditures (Moscone et al., 2007). Borck et al. (2007) are among the
few authors who use municipality data and distinguish between various spending
categories, although only cross-sectionally.
The literature on fiscal interactions largely ignores developing countries since
large and complete fiscal policy datasets rarely exist in these regions. It is important
to investigate developing countries separately because they are in the focus of
decentralization reform efforts. Additionally, they differ from developed countries
in their forms of decentralization and institutional as well as budgetary constraints.
Akin et al. (2005) investigate health care budgets in less than 30 districts in Uganda
and Arze del Granado et al. (2008) local public spending based on cross-sectional
data from Indonesia. Agostini et al. (2016) and Yu et al. (2016) analyze spatial spend-
ing interactions in China. Caldeira et al. (2014) use a panel of 77 communes in Benin
4To further investigate whether the identification approach influences results within the same
country and institutional setting, it would be interesting to compare our approach using quasi-
experimental variation between municipalities with an approach using spatial discontinuities at the
borders of higher-level jurisdictions. In principle, Colombia could be suitable for such a comparison
as departments also receive royalties from the exploitation of natural resources, potentially providing
a spatial discontinuity setting. However, institutional details complicate such an analysis because de-
partments near oil producing departments may also receive a share of the royalties (“escalonamiento”).
At the municipal level, a similar mechanism rarely applies and if so, it affects all municipalities
within the same department. In our approach we can account for this by using a control variable
(transfers) and department-time fixed effects. Furthermore, departments have much less autonomy
than municipalities regarding taxes and public expenditures in Colombia (Bird, 2012). Given the
institutional and data issues, a spatial discontinuity approach is not within the scope of this paper,
but might be an interesting avenue for future research.
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and report strategic complementarity of local public spending. The significant fiscal
externalities found in Caldeira et al. (2014) question the efficiency of decentraliza-
tion reform in developing countries. In contrast to our paper, the existing literature
in the developing country context does not use quasi-experimental variation for
identification and may therefore overestimate expenditure interactions.5
Our paper is also related to studies using an identification strategy similar
to ours based on Colombian data. Martinez-Vazquez et al. (2017) shows that
local governments in Colombia perform better in providing public goods if more
revenues come from their own taxes rather than oil royalties. He exploits exogenous
variation in oil revenues for identification. Dube and Vargas (2013) investigate effects
of income on civil conflict in Colombia using commodity price shocks.
This paper proceeds as follows: The next section reviews the theoretical literature,
while Section 3.3 introduces the relevant Colombian context. Sections 3.4 and 3.5
present the data and empirical strategy before we discuss our results in Section 3.6.
Section 3.7 concludes the analysis.
3.2 Theory of Expenditure Interactions
There are at least four different reasons why expenditures might be linked among
municipalities. First, yardstick competition (Shleifer, 1985; Besley and Case, 1995)
may induce local politicians to mimic their neighbors’ policies. This is because voters
can assess the quality of their incumbent politician only by observing policies in
neighboring jurisdictions. The theory was originally developed to explain spillovers
in local tax-setting and has been subject to vast empirical tests (see Allers and
Elhorst (2005) for an overview). The mechanism may also apply to local public
spending and result in positive interactions among local expenditures. Yardstick
competition might be particularly relevant in developing countries with elected
local governments like Colombia because information problems are likely to be
comparably severe.6
Second, expenditures may be linked due to competition for attracting a mobile
tax base as suggested by Tiebout-type models (Tiebout, 1956). For instance, munici-
palities could compete for company settlements or highly-skilled workers (Borck
et al., 2007) by investing in their communication infrastructure or education system.
In this case, the interjurisdictional spending is positively correlated. The classic
model of fiscal spillovers by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) shows how local
governments competing for mobile capital will underinvest in public services. Keen
and Marchand (1997) argue that non-coordinated spending of local governments
5Yu et al. (2016) find spatial interactions within, but not across Chinese provinces, which supports
their conclusion that Chinese local leaders engage in tournament competition.
6Faguet and Sánchez (2013) conclude that decentralization reform has made Colombian mayors
more accountable.
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under tax competition may be downward biased relative to the efficient level. They
also posit that the underprovision of public consumption-oriented investment com-
pared to public production inputs is relatively more pronounced. This is because
capital is assumed to be more mobile than households and thus receives a more
favorable treatment by the government.
A third explanation for expenditure interactions is the externality-producing
nature of public investments (Case et al., 1993), which may either be substitutes
or complements to spendings in other regions. The sign of the correlation implied
by this channel is ambiguous: On the one hand, a neighboring hospital might
be sufficient to fulfill the regional demand for health services, making additional
investment in another hospital obsolete. Investments then are substitutes and
expected to be negatively correlated among neighbors. On the other hand, if a road
construction project is supposed to link two municipalities, public local investments
are likely to be complementary and positive expenditure interactions are expected.
Hence, investments likely differ in their external effects, which is why we study
different spending categories separately.
A fourth potential mechanism that could lead to horizontal interactions between
municipalities is competition for bailouts (Baskaran, 2012). Municipal governments
may believe that a higher level government authority might bail them out in case of
an imminent insolvency, but that a budget constraint at this higher level might limit
the scope for bailouts. A municipality’s chances of a bailout and thus incentives to
spend and incur debt then depend on other municipalities’ expenditure and debt
levels, which would lead to horizontal interactions. Municipalities in Colombia
are allowed to incur debt, and this led to municipal debt problems in the 1990s.
However, reforms in 1997 and 2000 introduced strong borrowing and bailout
restrictions for subnational governments, which led to a sizable municipal debt
reduction (Villar et al., 2013). Therefore, bailout expectations may not be as relevant
in Colombia in our period of analysis as they might have been before.
The first two mechanisms discussed above would lead to positive interactions
in local expenditures. The third and forth mechanisms would lead to nonzero
interactions, but the sign is ambiguous in these cases. Using data from German
federal states, Baskaran (2012) estimates that bailout competition leads to positive
interactions as well.
Fiscal competition in developing countries may differ from the case of developed
economies usually studied. Caldeira et al. (2014) emphasize that poor municipal-
ities in developing countries may be restricted in their spending choices. They
develop a model of expenditure competition with a constrained Nash equilibrium.
One implication of the model is that there may be no strategic interactions despite
positive externalities if the level of fiscal resources is insufficient. However, for
the case of Benin, the authors empirically find significant positive strategic inter-
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actions. Colombia is a developing country (GDP per capita: US$6,056), but less
constrained than Benin (GDP per capita: US$762)7, so we expect to find nonzero
fiscal interactions in Colombia as well.
Spatial expenditure reactions may depend on the source of funds used to finance
local spending. In Colombia, transfers municipalities receive from the central
government as well as royalties from the extraction of natural resources are partially
earmarked for spending in specific categories such as education, as detailed in
the next section. Basic theory suggests that earmarking should not have practical
relevance, because local governments can reallocate other funds and adapt other
tax and spending decisions to offset the intended allocation. Thus, a block grant
nominally earmarked for a certain category should have the same effect as a
general increase in local taxpayers’ income of the same amount (see Smart, 2007,
for an overview on the incentive effects of grants). However, the empirical literature
provides evidence that block grants are disproportionately used for public spending
rather than for tax cuts and also tend to stick to the spending category they are
intended for, a phenomenon known as the flypaper effect (e.g. Hines and Thaler,
1995; Inman, 2008). If earmarking in practice limits the freedom of municipalities in
their spending decisions, this may attenuate the scope for expenditure interactions
between municipalities in Colombia.
In summary, from the theory we expect to find nonzero and most likely positive
expenditure interactions between municipalities in Colombia, although interactions
might be smaller than in fully developed economies or in settings with fewer
institutional constraints.
3.3 Fiscal Policy in Colombian Municipalities
Colombia has been a politically, administratively and fiscally centralized country
throughout most of its history. However, as many other Latin American countries,
Colombia phased in important policies towards decentralization starting from the
mid 1980s (Acosta and Bird, 2005; Alesina et al., 2005; Chaparro et al., 2005). The
goal of the reforms was to delegate more functions to lower tiers of government,
namely Colombia’s 32 departments and more than 1000 municipalities. To this
end, in 1991, a new constitution introduced a number of provisions regarding the
delegation of administrative and fiscal duties from the central to the lower tiers of
government. Among them were increases in the amount of transfers to local and
regional governments and rules on how to spend these resources. In 2001, a unified
system to transfer the resources to the lower tiers of government called General
System of Participations (SGP by its initials in Spanish) was created.
7Figures for 2015, given in current USD and retrieved from World Bank (2017).
45
3 Commodity Price Shocks and Local Government Spending in Colombia
In fiscal terms, these reforms have made the municipal sector the most important
subnational level of government in Colombia (Acosta and Bird, 2005). Munic-
ipalities possess three main sources of income. First, municipalities obtain the
aforementioned transfers from the central government. Second, municipalities have
their own revenues coming from local taxes, mainly the property tax and the ICA
tax (a tax on industrial and commercial activities). Third, municipalities receive
royalties from the exploitation of natural resources. Each source accounts roughly
for 50%, 30%, and 5% of the total amount received by the municipalities respectively
(Bonet et al., 2014). The remaining revenue comes from non-tax income such as
capital dividends, leased property or fees from construction permits.
Royalties from oil extraction are particularly relevant for this analysis as we use
them as our source of exogenous variation. In Colombia, private companies extract
oil and pay a fixed share of their oil revenues (in Colombian Pesos) as royalties
according to this formula:
Royaltyi,t = outputi,t×world market pricet× exchange ratet×fixed royalty rate (3.1)
The municipalities where the oil was extracted (as well as oil ports) receive a
share of these royalties according to a fixed schedule defined by law with rates
decreasing in local oil output. For those municipalities extracting oil or with an
oil port, royalties are very important, accounting on average for 23% of their total
revenues.8 Oil is the most important natural resource in Colombia and accounts for
69% of total royalties, followed by coal with 23% (Martinez-Vazquez et al., 2017).
There are several rules on how to spend the revenues from the different sources
of income. According to a law introduced in 20019, 4% of the federal SGP transfers
were to be used for special purposes like food programs in schools or indigenous
reservations. Of the remaining 96%, 58.5% had to be used for education, 24.5% for
health, and 17% for a general purpose category, including water and sanitation,
housing, and agricultural investments, among other items. In 2007 a new change
in the legislation10 gave continuity to the transfers’ system, marginally modified
the growth rate of the transfers to each category, separated water and sanitation
from the general purpose category and assigned it 5.4% (leaving 11.6% for general
purposes). After the allocation of the transfers to the different categories, the
ministries in charge distribute them between the municipalities. In terms of own
revenue, municipalities have almost complete freedom to spend the money they
8We use the term royalties to refer to direct royalties, i.e. royalties that directly go to the oil
extracting municipalities. An oil extracting municipality with average (or median) oil output receives
32% of the total local oil royalties and the department receives 52% in this case. Another 8% are
allocated to municipalities with oil harbors. The National Royalty Fund distributes the remaining
oil royalties (indirect royalties) to municipalities that apply for specific investment projects and get
approved (Bird, 2012). Our control variable “transfers” also accounts for these indirect royalties.
9Law 715, 2001
10Law 1176, 2007
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collect in taxes. The only provision in this regard is a minor mandatory contribution
to the regional environmental agency.
Concerning expenditure of direct royalties from the exploitation of natural re-
sources, legislation mandates that municipalities spend at least 75% in the achieve-
ment of coverage goals for health and child mortality, education, and water and
sanitation.11 In the following, we refer to the corresponding spending categories
health, education and water as earmarked categories. If all the goals are achieved,
local governments can use all the royalty revenues as desired.
The rules on how certain revenue types have to be spent could restrict spending
decisions and limit the potential for expenditures interaction across municipalities
(Bird and Smart, 2002). However, the evidence shows that local governments
in Colombia possess considerable leeway in the composition of their spending.
Drazen and Eslava (2010) demonstrate that incumbents increase expenditure in
public goods that are more visible to citizens in a bid to increase their vote shares
before elections. According to Sánchez et al. (2004, p. 3), municipalities may relocate
their own-source revenues to circumvent conditionalities and conclude that “there
is considerably more fungibility in grants than a strict reading of the law would
suggest”. Thus, municipalities can direct some of their investments according to
their own desires, leaving the door open for expenditure interactions between local
governments.
Nevertheless, according to Perotti (2005), the central government’s attempt to
force municipalities to spend disproportionately more on categories such as health
and education has prevented local governments from using resources in other
areas like social programs that might have had a larger impact on local poverty
reduction and therefore on the welfare of individuals. By identifying categories of
public spending where local governments in Colombia compete, our paper informs
policymakers which spending areas local governments are focusing on, in turn
revealing local electorates’ preferences.
The case of Colombia is informative in a more general context because many
developing countries, especially in Latin America, implement similar institutions
regarding royalties from natural resources and their allocation to subnational gov-
ernments. According to Viale and Cruzado (2012), Bolivia, Brazil and Peru allocate
a share of income of extractive industries directly to subnational governments, as
Colombia does. Ecuador and Venezuela also use payments from the exploitation of
natural resources to compensate producing regions. In all the countries mentioned,
there are restrictions on how the income from the extraction of natural resources
may be used. Otto et al. (2006) note that it is standard practice in most African and
Asia-Pacific countries to levy royalties on mineral extraction.
11The minimum coverage goals for health, child mortality, education, and water are respectively:
100% of health insured population, less than 1% of child mortality before reaching the second year of
life, 90% of school enrollment, and 70% of the population with access to clean water.
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3.4 Data
To pursue our analysis of spatial interactions in municipal spending, we require four
types of data: Public spending data at the local level, varying over time and across
municipalities; information on municipalities’ oil extraction; time-series data on
world market oil prices; and cross-sectional geo-information on the municipalities’
locations to construct spatial weighting matrices.
We retrieve local public spending data from the Center for Studies on Economic
Development (CEDE) of the University de los Andes, which in turn collected
the information from government agencies. The data contain a wide range of
government-related variables from the full universe of Colombian municipalities
over the years 1993 to 2013. This dataset has previously been used to analyze
the effects of fiscal decentralization (Soto et al., 2012), income shocks (Dube and
Vargas, 2013) and political stability (Acemoglu et al., 2013), among other studies.
As full coverage is not given for all years and to avoid large differences in the
institutional setting, we focus on the period between 2000 and 2010. This results in
a strongly balanced panel of 1093 municipalities over eleven years. The data allow
us to differentiate between eleven major spending categories at the municipality
level. We express all variables in real per capita Colombian Pesos (COP) with the
base year 2008 if not stated otherwise.
Figure 3.1a shows the largest expenditure categories in terms of their average
shares in total local public spending. About 31% of a municipalities’ expenditures
go into the area of health. Spending in water and basic sanitation as well as in education
account for another 17% and 14%, respectively. The remaining funds are spent
on sport and recreation, housing, attention to vulnerable groups, municipal facilities,
agriculture, disaster prevention, community development, justice and security as well as
further smaller categories. Figure 3.1b shows that there was an increase in local
real expenditures since the year 2000, mirroring the Colombian decentralization
process. Table B.1 in Appendix B.1 describes the spending categories in more detail
and provides some examples.
The data are very complete and have an exceptionally high quality for a de-
veloping country context. We did not detect systematic trends of missing values
and had to impute less than 3% of the observations by linear intrapolation (see
Appendix B.2). From CEDE, we also retrieve the total transfers to municipalities
from the central government and other sources and the municipalities’ total and
rural population.
We retrieve information on oil extraction by private companies within a munici-
pality from the Ministry of Finance. To get an exogenous indicator of oil extraction,
we create a binary variable equaling one if oil was extracted on a municipality’s
soil at any time during the years 1990 to 1999, the decade preceding our analysis.
To obtain a measure of the value of the oil extracted, we use the oil basket price
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Figure 3.1: Local public expenditures of Colombian municipalities
Note: Relative shares of spending types per
capita, averaged over 2000-2010.
a. Relative shares of expenditure categories
Note: Annual averages across categories,
2000-2010.
b. Expenditure levels over time
in USD provided by OPEC. According to Colombian law,12 the exchange rate used
to calculate the value of the royalties is the average of the daily official exchange
rate between the USD and the COP calculated by the Financial Superintendence of
Colombia. Thus, we convert oil prices into COP applying the official exchange rate.
Finally, we collect the cross-sectional geographical information on municipalities
from the Colombian Geographic Institute Agustin Codazzi (IGAC).
Table 3.1 summarizes descriptive statistics of the major variables from the final
sample. Figure 3.2 depicts the spatial distribution of local total public expenditures
in Colombian municipalities and suggests spatial clustering. In our econometric
analysis we investigate whether this is due to causal expenditure interactions.
3.5 Empirical Strategy
3.5.1 Model of Spatial Expenditure Interaction
To estimate the effect of neighboring municipalities’ expenditures on the spending
of the focal municipality, we consider the following model:
Yi,d,t = δWY + η oili × poilt + WXθ + Xi,tβ+ αi + τd,t + ε i,d,t (3.2)
where Yi,d,t is the natural log of local public spending per capita (total spending
or one of the spending categories) in municipality i of department d in year t.
WY denotes the spending in neighboring municipalities (total or in the respective
category), where W is a spatial weighting matrix. The coefficient of interest is the
spatial autocorrelation coefficient δ, which measures potential spatial interaction
effects. The dummy oili equals 1 if oil was exploited within a municipality between
12Law 141 of 1994, law 756 of 2002.
49
3 Commodity Price Shocks and Local Government Spending in Colombia
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std. dev.
Total Expenditures 507.92 441.15
Health 158.87 89.92
Water and Basic Sanitation 85.84 137.99
Education 71.46 101.10
Housing 14.05 32.87
Sport and Recreation 13.99 23.53
Agriculture 12.77 22.40
Municipal Facilities 12.32 29.90
Attention to Vulnerable Groups 10.60 17.08
Justice and Security 5.59 12.45
Disaster Prevention 3.99 14.21
Community Development 1.72 7.94
Federal Transfers 390.42 268.46
Oil production status (1990-99) 0.06 0.24
Population in thousand inhabitants 39.08 235.98
Rural population share 582.27 236.14
Notes: The table provides averages over the entire sample period 2000-
2010. Expenditures and transfers are real per capita values in thousand
2008 COP. N = 1093 municipalities.
Figure 3.2: Total expenditures per capita in thousand COP by quartiles in 2005
(550, 6090]
(398, 550]
(303, 398]
[106, 303]
No data
Notes.– In all figures, “No data” refers to entities not used in our analysis, see Appendix B.2.
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1990 and 1999. poilt is the natural log of the world market price of oil converted to
real COP. The interaction of the previous two variables captures differential effects
of oil price changes on oil endowed and non-endowed municipalities primarily due
to the receipt of royalties. The vector Xi,t collects additional time-variant covariates:
Total spending of a municipality on all categories other than the focal category Y,
population of the municipality and its square, the local share of the rural population,
and transfers from higher levels of government (including indirect royalties). We
also include the spatial lags WX of all X variables (Spatial Durbin Model). This
accounts for the possibility that changes in neighboring municipalities such as
population growth directly influence a focal municipality’s spending. Municipality
fixed-effects αi capture time-invariant unobserved factors such as the distance to
the capital, geographical size and climatic conditions. Department-year fixed effects
τd,t control time variation that affects all municipalities within a department in
the same way such as regional economic shocks and changes in department-level
regulations and funding.
3.5.2 Oil Price Shocks as Exogenous Variation in Local
Spending
In Equation (3.2), WY is endogenous due to the simultaneous influence of neigh-
boring municipalities on one another. Furthermore, unobserved factors that change
over time with variation within departments are contained both in WY and the
error term ε i,d,t. To deal with this endogeneity, our empirical strategy employs
an instrumental variable approach that isolates exogenous variation in municipal
spending.
Similar to Acemoglu et al. (2013), we exploit oil price shocks that affect the
finances of some but not all municipalities. We do so by combining information
on oil endowments of municipalities with variation in oil prices on the world
market over time to extract quasi-experimental variation in spending changes of
neighboring municipalities.
In the 2SLS estimation, the first stage is given by
WY = γ oili × poilt + Woil × poilt λ+ WXκ + Xi,tρ+ α fi + τ fd,t + ϑi,d,t (3.3)
where neighboring oil endowment (in the 1990s, before the period of analysis)
interacted with current international oil prices in real COP (Woil × poilt ) is used as
the instrument for neighboring spending.
The validity of the instrument relies on two requirements. First, the combination
of oil endowment and oil prices must be correlated with local spending (instrument
relevance). Oil prices are linked to local spending as Colombian municipalities
receive royalties from oil extracted on their soil, relaxing their budget constraint.
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Federal law mandates royalty payments depend on extracted quantities as well as
current world market prices (see Section 3.3). Figure 3.3 suggests that oil production
in the 1990s (Panel a) corresponds well with oil royalty income in the middle
of our period of analysis (Panel b). Therefore we expect the instrument to be
relevant for total local public expenditures and its components. To obtain a strong
instrument, the movements of the global oil price must provide sufficient variation
to substantially influence spending of oil-endowed municipalities. Depicting the
evolution over time, Figure 3.4 illustrates that oil prices were highly volatile over
the sample period and, thus, introduce plenty of variation.
Figure 3.3: Geography of oil production and municipal oil revenues
Oil extraction
No oil extraction
No data
a. Municipalities producing oil (1990-1999)
(0.357, 0.904]
(0.084, 0.357]
[0.003, 0.084]
No oil extraction
No data
b. Shares in municipal income coming from
oil royalties by terciles conditional on posi-
tive oil royalties (2005)
Concerning single expenditure categories, municipalities are supposed to spend
75% of the royalties for the earmarked categories health, education and water
as long as coverage goals have not been achieved, as explained in Section 3.3.
Therefore, we expect the instrument to be strong for the earmarked categories.
As mentioned before, royalties can potentially also be used for expenditures in
non-earmarked categories, so we test the strength of the instruments for these
categories as well. Statistical tests of the strength of the instrument are satisfactory
for total expenditures and the earmarked categories but not for most non-earmarked
categories; we discuss this in more detail in Section 3.6.1.
The second requirement for a valid instrument is that conditional on the co-
variates included, the IV must not correlate with the error term in the second
stage (exogeneity assumption). As we control for municipality fixed effects, time-
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Figure 3.4: Oil price in 2008 real COP (OPEC basket)
invariant differences between oil-endowed municipalities and other municipalities
are accounted for. The spatial distribution of oil reserves is not under the control of
local governments. Potentially endogenous efforts in oil discovery do not affect our
identification because we use oil extraction indicators from 1990 to 1999, the decade
preceding our period of analysis. Moreover, municipalities cannot manipulate the
extracted quantities as private companies negotiate drilling contracts with the
central government. Federal law regulates the royalties paid to the municipalities.
Regarding the oil price on the world market, municipalities in Colombia are price
takers. Although crude oil is the country’s most important export good, Colombia
does not rank among the major exporting nations and is not part of OPEC.
The spatial lag of a municipality’s total expenditures (excluding the focal cate-
gory Y) is a potentially important control variable, because oil royalties received
by neighboring municipalities are likely to influence their spending not only in
the focal category but also in other categories. If these other spatially lagged ex-
penditures were omitted from the regression, our instrument could potentially
be correlated with the error term in the second stage equation. In Section 3.6.3,
we explore the sensitivity of our results when we treat total expenditures and its
spatial lag as endogenous and when we include spending in all categories and
their spatial lags separately in the regression.
In Table 3.2, we assess the structural similarity of oil-endowed and non-endowed
municipalities using an additional source of data, the Colombian census conducted
in 2005. The comparison shows that the two groups of municipalities are obser-
vationally equivalent concerning demographic and socio-economic characteristics.
The good balance indicates that both municipality types are very similar except
for their oil endowments, which supports our identification strategy. Figure 3.3a
depicts the two groups of municipalities within a map of Colombia. This map
reveals that oil extracting municipalities are somewhat clustered but sufficiently
scattered over the country to obtain broad coverage of our instrument.
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Table 3.2: Treatment - Control Balance in Observables
Mean t-test
Variable Endowed Non-endowed p-value
Poverty rate 0.69 0.69 0.92
Informal employment share 0.95 0.95 0.51
Economic dependence share 0.54 0.54 0.81
Illiteracy share 0.28 0.29 0.46
Child labor share 0.06 0.06 0.59
Children w/o access to education, share 0.14 0.13 0.54
Children w/o access to care services share 0.21 0.20 0.56
Household share w/o health insurance 0.28 0.30 0.35
Household share w/o access to health 0.09 0.09 0.42
Household share w/o access to clean water 0.36 0.37 0.66
Household share w/o a sewage system 0.31 0.34 0.21
Household share w/o floors 0.19 0.21 0.27
Household share w/o walls 0.07 0.07 0.63
Notes.– All rates and shares refer to the households within a municipality. A municipality is defined
as endowed if oil was extracted on its soil at any time between 1990 and 1999. Means are unweighted
averages across municipality groups. The table shows p-values for t-tests of equal means between the
two groups. Variables based on the Colombian 2005 census (cross-section).
Our estimation approach differs from the traditional spatial IV estimator. The
latter uses all spatially lagged covariates WX to instrument the neighboring en-
dogenous variable WY, in our case spending (see Anselin, 2008, for an overview).
However, whether all WX can be excluded from the second stage equation is
questionable (Gibbons and Overman, 2012; Revelli, 2015). For example, population
changes in neighboring municipalities may well have a direct effect on spending
decisions of the focal municipality or be correlated with spatially clustered time-
varying unobserved factors, which would invalidate the traditional instruments.
Therefore, we safely control for all WX in the second stage equation. The only
excluded instrument is the interaction term of oil endowment of neighboring mu-
nicipalities before the observation period with the international oil price. As we
control for the interaction of the oil endowment dummy of the focal municipality
with the oil price as well as municipality and department-time fixed effects in the
second stage, the argument of exogeneity of this selected instrument is very strong.
In Section 3.6.2, we compare the results from our preferred IV estimator with those
from the arguably inconsistent traditional IV estimator.
To construct the spatial weighting matrix, we use the 5-nearest neighbor (NN)
criterion as our main approach because the average municipality has five neighbors.
As robustness checks, we compare the results to estimations using 4-NN and 6-NN
matrices and an economic proximity matrix based on municipalities’ average per
capita income. To safeguard against potentially remaining serial correlation in the
error term even after eliminating the unobserved fixed effects, we report standard
errors clustered at the municipal level throughout the paper.
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We contrast our IV results with the traditional spatial econometric estimators that
use the Quasi Maximum-Likelihood method to estimate fiscal spillovers (Anselin,
2010). We follow the model selection procedure suggested by Elhorst (2010). Starting
from OLS and going through the Spatial Lag (SAR), Spatial Error (SEM) and Spatial
Durbin Model (SDM), we test hypotheses on whether and what kind of spatial
terms should be included. The tests indicate that the SDM is the preferred model
and thus confirm our initial model choice.13 Thus, we estimate Equation (3.2)
by QML, but without the oil-related variables.14 For the QML-estimation to be
consistent, knowledge of the true data generating process including the spatial
weights must be assumed, as criticized by Gibbons and Overman (2012). Therefore,
we prefer our IV estimator and present results from the potentially inconsistent
QML estimator for comparison only.
3.6 Empirical Results
3.6.1 Results Based on the Quasi-Experimental Instrument
Table 3.3 reports the main (second stage) results from estimations of Equation (3.2)
using our preferred IV estimator. In this table we present estimates for total local
public expenditures, the three categories earmarked for spending royalty income,
all non-earmarked categories combined, as well as the specific non-earmarked
category sport and recreation. The first row contains the estimated parameter of in-
terest δ, which captures spatial public spending interaction. Our results indicate no
significant spatial interactions in total expenditures, the earmarked categories, and
the non-earmarked categories combined. The point estimate of spatial interactions
for total local public spending is particularly close to zero (-0.081). The exception is
the category of local public spending for sport and recreation, where local govern-
ments respond significantly to spending decisions of neighboring municipalities;
we discuss this result in more detail below.
The control variables confirm expectations. Higher total expenditure as a mea-
sure of a municipality’s budget (excluding the focal spending category to avoid
endogeneity) increases spending in the focal category as well. Similarly, higher
transfers from higher levels of government increase total spending and spending in
all categories. When the population in a municipality grows, total public expendi-
13Detailed results are available from the authors on request.
14Moreover, for computational reasons, the year fixed effects are not department-specific in the
QML estimations. This does not drive our results, though, because the IV estimates remain similar if
we use country-level instead of department-level year fixed effects, see Section 3.6.3. In order to make
our IV and QML estimations comparable, we report estimations based on the same sample in our
tables. Therefore, we do not apply the bias corrected QML estimator suggested by Lee and Yu (2010)
because this would imply losing one year of observations. However, we obtain similar results when
implementing the bias correction. The small impact of the bias correction can be explained by our
relatively large sample size.
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Table 3.3: Main Estimation Results of Expenditure Interactions
Total Health Education Water Non-earmarked Sport & rec.
W_y -0.081 -0.140 0.282 0.358 0.492 1.257**
(0.499) (0.540) (0.238) (0.413) (0.663) (0.576)
Oil extraction x oil price 0.302*** 0.405*** 0.921*** 0.505*** -0.277** -0.185
(0.080) (0.117) (0.135) (0.157) (0.115) (0.129)
Total excl. y 0.260*** 0.418*** 0.587*** 0.108*** 0.555***
(0.035) (0.034) (0.034) (0.031) (0.030)
W_total excl. y 0.087 -0.059 -0.147 -0.047 -0.702**
(0.129) (0.114) (0.261) (0.076) (0.303)
Population 6.175*** 4.625 16.350*** -7.207** 0.808 0.003
(2.359) (3.373) (4.668) (3.001) (3.168) (3.823)
Population squared -2.996*** -2.120 -7.159*** 3.191** -0.768 -0.287
(1.088) (1.564) (2.161) (1.402) (1.482) (1.781)
Share of rural population -0.596*** -0.377** -1.147*** 0.027 -0.182 0.139
(0.144) (0.166) (0.244) (0.164) (0.176) (0.165)
Transfers 0.029*** 0.012*** 0.020*** 0.017*** 0.027*** 0.012***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
W_population 0.444 -2.140 -10.329 1.750 0.166 -4.647
(5.820) (6.037) (8.862) (6.878) (6.885) (8.744)
W_population squared 0.136 1.119 5.378 -0.628 0.294 2.520
(2.678) (2.806) (4.028) (3.189) (3.336) (4.173)
W_share of rural population -0.508 -0.082 -0.637 0.177 0.003 0.086
(0.430) (0.428) (0.516) (0.408) (0.357) (0.334)
W_transfers 0.008 -0.006 -0.009 -0.016 -0.004 -0.014*
(0.018) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.026) (0.009)
Observations 12,023 12,023 12,023 12,023 12,023 12,023
Number of municipalitites 1,093 1,093 1,093 1,093 1,093 1,093
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Department - year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
AP F-statistic excl. inst. 16.26 22.25 83.01 24.09 9.035 13.99
Notes: Second stage IV estimation results of spatial expenditure interactions. The columns show results for different local public
expenditure variables Y. Excluded IV for WY: Endowment of neighboring municipalities with oil in the 1990s interacted with the
current world market price for oil. 5-NN spatial weighting matrix. Expenditures and transfers are real per capita values in 2008 COP.
All continuous variables in logs. The Angrist-Pischke (AP) first-stage F-statistic of the excluded instrument is also reported. Standard
errors given in parentheses are clustered at the municipality level. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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tures increase, but at decreasing marginal rates, which is likely due to economies
of scale. A larger share of rural population decreases local public spending.
The F-statistic of excluded instruments is sufficiently large in all columns of this
table except for the non-earmarked composite. Table 3.4 presents the corresponding
first stage results in more detail. As expected, the interaction of oil extraction of
neighboring municipalities with the oil price is positive and highly significant
when total spending or the earmarked spending categories of the neighboring
municipalities are the dependent variables in the first stage. This indicates that
municipalities spend more on the earmarked categories and also spend more in total
when they receive more royalties from the extraction of oil. Thus, they largely seem
to follow the federal laws regulating the spending of royalty income. In contrast,
neighboring municipalities spend less on the non-earmarked categories when they
receive more oil royalties. A potential explanation is that the increased expenditures
in earmarked categories triggered by higher royalty income directs attention of
local politicians and thus spending away from non-earmarked categories.15
Table 3.4: Main Specification: First Stage
W_total W_health W_education W_water W_non-earmarked W_sport & rec.
Oil extraction x oil price -0.020 0.035 -0.034 0.026 -0.045 -0.095**
(0.031) (0.042) (0.058) (0.061) (0.049) (0.041)
W_Oil extraction x oil price 0.281*** 0.361*** 0.980*** 0.582*** -0.291*** -0.322***
(0.070) (0.076) (0.108) (0.119) (0.097) (0.086)
Total excl. y -0.004 0.011 -0.000 0.010** -0.014*
(0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.005) (0.008)
W_total excl. y 0.234*** 0.462*** 0.622*** 0.109*** 0.522***
(0.019) (0.021) (0.023) (0.015) (0.019)
Population -0.121 -0.221 -0.063 1.305 -0.918 0.632
(1.279) (1.507) (1.650) (1.513) (1.908) (1.467)
Population squared 0.127 0.155 0.226 -0.596 0.458 -0.270
(0.600) (0.702) (0.770) (0.710) (0.901) (0.687)
Share of rural population -0.032 -0.066 -0.228*** -0.094 0.121 0.042
(0.058) (0.063) (0.083) (0.081) (0.075) (0.074)
Transfers 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.003** -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
W_population 8.399*** 3.912 11.793*** -4.401 6.386* 7.630***
(2.279) (3.008) (3.567) (3.094) (3.423) (2.935)
W_population squared -3.867*** -1.835 -4.501*** 2.103 -3.287** -3.797***
(1.062) (1.404) (1.654) (1.443) (1.599) (1.363)
W_share of rural population -0.691*** -0.586*** -1.685*** -0.458*** 0.070 0.178
(0.121) (0.135) (0.181) (0.147) (0.149) (0.140)
W_transfers 0.036*** 0.012*** 0.021*** 0.020*** 0.039*** 0.008***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 12,023 12,023 12,023 12,023 12,023 12,023
R-squared 0.069 0.042 0.212 0.126 0.049 0.113
Number of municipalities 1,093 1,093 1,093 1,093 1,093 1,093
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Department - year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
AP F-value excl. inst. 16.26 22.25 83.01 24.09 9.04 13.99
Notes: First stage IV results; the second stage is reported in Table 3.3. Expenditures and transfers are real per capita values in 2008 COP. All
continuous variables in logs. The Angrist-Pischke (AP) first-stage F-statistic of the excluded instrument is also reported. Standard errors given in
parentheses are clustered on the municipality level. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
15For the strength of the instrument, it is only important that it is strongly correlated with spending
of neighboring municipalities; the sign of the relationship is irrelevant.
57
3 Commodity Price Shocks and Local Government Spending in Colombia
Table B.2 in Appendix B.1 shows the second-stage results for all single non-
earmarked categories, where each row represents a separate estimation for the
indicated category. We only present the most relevant coefficients and statistics in
the columns. For most of these non-earmarked categories, the F-statistic indicates
that the instrument is weak, except for the categories sport & recreation and munic-
ipal equipment. Thus, our identification strategy allows us to identify the presence
of expenditure interactions for total expenditures and the earmarked categories as
well as for the two non-earmarked categories mentioned. For municipal equipment,
we do not find significant spatial spending interactions.16
For the category of sport and recreation, the point estimate of the significant
coefficient of spatial interaction is larger than one, indicating an explosive process.
When the five nearest neighboring municipalities increase their spending for sport
and recreation on average by 1%, this causes the focal municipality to increase its
spending in the same category by 1.25%. Given that municipalities spend a compa-
rably small share of their total budget for sport and recreation (see Figure 3.1a), a
temporarily explosive pattern during our period of analysis is not implausible.17
However, the finding of an instable spatial process should be regarded with caution
for two reasons. First, a t-test fails to reject the hypothesis that the coefficient is
smaller than one (p-value: 0.33), so we do not rule out that the process is stable.
Second, when using certain alternative spatial weighting matrices in robustness
checks reported in Section 3.6.3, the point estimate of the coefficient drops below
one. Figure B.1 in Appendix B.1 shows that municipal spending on sport and recre-
ation is clearly clustered both at the beginning and end of our period of analysis,
which is consistent with the presence of fiscal interactions, but it is unclear weather
these interactions are explosive during this time period.
As there is no spatial interaction in total local spending, the significant interaction
in the spending category sport and recreation reflects a change in the composition
of the local budget. The finding of fiscal interaction in this area reflects the impor-
tance of sports and recreational activities all over Colombia.18 At least three factors
may explain the presence of expenditure interactions in this spending category.
Firstly, because this category includes items such as playgrounds or sports fields
and instructors, these expenditures are very visible to the local voters and could
therefore be used by incumbent local politicians to secure votes in future municipal
elections, as argued by Drazen and Eslava (2010). Because of its visibility and voters’
16There appears to be weak evidence of significant fiscal interactions also in the category of
spending for justice and security, but this result must be interpreted with caution because of the
weak instrument for this category.
17The literature on spatial competition in local public welfare spending occasionally reports spatial
interaction coefficients larger than one as well (Figlio et al., 1999; Saavedra, 2000).
18Case studies indicate that Colombian municipalities devote a high proportion of resource
royalties to areas like entertainment and sports complexes (Gaviria et al., 2002). We additionally run
separate estimations for different regions of Colombia and find that the statistically and economically
strongest spatial interactions in spending for sport and recreation occur in the east of the country.
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awareness, spending in this category may be used primarily in yardstick competi-
tion. Secondly, positive interactions could also arise because of complementarities
in expenditures in this category between neighboring municipalities. For example,
neighboring municipalities might cooperate in certain sports events or programs or
jointly build and use sports stadiums. A third reason for the interaction could be
competition between municipalities to attract a mobile tax base. For example, bigger
and better recreational facilities might attract businesses to the municipality that
value employee wellbeing. In this case, municipalities have an incentive to respond
to expenditures of their neighbors in this category. Each of these explanations is
consistent with the positive estimated interaction effect.
3.6.2 Classical Spatial Econometric Approaches
For comparison with our preferred IV estimates, Table 3.5 presents the estimation
results using the traditional QML estimator with municipality and year fixed
effects. Based on this estimator that does not exploit quasi-experimental variation,
the results suggest highly significant spatial autocorrelation between neighboring
municipalities in total local public expenditures as well as all the earmarked
categories and the combined non-earmarked categories (as well as sport and
recreation).19
19This also holds when we use the SAR or SEM models or different weighting matrices.
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Table 3.5: QML Results of Expenditure Interactions
Total Health Education Water Non-earmarked Sport & rec.
W_y 0.182*** 0.116*** 0.148*** 0.126*** 0.147*** 0.0685***
(0.0147) (0.0157) (0.0158) (0.0148) (0.0148) (0.0148)
Total excl. y 0.262*** 0.433*** 0.587*** 0.116*** 0.534***
(0.0350) (0.0343) (0.0367) (0.0304) (0.0263)
W_total excl. y -0.000665 0.0537 -0.00902 0.0198 -0.0635
(0.0357) (0.0390) (0.0455) (0.0199) (0.0389)
Population 6.910*** 4.293 19.30*** -5.039 1.138 1.479
(2.453) (3.619) (4.936) (3.502) (3.164) (3.237)
Population squared -3.360*** -1.994 -8.497*** 2.200 -0.959 -1.001
(1.129) (1.672) (2.281) (1.642) (1.470) (1.495)
Share of rural population -0.501*** -0.313* -0.986*** 0.0308 -0.0938 0.261*
(0.147) (0.170) (0.246) (0.152) (0.159) (0.150)
Transfers 0.0283*** 0.0135*** 0.0177*** 0.0165*** 0.0271*** 0.0101***
(0.00259) (0.00330) (0.00330) (0.00361) (0.00359) (0.00299)
W_population -4.206 -9.690* -8.972 7.029 1.196 4.388
(4.083) (5.759) (7.909) (6.884) (5.558) (6.673)
W_population squared 2.284 4.705* 4.887 -3.101 -0.462 -2.115
(1.873) (2.664) (3.668) (3.191) (2.575) (3.099)
W_share of rural population -0.00124 0.138 -0.101 0.255 0.116 0.423
(0.240) (0.267) (0.310) (0.312) (0.308) (0.280)
W_transfers -0.00285 -1.20e-05 -0.0156** -0.0129** 0.00313 -0.00649
(0.00441) (0.00718) (0.00634) (0.00650) (0.00672) (0.00545)
Observations 12,023 12,023 12,023 12,023 12,023 12,023
Number of municipalitites 1,093 1,093 1,093 1,093 1,093 1,093
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: QML estimation results of spatial expenditure interactions. The columns show results for different local public expenditure
variables Y. Expenditures and transfers are real per capita values in 2008 COP. All continuous variables in logs. Standard errors given in
parentheses are clustered on the municipality level. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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From these estimates alone, it would be tempting to conclude that significant
spatial interaction is present in all these categories of local public expenditures.
However, the results from using exogenous variation in the previous section show
that this spatial autocorrelation does not indicate causal effects. This methodological
comparison highlights the importance of relying on quasi-experimental variation
in the causal analysis of fiscal interactions.
As another comparison, Table B.3 in Appendix B.1 provides results from the
traditional spatial IV estimator that uses spatial lags of all control variables as
excluded instruments. As argued in Section 3.5.2, we expect this estimator to
be inconsistent, like the QML estimator. The results suggest significant spatial
interaction in local spending on education. However, our preferred IV estimator
that uses quasi-experimental variation suggests that this correlation is spurious.20
3.6.3 Robustness Checks
We assess the sensitivity of the results from our preferred IV estimator by employing
alternative weighting matrices and specifications. Table 3.6 summarizes the first set
of robustness checks for total local public expenditures (first two columns) and local
spending for sport and recreation (two rightmost columns). In the first three table
rows, we vary the number of neighbors included for constructing the k-nearest
neighbor weighting matrix. In row four, we use an inverse distance weighting
matrix where distance is defined in an economic way by the difference in income
between municipalities.21 The results show that fiscal interactions in total spending
are always insignificant.22
The point estimates also indicate strong spatial interactions in sport and recre-
ation in all specifications. Only when using the 6-NN matrix, the coefficient loses
statistical significance, suggesting that interactions cannot be detected when neigh-
bors are too far away. When using the 6-NN matrix or the inverse income distance
matrix, the point estimate of spatial interaction drops below one, which indicates a
stable process, in contrast to our baseline result of an explosive process. Thus, while
we find robust evidence of strong spatial interactions in local public spending for
sport and recreation, we cannot decide with high confidence whether this process
is stable or explosive.
In some spending categories, a number of municipalities report zero spending in
some years, for example in the sport and recreation category. To avoid dropping
these municipalities, in the baseline specification we add one to all spending
20Furthermore, when using the traditional spatial IV estimator, the point estimate of the spatial in-
teraction in total local public spending increases, but remains insignificant, and the spatial interaction
in sport and recreation loses significance.
21Geographical distance is not suitable in the Colombian context because municipalities vary
extremely in their area size, see Figure 3.2.
22This also holds when we run separate estimations for different regions within Colombia using
our baseline 5-NN weighting matrix.
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Table 3.6: Robustness Checks: Different Matrices and Specifications
Total expenditures Sport & recreation
Specification W_y AP F-statistic W_y AP F-statistic
4-NN weighting matrix -0.010 13.09 1.188** 17.49
(0.499) (0.539)
5-NN weighting matrix -0.081 16.26 1.257** 13.99
(0.499) (0.576)
6-NN weighting matrix -0.132 22.87 0.859 23.30
(0.496) (0.533)
Inv. income distance w. matrix 0.526 11.17 0.729* 7.976
(0.403) (0.408)
Inverse hyperbolic sine -0.121 16.94 1.284** 13.14
(0.501) (0.602)
Country-level year fixed effects -0.294 18.68 1.188*** 28.40
(0.548) (0.375)
Controlling for conflict -0.099 15.82 1.263** 13.32
(0.510) (0.594)
Notes: Each row represents a different model specification and shows the spatial autocorrelation
coefficients for total local public spending and sport & recreation as dependent variables (separately
estimated) with the corresponding Angrist-Pischke (AP) first-stage F-statistics of the excluded instrument
to the right. Excluded IV for WY: Endowment of neighboring municipalities with oil in the 1990s
interacted with the current world market price for oil. Expenditures and transfers are real per capita
values in 2008 COP. All continuous variables in logs. Standard errors given in parentheses are clustered
on the municipality level. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
variables before taking the logarithm. In the robustness check in row five of Table
3.6, we use the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation instead (again using our
preferred 5-NN weighting matrix). This function is similar to the logarithm, but
defined for values of zero as well. The results are very similar to the baseline
results.
To present a specification fully comparable with our QML estimation, we also
run a version of our main IV model where year fixed effects replace department-
year fixed effects. The estimates show that this alternation leaves the main results
unchanged.
Next, we assess whether the Colombian civil war that started in the 1960s influ-
ences fiscal interactions. The violence was particularly severe during the late 1990s
and early 2000s. Civil conflicts in a certain region could induce spatially correlated
public spending patterns. Therefore, we include civil war related casualties in
the municipality and its spatial lag as additional covariates in our model. Follow-
ing Dube and Vargas (2013), we retrieve the casualties variable from the Conflict
Analysis Resource Center (CERAC) which provides the most comprehensive and
independent source of civil war related data. However, the coefficients of these
additional controls turn out to be insignificant, and the inclusion of the variables
does not affect the estimates of the fiscal interaction coefficients. The inclusion of
the variables does not alter the findings in the QML specifications either (results
62
3.7 Conclusion
not tabulated). Thus, our results are robust to the inclusion of civil war related
variables.23
Another concern regarding our model could be potential endogeneity of the
total expenditure covariate and its spatial lag. Although we exclude the category
of interest Y from the total expenditure controls to avoid a mechanical correlation
with the dependent variable, one may be concerned about simultaneity of choices.
Therefore, for these two potentially endogenous covariates, we consider using
their one-year time lags as excluded instruments, assuming that the error terms in
Equation (3.2) are serially uncorrelated. On this basis we conduct a Hausman test of
endogeneity of the two covariates.24 The test results indicate that the null hypothesis
of exogeneity of total expenditure and its spatial lag cannot be rejected. Therefore,
our more efficient baseline estimator that treats these controls as exogenous is
preferred.
We also estimate more flexible specifications where we include each of the ten
other public spending categories and their spatial lags separately in the model
as control variables when a specific spending category is the dependent variable.
Table B.4 in Appendix B.1 reports the results; we do not report the coefficients
of the spatial lags of the spending categories for brevity. The findings confirm
that there are no significant spatial interactions for the earmarked categories, and
they also replicate the size and significance of the interaction in spending for
sport and recreation.25 In summary, we conclude that the main results are robust
to specification choices as long as identification relies on our quasi-experimental
instrument.
3.7 Conclusion
This paper investigates spatial interactions in local public expenditures in a devel-
oping country applying a quasi-experimental identification strategy. We use panel
data on the universe of the more than 1000 municipalities in Colombia over a period
of eleven years to estimate spatial interaction effects in total local expenditures
and the eleven most important spending categories. For identification, we rely on
exogenous variation in the exposure of individual municipalities to shocks in oil
prices on the world market due to their local endowment of oil resources.
For total local public expenditures and most spending categories, the estimates
23As we cannot rule out potential endogeneity of civil conflict, we do not employ this covariate in
our main specification but only in this robustness check.
24We run this test for the spending category of sport and recreation, where we found the significant
spatial interaction effect.
25However, this specification does not seem to be suitable for the health category, where the
standard error and the point estimate increase a lot. When we treat all expenditure categories and
their spatial lags as endogenous and instrument them with their on-year time lags, the point estimate
of the spatial interaction in health spending decreases to -0.08, so the large point estimate seems to
be biased.
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of spatial interactions are small and not significantly different from zero. The
notable exception is public expenditures for sport and recreation, where we detect
significant and large causal spatial interactions. In contrast, when we use spatial
econometric estimators that do not employ quasi-experimental variation, we find
strong and significant spatial autocorrelation in almost all categories of public
expenditures. Our comparison of methods shows that this spatial autocorrelation
cannot be interpreted causally. Therefore, our results highlight the importance
of using additional exogenous sources of variation for causal inference on fiscal
interactions. This is in line with the results of Isen (2014) concerning spending
competition in Ohio and of Lyytikäinen (2012) regarding tax competition in Finland
although we do find evidence for significant causal expenditure interactions in the
spending category of sport and recreation.
Our findings have important policy implications. The results demonstrate that
fiscal decentralization in developing countries does not necessarily lead to a general
race to the bottom concerning local public expenditures due to strategic interactions
of local governments. Our findings lend support to decentralization reform in
developing countries as they alleviate concerns about inefficiencies implied by fiscal
externalities. On the other hand, one also cannot expect that innovative expenditure
policies rolled out in a municipality, perhaps in the context of decentralized foreign
aid, will spread out substantially to neighboring municipalities through mimicking
of local expenditure policy.
A caveat is in order when applying our findings to other countries. Although
Colombian municipalities have considerable leeway in their expenditure decisions,
spending rules for royalties and transfers may restrain fiscal interactions in Colom-
bia. Nonetheless, many developing countries have similar institutions in this respect.
Countries such as Bolivia, Brazil and Peru directly allocate a share of income from
extractive industries to subnational governments, as Colombia does. Most countries
that levy royalties on the extraction of natural resources also impose restrictions on
how this income can be used. Thus, the case of Colombia is illustrative in a larger
context.
More research is needed to investigate whether our findings hold in other coun-
tries with and without income from natural resources, the allocation of royalties to
subnational governments and earmarking. Future research should also explore dif-
ferent quasi-experimental setups and spatial discontinuity designs, ideally within
the same institutional environment, and additional fiscal variables. Another av-
enue for further research is to address the significant causal spatial interactions in
local public expenditures for sport and recreation we found and to examine the
mechanisms leading to this novel empirical result.
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Efficiency: Evidence from Mass
Privatization
4.1 Introduction
Privatization is a widely-used policy tool for governments worldwide. Global priva-
tization revenues reached a record high of $319.9 billion in 2015 (Megginson, 2017).
While economists have made tremendous progress in understanding potential
consequences of privatization, privatization decisions themselves remain a black
box. In this paper, I study whether governments follow the principles of economic
efficiency when deciding which firms they are going to privatize.
Assessing this question offers three major contributions to the understanding
of privatization and government behavior. First, privatization decisions are an
intriguing type of policymaking as benefits arising from it, such as sales revenues,
are dispersed across the population, while potential costs (e.g. job losses) are highly
concentrated in affected regions. This discrepancy allows the opponents of pri-
vatization to organize and campaign more effectively than its proponents. Thus,
existing literature highlights the importance of political processes in the determina-
tion of privatization decisions (Roland, 2002). For instance, Dinc and Gupta (2011)
find that governments privatize strategically to please voters in politically contested
districts or which are in districts home to members of the government. The political
motivation of privatization policies thus raises the question whether there is still a
role to play for economic efficiency arguments in these decisions.
Second, firms’ selection into privatization is non-random if governments sort
more efficient firms into privatization programs. This type of selection would have
a direct consequence for the empirical analysis of privatization outcomes. Brown
et al. (2010) acknowledge that “the most difficult problem is the possibility of
selection bias in the privatisation process”. However, the literature on the effects of
privatization mostly takes these decisions as exogenous, conditional on covariates,
thereby relying on conditional independence assumptions (see e.g. Estrin et al., 2009,
for a review). A profound analysis of privatization decisions helps to understand the
selection of firms into privatization and examine the validity of these assumptions.
Third, I introduce the Treuhand firm surveys, a novel dataset which allows the
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most comprehensive analysis of the German Treuhand privatizations. The Treuhand
privatizations are one of the most ambitious privatization programs in history and
have previously received little attention by researchers.
The Treuhandanstalt (short: Treuhand or THA) was a government agency founded
in 1990, which became the owner of all state-owned enterprises of the German
Democratic Republic (GDR). These enterprises comprised the GDR’s entire indus-
trial sector, among other businesses. Following German reunification, the Treu-
hand’s task was to either transfer ownership to the private sector, or shut down
enterprises if firms were nonviable.1 This task had to be completed by 1994 but
was complicated by the firms’ lack of competitiveness. Analyzing classified data
from the GDR’s planning ministry, Akerlof et al. (1991) found that only one out
of more than 400 examined companies was viable under world-market conditions.
Hence, the choice between privatization and liquidation was highly ambiguous
as the Treuhand had to offer substantial subsidies to potential buyers, commonly
resulting in effectively negative sales prices. The dire need for subsidies left discre-
tionary room for decision makers in determining which firms should be selected
for privatization.
Post-reunification Germany is an ideal setting to study privatization decisions
for at least five reasons. First, the privatization program itself was an exogenous
and unanticipated event. Even expert observers did not foresee the fall of the
Berlin wall in November 1989 and its potential consequences (Redding and Sturm,
2008; Burchardi and Hassan, 2013). Second, the program’s massive scale, spanning
more than 8,000 companies, is unusually large in a single-country context. The
setting thus combines large-scale variation in firm characteristics with an otherwise
institutionally homogeneous environment. Third, the law governing the program
(TreuhG) did not specify precise privatization priorities. Instead, it defined multiple
broad objectives, leaving plenty of opportunities for political agents to exert their
influence. Fourth, direct sales to buyers was the main privatization method, rather
than auctions or voucher programs where interference in the process is more diffi-
cult to attain. Fifth, privatizations in Germany occurred within a stable economic
environment and followed a clear path of reform towards West German standards.
Thus, privatization was credible in the sense of Perotti (1995), making future policy
reversals unlikely. In sum, the Treuhand privatizations offer a unique opportunity
to study large-scale privatization decisions within an almost ideal framework.
I start the analysis by discussing simple productivity-based rules, derived from
economic theory, which describe the decisions of a government solely committed to
economic efficiency. Such rules later provide a benchmark for analyzing observed
behavior. I hypothesize that the economically efficient solution to the government’s
1In fewer cases, the Treuhand also restituted firms to formerly expropriated owners or, for few
specific industries such as public transport, transferred ownership to local municipalities. The federal
government ruled out that it would retain ownership in any of the GDR’s industrial companies.
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decision problem is to privatize firms able to compete under market conditions
and liquidate all others. However, in Germany, this would have translated into
liquidating the entire industrial sector. Thus, to reduce undesirable side effects
from liquidations, governments may set aside a budget to subsidize firms’ pri-
vatization and ensure their future existence. In this case, the government should
give support to those firms where subsidies can have the greatest effect, i.e. to
the firms whose productivity is the highest and closest to subsistence. These rules
provide empirically testable predictions, linking privatization decisions and firms’
productivity.
Exploiting the first comprehensive data set on Treuhand-owned companies, I
descriptively investigate whether the privatization decisions within the Treuhand
program are consistent with these rules. The data stems from the Treuhand firm
surveys, a panel survey which targeted the entire population of Treuhand firms
between 1991 and 2003, providing unusually rich background information for
participating firms. A complementary Treuhand firm census ensures the repre-
sentativeness of the firms participating. Using these surveys, I construct several
productivity performance indicators and match this data with additional regional
and election data. Thereby, I am able to investigate alternative or complementary
explanations for observed privatization patterns.
I find that privatization probabilities are increasing in firm productivity, consis-
tent with the notion that governments take economic efficiency into consideration.
This result is robust to conditioning on finely grained industry, state, and survey
fixed-effects and consistently found for various productivity indicators. Notwith-
standing, economic efficiency considerations explain less than 10% of the variance in
linear models of privatization decisions. I do not detect that privatization decisions
link with patronage, close elections, or potential lobby size. Hence, privatization
decisions in Germany are likely influenced by economic rather than political factors.
The lessons are threefold. First, productivity matters for governments’ privati-
zation decisions – but it does not explain the full story. Second, a highly selective
and complex process determines which public firms become private enterprises.
Hence, any study of post-privatization effects needs to carefully consider a credible
identification strategy to account for endogenous sorting of firms into privatization.
Third, privatization decisions in Germany starkly differ from experiences in other
countries where political factors are found to be highly influential (see, e.g. Gupta
et al., 2008)). These different institutional settings and privatization decision pro-
cesses may also rationalize the broad range of estimates for post-privatization firm
performance across time and states.
Existing literature rarely studies privatization decisions themselves. For instance,
the extensive review by Estrin et al. (2009) only lists the paper by Gupta et al.
(2008). If the selection of firms into privatization is addressed at all, researchers
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commonly emphasize political rather than economic factors as the determinants
of these decisions. Moreover, they focus on the timing of privatization rather than
the selection of firms into the program. Gupta et al. (2008), for example, study the
sequencing in privatizations of 1470 firms in the Czech Republic. Similar to the
theoretical model by Roland (1993), the authors find the timing of firm privatization
to most closely relate to governments aiming at maximizing public goodwill. This
implies that firms with higher current profitability are sold at earlier stages of the
reform to maintain voter’s support for further privatizations.
Dinc and Gupta (2011) study financial and political factors in the privatization
decisions for 259 public non-financial companies in India, of which 49 were priva-
tized between 1990 and 2004. The authors find profitable and low-wage-bill firms
to be privatized earlier, consistent with the public goodwill argument. Moreover,
governments delay privatizations of firms located in districts contested by opposi-
tion parties and never privatize firms in regions home to the minister in charge.
While the analysis emphasizes that political competition and patronage matter for
privatization decisions, it does not cover the role of economic efficiency and firm
productivity.
Szentpèteri and Telegdy (2012) conclude for Romanian privatizations that gov-
ernments sacrifice efficiency enhancements to minimize employment losses. In
their analysis of 2019 state-owned firms, the authors find that politicians sheltered
particularly large and inefficient firms even if they paid low wages and faced
financial problems. De Fraja and Roberts (2009) study the privatization timing
of 147 large firms in Poland. These sequencing decisions were most compatible
with consumer surplus maximization motives rather than maximizing privatization
revenues or minimizing employment losses. The authors do not consider political
factors in their analysis. The political process of privatization though matters for
potential voters. In a survey conducted in 28 post-communist countries, Denisova
et al. (2012) find that citizens’ view on privatization depends on the legitimacy
they attach to the privatization proceedings. For Germany, Hau (1998) analyzes the
decision-making of the German Treuhand based on 1,804 privatization and 1,097
liquidation decisions. Hau (1998) finds a subsidy bias towards large state-owned
enterprises which was increasing over time, consistent with the interpretation of a
growing political intervention risk over time.
Finally, this paper also builds upon the literature on the provision of local
government services, such as water, energy, and waste management. These services
can either be provided by local governments themselves, or contracted-out to private
providers (Lopez-de Silanes et al., 1997). However, these sectors usually occur to be
natural monopolies, making them a special case of privatization. After reviewing
the existing papers on the motives for local privatization decisions, Bel and Fageda
(2007) conclude that “any finding of significance for a particular relationship is
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quite sensitive to the characteristics of the particular study”, emphasizing the need
for further research.
In the following section, I describe the institutional features of German priva-
tization. Section 4.3 discusses theoretical foundations of government behavior in
privatization decisions. Section 4.4 describes the data and descriptive statistics.
The results are presented in section 4.5. I conclude in section 4.6 and highlight
implications for policymakers as well as future research.
4.2 Institutional Background of the Treuhand
Privatizations
This section briefly reviews the origins and main features of the German Treu-
hand privatizations. The fall of the Berlin Wall constituted a collapse of the GDR’s
centrally-planned and publicly-owned economy. As a consequence, the federal gov-
ernment of reunified Germany abolished the planning system, extending all existing
West German market institutions and regulations to the East. The Treuhandgesetz
(TreuhG) and preceding legislation of the last GDR government required that
all state-owned enterprises, representing the GDR’s entire industrial sector, were
transferred to the newly created Treuhand agency. On July 1st 1990, the Treuhand
effectively owned 10,334 companies with about 4 million employees. These firms
composed all listings in the GDR’s registry of publicly owned operations on July
1st 1990 (Kühl et al., 1991).
While other post-communist countries assigned the privatization task directly
to a ministry, the Treuhand was a separate entity with a potentially larger degree
of autonomy. However, the agency was subject to the supervision of the Federal
Ministry of Finance. Its supervisory board was instated by the federal government,
with members of all East German state governments directly represented on the
board. The supervisory board instated the members of the executive board and
controlled their decisions. Hence, political influences were likely through various
formal and informal channels. Horst Siebert (1991), then a member of the German
Council of Economic Experts, therefore warns that the “Treuhand operates under
tight political scrutiny”. The Treuhand created a two-tiered organizational structure,
consisting of the Berlin-based headquarter and fifteen local branch offices. The
headquarter was in charge of all enterprises with more than 1500 employees. Local
branch offices were responsible for companies below this threshold. Furthermore,
the Treuhand’s firm database which allowed for a definite assignment was only
available by April 1991. Despite the uniqueness of the East German setting, the
institutional structure still resembles those found in other countries. In particular,
the setup of the Treuhand Agency is comparable to the Hungarian State Property
Agency (see Carlin and Mayer, 1994, p. 211).
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The Treuhand’s objective was to “privatize quickly, restructure resolutely, and liq-
uidate carefully” (Bundesanstalt für Vereinigungsbedingte Sonderaufgaben, 2003).
After assuming ownership of the GDR’s state-owned enterprises, the Treuhand
transformed them into companies under private law and split up large conglom-
erates into individual firms. The Treuhand then urged firms to compile opening
balance sheets and business plans to find potential buyers. Few exceptions aside, the
main method of privatization was direct sales to potential investors. This approach
is in stark contrast to privatization programs in other transition countries where
auctions and voucher systems facilitated sale processes and impeded external
influences in privatization decisions.
Challenges inherent to the task complicated the Treuhand’s efforts. Overstaffing,
outdated production technologies, the loss of traditional trading partners from
the Soviet Union, and a lack of market experience made East German firms a
hard sell. Simultaneously, a currency reform and union bargaining put substantial
upward-pressure on wages, further deteriorating the business situation (Dornbusch
and Wolf, 1994). Akerlof et al. (1991) illustrate the extent of these problems by
analyzing confidential data from the GDR’s central-planning bureaucracy, cover-
ing the major business conglomerates. These conglomerates frequently exported
products to clients outside the Soviet Union, so the authors combine domestic
resource costs for these products and their respective export revenues in 1989 to
calculate the expenses per revenue unit earned. The results present a dim picture
of the firms’ competitiveness, as all but one of 183 enterprises had production costs
higher than their respective revenues. Consequently, the Treuhand was allowed
to give significant concessions to potential buyers, including capital injections,
debt redemptions, or the assumption of environmental liabilities. These subsidies
commonly resulted in economically negative privatization prices (Hau, 1998).
A substantial organizational challenge was that the agency operated under two
conflicting principles; intending to maximize profits through privatization but
handling the task under the focus of social acceptability. Attempting to reconcile
both goals, the Treuhand asked potential investors for employment and investment
guarantees in addition to the sales price. Nevertheless, fierce protests by workers,
unions, and local politicians accompanied numerous privatization and liquidation
decisions.
The Treuhand closed its operations on December 31st, 1994. In total, 14,000
companies and company subsidiaries were privatized between 1990 and 1994,
preserving 1.5 million out of 4 million jobs. The financial loss from its operations
amounted to 230 billion Euros. The Bundesanstalt für vereinigungsbedingte Sonder-
aufgaben (BvS) took over remaining tasks, such as contract surveillance. Although
the Treuhand was dissolved many years ago, the consequences of its decision are
still present in today’s East Germany (Goschler and Böick, 2017).
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4.3 Economic Efficiency and Privatization
Decisions
When evaluating their portfolios of publicly-owned firms, governments have to
choose which firms to privatize, which ones to liquidate, and which ones to
maintain under public ownership. This section asks how governments should make
their decisions according to economic efficiency and alternative goals. Existing
economic theory typically uses one of two opposing assumptions regarding the
behavior of governments in privatization decisions. The first group assumes rational
welfare-maximizing governments, where welfare is typically the combination of
consumer and producer surplus. This assumption is typical for models in the
incomplete contracts literature on privatization, including Laffont and Tirole (1991),
Schmidt (1996), or Lülfesmann (2007). Inefficiencies in these models do not stem
from the government’s behavior but from asymmetric information between the
government and the firm’s manager, resulting in principal-agent problems.
The second stream of models assumes egoistic governments aiming to increase
their personal benefits and, in particular, their reelection chances. These assump-
tions are common in papers within the public choice tradition, such as Biais and
Perotti (2002). Roland (1993, 1994) argues that privatization policies are subject to a
structural mismatch of political costs and benefits. The political costs of shutting
down an inefficient enterprise are concentrated primarily in workers whose jobs
are in danger. Conversely, the respective gains are widespread across the popu-
lation through the lower need for public subsidies. This mismatch incentivizes
vote-seeking politicians to dismiss economic efficiency and bail-out nonviable firms.
In this spirit, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) and Boycko et al. (1996) assume that
politicians derive utility from (excess) employment. By disregarding costs for the
public, governments of this type directly violate economic efficiency.
In the case of East Germany, the federal government ruled out maintaining state
ownership at all, effectively shrinking its choice set to privatization or liquidation.
Combining both strands of the literature and applying them to the German setting,
I may generalize the government’s problem as
Privatizationi = f (Economics, Politics)
where the decision to privatize firm i is a function of economic and political
considerations. The strength of these factors depends on the specific objectives
pursued by the government.
A government purely committed to economic efficiency is a natural benchmark.
How should it decide between privatization and liquidation within a given portfo-
lio of firms? Assuming that the ability of a state-owned company to survive under
market conditions is best described by its productivity, governments should save
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those firms from liquidation whose productivity is equal to or above the productiv-
ity levels in a competitive market. These firms do not require state subsidies and
should sell at non-negative prices. Firms with lower productivities, and thereby
lower sales values, should then be liquidated. Otherwise, governments would
provide costly bail-outs to nonviable companies. Hence, the government could rank
all firms according to their productivity and privatize those above the competitive
market threshold. As a minimum criterion for an efficiency-oriented agenda, I
presume that more productive firms have a higher probability of privatization
than low-productivity firms. In particular, I expect this pattern to hold for firms
within the same industry, as they face more similar competitive and regulatory
environments.
Additional alterations are necessary to adapt these considerations to the German
context. This is because hardly any East German firm was viable under market
conditions, as found by Akerlof et al. (1991) and explained in section 4.2. Fearing
a de-industrialization of East Germany, the government granted the Treuhand
additional means of financing to cover these losses and subsidize privatizations.
For instance, in 1991, the Treuhand had a financial framework of DM 25 bn and
an additional loan guarantee limit of DM 35 bn at its disposal (Christ and De
Weck, 1991).2 Given the privatization budget, a government committed to economic
efficiency would still privatize the most competitive firms. However, the cutoff
productivity at which a firm is privatized now decreases by the productivity
value of the public sales subsidy. This enables a larger number of firms to avoid
liquidation. To maximize the subsidy budget’s impact, such a policy should support
those firms that are closest to the productivity frontier. Consequently, the previous
rule that more productive firms have a higher rate of privatization should still hold
true, particularly within industries.
In contrast to efficiency-oriented governments, existing literature highlights
political factors determining privatization decisions. In particular, employees losing
their jobs are directly linked and thus can easily form an effective lobby group.
Conversely, beneficiaries of privatizations are more widespread and thus face
difficulties in organizing and campaigning. Governments susceptible to lobbying
will thus always try to prevent liquidations. This effect should be particularly
strong for large firms and firms that are an important employer in their region,
another testable implication for privatization decisions. Similarly, the effect should
be stronger for districts that are highly contested in elections.
Finally, political pressures may give rise to particular time patterns of privatiza-
tion. If the hypothesis embedded in the theoretical model by Hau (1998) is correct,
political pressure for the Treuhand was growing over time as the opposition to liq-
uidations had to organize their lobby first. This implies that the role of productivity
2The official exchange rate set for the Euro’s introduction is 1 DM = 0.51 EUR.
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in privatization decisions should have decreased over time while political factors
should have increased.
4.4 Data
The Treuhand Firm Surveys are the foundations of this analysis and augmented
with additional data sources. The Treuhand Firm Surveys covered all firms currently
or formerly owned by the Treuhand. Starting in April 1991, these firms received
questionnaires every six months which were administered by the Berlin-based
SOESTRA institute (Kühl et al., 1991). From October 1994 to 2003, surveys were
conducted annually. Formally, participation was not obligatory. However, an official
cover letter by the head of the Treuhand asked firms for a reply.
The sampling frame comprises the universe of Treuhand companies from the
Treuhand’s administrative records. Based on the Treuhand’s adminstrative records,
the survey data contains basic background information for all firms, including
four-digit industry identifiers, district of firm location, privatization status, and the
month when Treuhand ownership ended. Firms’ survey responses yield additional
items. Questionnaires consistently covered employment and revenue items, while
other questions varied among survey waves. Moreover, response rates between 20
to 65% (with higher response rates in earlier surveys) implied that not every item
is available for every firm in every wave. For more than 74% of all firms, at least
one valid response to a survey wave is available. Appendix C.4 presents further
background information on the data in addition to evidence on its validity and
representativity.
Consistent with the privatization literature (see, e.g. Frydman et al., 1999; Brown
et al., 2006, 2010), I focus my analysis on industrial companies and drop firms
from the service and agricultural sector from the original sample of 14,961 firms. I
also exclude municipalized and firms restituted to previous owners. Municipalities
became the owners of Treuhand firms only in pre-determined economic activities
related to communal functions, mainly in the energy and public transport industries.
Restitutions were granted based on audited requests by formerly expropriated
owners and followed strict guidelines. Hence, both decision procedures were largely
outside the government’s direct control. Applying these boundary conditions
results in a final sample of 6,338 firms.
Addressing varying question types and response behaviors across different
waves, I collapse all surveys into a cross-sectional dataset and always keep the
earliest response to a given question. For instance, for the employment variable,
this procedure implies that the item is available for 5,315 firms (84%), of which
4,109 (77%) stem from 1991, and the remainder from later waves. I apply a 1%
winsorizing rule to financial variables as they may be prone to measurement error
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Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std. Dev.
Privatization (=1 if privatized at the end of 1994) 0.62 0.49
Annual Revenue per Worker (in 1000 DM) 111.16 186.56
Revenue per Hour Worked (in DM) 59.95 98.08
Gross Value Added per Year (in 1000 DM) 9873.86 24746.56
Share of Employees Working in R&D (%) 2.82 7.24
Vote share of government coalition, second vote (%) 56.79 7.13
Abs. vote share difference, second vote (%) 21.32 11.23
Employee Share Within State (%) 0.07 0.18
Wage Bill Share Within State (%) 0.07 0.17
Notes.– Treuhand Firm Data, own computations.
Figure 4.1: Overall Frequency of Privatization
(Bollinger and Chandra, 2005). Employment variables based on simple counts are
more easily measurable and therefore remain unaltered.
My main variable of interest is the privatization status of a firm in December
1994, when the Treuhand finished its operations. This dummy variable is one
if a firm was privatized and zero if it underwent liquidation. Figure 4.1 shows
that privatized firms account for roughly two-thirds of all firms in my sample.
The main covariate is productivity which I operationalize in three different ways.
The first one is the ratio of total revenues to the total number of employees, as
frequently used in the privatization literature (see Estrin et al., 2009, p. 720, for a
comprehensive review). Secondly, I construct revenues per hour, which additionally
accounts for the number of employees in short-time work. Short-time work is a
government-sponsored wage subsidy program for East German firms aiming to
reduce hours of work (Dornbusch et al., 1992). The third concept is gross-value
added, which excludes expenses for raw, auxiliary, and operating materials from
total revenues. The latter measure is only available from surveys in October 1993
and 1994, which is why it is only used as a supplementary criterion.
The profit variable is defined as earnings before taxes, interests, and depreciation
(EBITDA). These are the total revenues minus the costs for material and labor
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inputs. Financial variables are generally measured in German Mark (DM) and
price-adjusted to the baseline year 2000. Further firm characteristics are directly
retrievable from the Treuhand Firm Surveys. Table 4.1 provides summary statistics
for each variable.
For supplementary analyses, I match the firm surveys with further industry-
level information. These include the productivity levels of East German industries
relative to their West German counterpart in 1990. Heske (2014) provides this
aggregated data for 14 industries. Its reliability confirmed by Glitz and Meyersson
(2017), the data provides a rare measure of the GDR’s productivity distance to the
West German frontier. Moreover, I add the OECD’s classification of technology-
intensive sectors (Hatzichronoglou, 1997).
To test for political channels, I complement the firm information with vote counts
per party from the first national election in reunified Germany, in 1990, from
Bundeswahlleiter (2016). I match vote counts from electoral districts with firms’
municipality to compute local vote shares for the governing party, the governing
coalition, as well as the difference in vote shares between the governing coalition
and opposition parties.
4.5 Empirical Approach and Results
4.5.1 Empirical Approach
This paper takes a descriptive approach to explore the role of economic efficiency
for privatization decisions. I employ binned scatter plots to assess the relationship
between the firms’ privatization status and productivity, the main explanatory
category of interest. The binned scatter plots divide all observations into twenty
equally sized groups according to the explanatory variable and compute the mean
privatization share for each bin. This strategy offers two major advantages. First,
the approach does not rely on potentially implausible parametric assumptions.
Second, it is intuitive and easy to understand. The scatter plots additionally feature
a linear fit curve through the underlying data points, indicating the direction of a
potential correlation.
Simple linear probability models complement the semi-parametric analysis to
account for potentially confounding factors and get a sense of the correlations’
strength. I therefore employ estimation equations of the form
Privatizationi = δProductivityi + β2 IndustryFEi + β3StateFEi + β4SurveyFEi + ε i
(4.1)
where Privatizationi denotes the privatization status of firm i at the end of the
year 1994 (dummy). Most importantly, I regress the privatization status on a firm
productivity indicator, with δ being my coefficient of interest. The regression in-
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cludes industry fixed effects at the four-digit level to account for general industry
differences and for public support programs which may have benefited particular
industries. On average, this leaves about 180 firms per industry cell. State fixed
effects control for state-level policies and geographic heterogeneity. Finally, survey
fixed effects for the year and month of the first appearance within the firm survey
responses capture additional seasonal, macroeconomic, and survey-specific factors.
Estimating the equation by ordinary least squares yields the best linear approxima-
tion of the respective conditional expectation function. The underlying assumption
is that the covariates are the only reason why Productivityi and ε i are correlated.
In the appendix, I confirm the main results using the respective logit models of
equation 4.1. I use Eicker-Huber-White standard errors throughout as a safeguard
against heteroscedasticity.
After analyzing the role of productivity for privatization decisions, I assess
factors that may contribute to both, higher privatization probabilities and higher
productivity. Finally, I analyze alternative explanations for observed privatization
patterns with a special focus on political factors.
4.5.2 Privatization - An Overview
Figure 4.2: Privatization by Industry Figure 4.3: Privatization by State
Figures 4.2 and 4.3 present the privatization shares by industry and state. There
is considerable variation in privatization decisions across industries. The building,
construction, and non-metallic minerals industries experienced particularly high
shares of privatization. In contrast, industries producing leather and shoes, textiles,
or simple metalworkings faced liquidations in more than half of all cases. Privati-
zation shares differ less across East German states, although the figure is slightly
lower in Saxony. A potential explanation is that the leather and textiles industry
which fared particularly badly is more concentrated in Saxony.
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Note: Dots represent binned scatter plot where
the observations are grouped into twenty
equally sized bins. A simple linear regression
line indicates the direction of the correlation.
Figure 4.4: Privatization and Revenues
per Worker
Note: Dots represent binned scatter plot where
the observations are grouped into twenty
equally sized bins. A simple linear regression
line indicates the direction of the correlation.
Figure 4.5: Privatization and Revenues
per Hour
4.5.3 Privatization Decisions and Firm Productivity
This section presents the results of my empirical assessment on the link between
productivity and selection into privatization using two alternative productivity
indicators, revenues per worker and revenues per hour worked. I transform the
productivity variables using the natural logarithm. Applying these transformations
allows for non-linear relationships between productivity and privatization, sym-
metrizes the otherwise highly skewed variables, and ensures a percentage-point
interpretation of respective regression coefficients.
Figure 4.4 and 4.5 present binned scatter plots for the relationship between
productivity and the share of privatized firms. They indicate that privatization
shares are increasing in both, revenues per worker and revenues per hour. Firms at
the bottom 10% of the productivity distribution were privatized in less than 40%
of all cases according to both measures. In contrary, privatized occurred in more
than 65% for firms in the top 10% of the productivity distribution. These patterns
strongly support the role of productivity in privatization decisions.
Ideally, the productivity variables describe the pre-privatization situation to avoid
the scenario that productivity has changed as a result of privatization. Hence, the
variables need to be measured before the privatization process started, which was
in 1991 and thereafter for most firms. Figures C.1 and C.2 therefore repeat the
previous analysis but restrict the sample to firms participating in a 1991 survey
and still in Treuhand ownership. The resulting binned scatter plots for revenue
per worker and revenue per hour show a strong positive relationship between
productivity and privatization chances. They are also remarkably similar to the
previous graph, showing that the timing of measurement likely does not impede
the analysis.
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Note: Rank coefficients calculated using Hazen’s rule.
Smoothing procedure uses an Epanechnikov kernel func-
tion of degree zero.
Figure 4.6: Non-Parametric Analysis Using Percentiles
Another objection to the previous result may suggest that revenues per worker
and revenues per hour do not capture differences in the amount of inputs used
in firms’ production process. I thus repeat the analysis using gross value added
as an alternative productivity indicator. Figure C.3 in the appendix shows that
productivity-privatization nexus found above consistently extends to this measure.
Figure 4.6 repeats the plots of privatization and productivity, using percentile ranks
as a non-parametric safeguard against potential outliers. This graph confirms that
privatization increases in productivity, with the exception of very high productivity
ranks.
Table 4.2: Regression Results: Privatization and Productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
W/o
Controls
Industry
Dummies
State
Dummies
Survey
Dummies
Revenue per worker 0.137*** 0.117*** 0.116*** 0.107***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Industry FE - X X X
State FE - - X X
Survey FE - - - X
R-squared 0.081 0.199 0.203 0.209
Observations 4,655 4,655 4,655 4,655
Notes.– * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Each column presents a different estimation of
equation (4.1). The outcome variable is a dummy equaling 1 if a firm was privatized at the
end of 1994 and 0 otherwise. Revenue per worker is in logs. Robust standard errors given in
parentheses.
Finally, I evaluate whether the main results hold true after controlling for poten-
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tially confounding factors. Table 4.2 presents the results of the linear probability
model for our main productivity indicator, revenues per worker. Each column
represents a separate estimation of equation (4.1). The first column estimates the
relationship without any further controls, suggesting that a 1% increase in revenues
per worker is associated with a 0.14 percentage point (p.p.) increase in the privatiza-
tion probability. This correlation remains remarkably stable in size and significance
even after subsequently controlling for additional factors. Column 2 introduces a
full set of four-digit industry dummies, meaning that the privatization-productivity
relationship is only inferred from within-industry variation. Column 3 additionally
includes state dummies, and column 4 presents results after including survey
dummies. Even after controlling for these factors, a 1% increase in productivity still
increases privatization probabilities by 0.1 p.p.. Table C.1 in the appendix repeats
the final estimation for the alternative productivity indicators and confirm the
previous results. Table C.2, also in the appendix, repeats the same exercise but
using a logit estimation, corroborating the signs and significances in the previous
table.
Assessing the explanatory power of productivity, the coefficient of determination
of the purely productivity-based model only ranges at around 8%. Still, the same
simple linear specification is able to predict 71% of all privatization decisions
correctly.3 Hence, productivity is a major predictor of privatization decision but
does not explain the entire variation in observed privatization patterns, motivating
the search for further determinants.
4.5.4 Potential for Productivity Increases
3To do so, I randomly split the observations into an estimation and validation sample. I run
specification (1) of Table 4.2 on the estimation sample and then predict the outcomes in the validation
sample. I classify firms with predictions above 0.5 as privatized and liquidated otherwise. Comparing
the predicted with the actual outcomes, the proportion of correct predictions then is 71%.
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Note: Industry-level analysis using the classification by
(Heske, 2014). A simple linear regression line indicates the
direction of the correlation.
Figure 4.7: Privatization and Closeness to the Technological Frontier
Absolute productivity measures, as analyzed in the previous paragraphs, may
be uninformative about the potential productivity a firm could achieve by imple-
menting the latest technologies. Next, I thus analyze whether proximity to the
West German frontier at the industry-level in 1990 was relevant for firms’ privati-
zation chances. West Germany provides a useful benchmark of the technological
frontier as it was a competitive market economy highly integrated into global
production chains. Repeating the previous graphical analysis, Figure 4.7 reveals
that privatization probabilities increase in proximity to the technological frontier.
This finding highlights that firms from industries with initially better productive
conditions were more likely to be privatized. I perform a similar analysis using
a broader range of industries classified according to the international OECD cat-
egories of technology-intensive sectors from (Hatzichronoglou, 1997). From this
perspective, low-technology industries have the lowest and medium-high-tech the
highest privatization chances.
An educated workforce and a strong R&D department provide further potential
for future productivity increases, making them considerable factors for privatiza-
tion decisions. Figure 4.9 presents the respective binned scatter plot for the share
of employees with a university degree. Surprisingly, the share of highly-educated
employees is not increasing with privatization shares but even decreasing. At least
three reasons may explain this finding. The finding could stem from industry
effects, a low value of university degrees in East Germany (e.g. due to the politiciza-
tion of university admissions), or from buyers being only interested in acquiring
production capacities, which may not require high-skilled workers. Figure 4.10
plots the same graph for the share of employees working in R&D. Underpinning a
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Note: OECD industry classification of technology-
intensive sectors.
Figure 4.8: Privatization and Sectors’ Technology-intensity
Note: Dots represent binned scatter plot where
the observations are grouped into 20 equally
sized bins. A simple linear regression line
indicates the direction of the correlation.
Figure 4.9: Privatization and Em-
ployee Qualification
Note: Dots represent binned scatter plot where
the observations are grouped into 20 equally
sized bins. A simple linear regression line
indicates the direction of the correlation.
Figure 4.10: Privatization and R&D
Intensity
positive relationship, the graph reveals that companies with more than one-tenth
of employees working in R&D exhibit privatization probabilities above 70%. This
finding speaks against the argument that investor demand would disregard firms
which comprise more than plain production capacities. Higher R&D personnel
shares are more closely associated with privatization than larger numbers of univer-
sity graduates in the workforce, potentially underlining the option value of R&D
personnel for future productivity increases. Table C.3 in the appendix complements
the graphical analysis with respective OLS regressions according which control for
general industry differences, among others. The results support the claim that R&D
personnel but not employee education is associated with privatization decisions.
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Figure 4.11: Privatization and Investor
Inquiries
Figure 4.12: Months Until Privatization
and Investor Inquiries
4.5.5 The Role of Investor Demand
The government and the Treuhand might have had little impact on the decision
between privatization and liquidation as privatization required the availability of a
potential investor. Figures 4.11 and 4.12 are based on industry-level data from the
Treuhand on the number of investor inquiries per firm. To inspect firms’ confidential
financial data, potential investors had to formally request this information, which
is reflected in this indicator. The resulting figures do not suggest any correlation
between investor requests and privatization probabilities as well as the months
until privatization (for the subsample of privatized firms). Thus, firm demand
from outside is neither a predictor of privatization probability, nor of the time of
privatization. Although inquiries are not a perfect indicator of investor interest,
the analysis suggests that there is room for Treuhand- and government-based
explanations of privatization behavior. This is particularly understandable given
the necessity of subsidies and concessions for any kind of firm sale. Thus, the
availability is endogenous and relies upon efforts and concessions made by the
privatizing institution.
4.5.6 The Role of Electoral Competition and Lobby Groups
With productivity likely explaining a significant but rather small part of priva-
tization decisions, additional factors must contribute to the patterns observed.
Following the literature, the prime explanation for privatization decisions is politics.
Political explanations stem from two different channels. First, (re)election concerns
based on previous election outcomes may drive politicians’ behavior and make
them seek influence in privatization decisions to reach higher rates of firm survival
for their electorate. Second, people and organizations (e.g. unions) affected by
privatization decisions may form lobby groups, campaigning against liquidations
and labor shedding. As a consequence, politicians could also resort to take influence
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Note: Dots represent binned scatter plot where
the observations are grouped into 20 equally
sized bins. A simple linear regression line
indicates the direction of the correlation.
Figure 4.13: Privatization and Politi-
cal Patronage
Note: Dots represent binned scatter plot where
the observations are grouped into 20 equally
sized bins. A simple linear regression line
indicates the direction of the correlation.
Figure 4.14: Privatization and Elec-
toral Competition
and please these constituencies.4
Within the election channel, incumbent politicians may be particularly wary
of liquidations in districts where the previous election outcome was particularly
tight. As described in section 4.2, formal and informal ways were available to exert
influence. Alternatively, politicians could use political patronage to reward their
core electorates by preventing liquidations in these districts. The following analysis
addresses both types of election channels.
Figure 4.13 shows binned scatter plots for the privatization share and district vote
share of the government coalition at the federal election 1990. It reveals that priva-
tization shares strongly decrease with higher government votes, a finding which
contradicts the political patronage argument. Figure 4.14 repeats the analysis for
the vote share difference between government and opposition parties as absolute
values, which indicates the outcome tightness of the previous federal election. With
privatization shares decreasing in the vote share difference, it appears that intense
electoral competition induces incumbents to fight for privatizations and avoid
liquidations. However, further analysis unveils that this conclusion is premature
as a simultaneous correlation with productivity exists. Figures C.4 and C.5 in the
appendix repeat the analysis of the election channel but now plotting productivity
on the y-axis. Both, the vote share of the governing coalition and electoral compe-
tition intensity decrease in productivity. Therefore, we can equally conclude that
productivity, rather than election factors, are the driving force behind privatization
decisions. Adding the two election channel variables to the main specification, the
regression results in Table ?? support this argument. The Table provides results for
repeated estimations of equation (1) but now taking political factors into account.
4Moreover, political ideology my drive privatization decisions. The topic is beyond the scope of
this paper but briefly discussed in Appendix C.3.
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Note: Dots represent binned scatter plot where
the observations are grouped into 20 equally
sized bins. A simple linear regression line
indicates the direction of the correlation.
Figure 4.15: Privatization and State
Employment Shares
Note: Dots represent binned scatter plot where
the observations are grouped into 20 equally
sized bins. A simple linear regression line
indicates the direction of the correlation.
Figure 4.16: Privatization and State
Wage Bill Shares
It turns out that productivity remains a strong predictor of privatization, whereas
the election variables in column (1) and (2) are indistinguishable from zero.
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Regarding the lobby group channel, I analyze two main measures for the poten-
tial lobby strength of a company’s workforce. The first one is the employment share
within a given state as a relative measure of the firm’s relevance as a regional em-
ployer. The state-level relationship may be particularly crucial as state governments
are directly represented in the Treuhand’s supervisory board and thus possess
an influential position. The resulting Figure 4.15 does not indicate a relationship
between privatization and the state employment share. The second one is the state
wage bill share of a firm to additionally reflect the wage level as an indicator of
the jobs’ value. Regarding the wage bill share, Figure 4.16 documents moderately
increasing privatization shares for larger potential lobby group strength. Hence, the
graphs only provide a weak foundation for the claim that a larger relative number
of jobs increase firm survival. Both plotted share measures are winsorized at the
5% and 95% level to safeguard the analysis against potential outliers. Figures C.6
and C.7 repeat the graphical analysis using original variables to document that the
interpretation does not rely on my handling of extreme values. The conclusions
from these graphs are complicated by the observation that the variable distinguish-
ing employment and the wage bill share, average gross wages, is also positively
correlated with productivity (appendix, Figure C.8). Hence, higher wage bills due
to higher productivities are an alternative explanation for greater privatization
shares. Columns (3) and (4) of Table ?? provide the respective regression results,
supporting the case that productivity rather than lobby group sizes mattered for
privatization decisions.
Table 4.3: Regression Results: Privatization and Politics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Revenue per worker 0.106*** 0.106*** 0.107*** 0.106***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Employment Share -0.043
(0.035)
Government Vote Share 0.002
(0.002)
Abs. Vote Share Difference 0.000
(0.001)
Industry FE X X X X
State FE X X X X
Survey FE X X X X
R-squared 0.205 0.205 0.205 0.205
Observations 4,572 4,572 4,572 4,572
Notes.– * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Each column presents a different estimation of equation (4.1). The
outcome variable is a dummy equaling 1 if a firm was privatized at the end of 1994 and 0 otherwise. Revenue
per worker is in logs. Lower sample sizes in comparison to Table 4.2 due to item non-response and electoral
district reforms. Robust standard errors given in parentheses.
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4.6 Conclusion
This paper provides one of the first analyses exploring how governments select
firms for privatization. I employ novel data on 6,433 formerly state-owned firms in
one of the world’s most ambitious privatization programs, initiated by the German
government following the collapse of the Berlin Wall. I find that productivity plays
a vital role in governments’ privatization decisions. Political factors including
close elections and the strength of potential lobby groups do not receive empirical
support, contrary to their importance in the existing literature.
The results support economic efficiency as a motive for governments’ priva-
tization decisions, although it is only able to explain a minor share of the total
variation. Also, the findings do not imply that governments promote economic
efficiency beyond the selection of firms for privatizations. Political forces may still
drive privatizations in ways not considered within this paper or not observable to
researchers. It is also possible that political factors did not matter in deciding on
whether to privatize or not, but did play a role in the decision about the extent of
subsidies and other concessions granted to investors – a question beyond the scope
of this paper.
More generally, the analysis demonstrates that the selection of firms into privati-
zation is endogenous. In particular, it may not only be endogenous with respect to
political factors, but certainly is endogenous with respect to initial firm productiv-
ity. Thus, analyzing privatization outcomes necessitates convincing identification
strategies. However, the results caution against the use of close elections as an
instrument for regional privatization levels (Dinc and Gupta, 2011), since local firm
productivity levels potentially correlate with election results.
A major qualification requires further consideration. The institutional environ-
ment certainly plays a crucial role in the formation of selection procedures and
privatization outcomes. Such differences in institutions likely explain different
findings in the study of Indian privatizations by Dinc and Gupta (2011). In return,
these differences may provide a valuable opportunity to better explain the widely
varying effects found in the sizable literature on the impact of privatization for
firms. Future work should try to explore these heterogeneities further, acquire a
deeper understanding of privatization decisions, and link these insights to firms’
post-privatization outcomes.
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A.1 Description of variables
Variable Description
FEA data
Monthly job-finding No. of monthly outflows of unemployed job center
clients into employment
Monthly job-finding rate No. of job-findings divided by the stock of unem-
ployed
Vacancies, inflow No. of newly registered vacancies registered by the
FEA within month
Vacancies, stock No. of registered vacancies registered by FEA
Unemployed, inflow No. of newly registered unemployed job center
clients within month
Unemployed, stock No. of unemployed job center clients
Share: Unemployed <25 yr Share younger than 25 years (15–24 years)
Share: Unemployed >55 yr Share older than 55 years (55–64 years)
Share: Foreign nationals Share of foreign nationals
Flow into ALMP No. of monthly outflows of unemployed job center
clients into any ALMP
Into short-term training Outflows into short-term training
Into subsidized employment Outflows into subsidized employment (wage
subsidies)
Into medium-term training Outflows into medium-term training (>three
months)
Into public job creation schemes Outflows into job creation schemes
continues on next page
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Monthly flow rate into ALMP No. of outflows into any ALMP divided by stock
of unemployed
New sanctions No. of new sanctions issued on job center clients
within month
Monthly sanctioning rate No. of new sanctions issued divided by stock of
unemployed
Stock of sanctions No. of active sanctions for job center clients
Stock of benefit sanctions Sanctions which reduce welfare benefits
Stock of accommodation sanction Sanctions which reduce accommodation benefits
Outflow out of welfare No. of outflows out of welfare receipt
Permanent outflow out of welfare Outflows lasting for at least three months
Share: Permanent outflow Outflow share lasting for at least three months
Destatis data
GDP per capita (in 1,000 euros) Gross domestic product per capita
Public debt p.c. (in 1,000 euros) Municipal debt per capita
Urban district (dummy) Urban district type (German: Stadtkreis)
East Germany (dummy) East Germany (former GDR including Berlin)
Civil labor force (in 1,000) No. of persons in civilian employment plus regis-
tered unemployed
Job-center unemployment rate No. of unemployed job center clients divided by
civil labor force
Employment rate No. of persons in civilian employment divided by
civil labor force
Share: Agriculture Employee share in agriculture
Share: Mining and energy Employee share in mining and energy
Share: Manufacturing Employee share in manufacturing
Share: Construction Employee share in construction
Share: Trade, transp., comm. Employee share in trade, transport, and communi-
cations
Share: Finance and real estate Employee share in finance and real estate
Share: Public and priv. services Employee share in public and private services
Notes.– FEA: Federal employment agency. Destatis: German Statistical Office.
Table A.1: Table of Variables
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A.2 Additional Descriptive Graphs
Figure A.1: District Characteristics Over Time by Job Center Type (Part I)
Notes.– The upper four panels depict monthly stocks and inflows of vacancies and
unemployed for districts in our sample. The lower three panels depict the demographic
composition of the unemployed.
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Figure A.2: District Characteristics Over Time by Job Center Type (Part II)
Notes.– The upper four panels depict monthly inflows into almp measures for districts
in our sample. The lower three panels depict the stocks of sanctions in place by
sanction type and the total inflow of new sanctions per month.
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A.3 Time Trends and Alternative Sample Periods
Table A.2 adds linear time trends to the baseline model specified in equation 2.1
while Table A.3 varies the sample period to ensure our results are not driven by
the transition period around the reform’s implementation.
Table A.2: Difference-in-Differences: Adding Linear Time Trends to the Baseline
Model
(1) (2) (3)
East trend State trends District trends
Decentralized -0.097*** -0.112*** -0.093***
(0.021) (0.019) (0.033)
R-squared 0.999 0.999 0.999
Districts 334 334 334
Observations 39,018 39,018 39,018
Notes.– * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Each column presents a different
estimation of equation 1. Decentralized is a dummy equaling 1 for districts
with decentralized job centers and 0 otherwise. All continuous variables in
logs. Regressions include a full set of dummies for districts and months.
Standard errors given in parentheses are clustered at the job center and
month level.
Table A.3: Difference-in-Differences: Alternative Sample Periods
(1) (2) (3)
W/o 2011 W/o 2012 W/o 2011 &
2012
Decentralized -0.099*** -0.085*** -0.088***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.022)
R-squared 0.958 0.959 0.958
Districts 334 334 334
Observations 35,010 36,043 32,035
Notes.– * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Each column presents a different
estimation of equation 1. Decentralized is a dummy equaling 1 for districts
with decentralized job centers and 0 otherwise. All continuous variables in
logs. Regressions include a full set of dummies for districts and months.
Standard errors given in parentheses are clustered at the job center and
month level.
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A.4 Correlation Analyses of ALMP and Sanction
Effectiveness
Figure A.3: OLS: Correlations of Lagged Entries Into ALMP Measures With Job
Finding
Notes.– The figures depict coefficients and their 95% confidence intervals from a
simple regression of job finding on the lags of monthly inflow into job-creation
schemes. The regression includes a full set of dummies for job centers and months.
Standard errors are clustered at the job center and the month level.
Figure A.4: OLS: Correlations of Lagged Sanctions With Job Finding
Notes.– The figures depict coefficients and their 95% confidence intervals from a
simple regression of job finding on the lags of monthly sanctions. The regression
includes a full set of dummies for job centers and months. Standard errors are
clustered at the job center and the month level.
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A.5 ALMP Policies and Communal Elections
Decentralized job centers may use their autonomy strategically to reduce unemploy-
ment ahead of elections. Communal election dates vary by state and are usually
held every 6 years. Hence, I normally observe two communal elections in each
district, one before and one after the decentralization. This section provides a sup-
plementary analysis where I augment the main model from equation (2.1) with an
additional communal election variable. The election variable is hand-collected from
the websites of the state’s election administrations. I implement the election variable
as a dummy equaling 1 in the month before an election and 0 otherwise. I add an
interaction term of decentralization and elections to check whether decentralized
job centers may use ALMPs more strategically ahead of elections than centralized
providers.
Variable (1)
All
ALMPs
(2)
Short-
term
trainings
(3)
Medium-
term
trainings
(4)
Wage
subsidies
(5)
Job
creation
schemes
Decentralized 0.029 −0.071 −0.061 −0.047 0.293 ***
(0.064) (0.096) (0.070) (0.074) (0.081)
Election 0.011 0.011 0.069 −0.024 0.012
(0.033) (0.030) (0.063) (0.041) (0.063)
Decentralized 0.114 *** 0.074 *** 0.133 0.066 0.232 ***
×Election (0.030) (0.026) (0.090) (0.050) (0.059)
R-squared 0.939 0.860 0.811 0.846 0.825
Districts 316 316 316 316 316
Observations 36656 36651 35027 36112 35290
Notes.– * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Each column presents a different estimation of
equation 2.1. The dependent variables are inflows of unemployed into the respective ALMP
categories. Decentralized is a dummy equaling 1 for districts with decentralized job centers
and 0 otherwise. Election variable is a dummy equaling 1 in the month before a communal
election and 0 otherwise. Regressions include the stocks and flows of unemployed and
vacancies as well as a full set of dummies for job centers and months. All continuous
variables in logs. Sample sizes vary due to missing observations. Standard errors given in
parentheses are clustered at the job center and the month level.
Table A.4: Communal Elections and ALMP Policies Under Decentralization
Table A.4 presents the results following the structure of Table 2.6. The first row
presents the effect of decentralization on ALMP policies independent of any elec-
tions and confirms the previous results. In the next row of coefficients, I check
whether elections have a general effect on ALMP policies. The estimated coeffi-
cients indicate that communal elections in general do not alter inflows into ALMP
programs. However, communal elections after decentralization are associates with
higher total ALMP inflows, as given by the next row of coefficients. Aside from
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short-term trainings, the overall increase particularly stems from higher assign-
ments into job creation schemes. This is suggestive evidence that decentralized
providers may use their autonomy to reduce local unemployment ahead of com-
munal elections.
A.6 Further Sensitivity Analyses
A.6.1 Conditional Difference-in-Differences
If observable characteristics influence the unobserved labor market trends of cen-
tralized and decentralized job centers, reweighing our observations with regard to
these characteristics should reinforce the validity of the common trends assump-
tion. Therefore, we employ a variant of the conditional difference-in-differences
estimator (see Heckman et al., 1997, 1998). This estimator balances the treatment
and the control observations with regard to their fundamental characteristics before
running the difference-in-differences regression. Usually, balancing is performed
on the propensity score which requires estimating potentially restrictive probit or
logit models in the first place. In contrast, we use entropy balancing which is a
non-parametric method. Entropy balancing assigns each control unit a non-negative
weight such that the reweighted control group and the treatment group match
exactly in terms of pre-specified sample moments of their covariate distributions
(Hainmueller, 2012).
We balance the growth rates of major population and labor market groups.
Table A.5 presents these mean growth rates and the statistical significance of their
differences across subsamples before and after matching. It turns out that the mean
growth rates were quite similar already before applying entropy balancing. Yet,
entropy balancing further reduces any differences.
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Treated Unbalanced Control Balanced Control
Variable Mean Mean P-Value Mean P-Value
GDP per capita 22.970 24.099 0.578 22.970 1.000
Civil labor force −4.053 −3.337 0.517 −4.052 1.000
Young (15–24 yr) −2.231 0.245 0.382 −2.231 1.000
Prime-aged (25–54 yr) −4.611 −4.361 0.808 −4.610 0.999
Old (55–64 yr) −2.702 −1.763 0.530 −2.702 1.000
Foreign nationals 1.079 6.711 0.017 ** 1.088 0.997
Employment 1.125 2.862 0.138 1.127 0.999
Agriculture −14.563 −13.323 0.696 −14.561 1.000
Mining and energy −2.042 1.540 0.490 −2.040 1.000
Manufacturing −7.174 −6.951 0.931 −7.172 1.000
Construction −15.049 −16.063 0.667 −15.052 0.999
Trade, transp., comm. 0.974 3.123 0.217 0.975 0.999
Finance and real estate 21.660 25.296 0.170 21.663 0.999
Public and priv. services 9.043 9.737 0.669 9.043 1.000
Job-center unemployment −11.523 −13.497 0.309 −11.525 0.999
Young (15–24 yr) −14.847 −19.351 0.282 −14.851 0.999
Prime-aged (25–54 yr) −13.299 −15.246 0.312 −13.302 0.999
Old (55–64 yr) 7.777 9.107 0.708 7.779 1.000
Foreign nationals −10.500 −12.917 0.301 −10.501 1.000
Population on welfare −7.451 −8.826 0.322 −7.453 0.999
Young (15–24 yr) −13.762 −15.478 0.421 −13.765 0.999
Prime-aged (25–54 yr) −10.174 −11.706 0.290 −10.176 1.000
Old (50–64 yr) 5.320 4.634 0.559 5.319 1.000
Foreign nationals −4.323 −7.023 0.119 −4.325 0.999
40 290 290
Notes.– P-values given for t-test of mean equality. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
Table A.5: Balancing of mean growth rates for 2000–2010 (GDP, population, em-
ployment) or 2007–2010 (unemployment, welfare)
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A.6.2 Synthetic Control
We implement the synthetic control method by constructing a synthetic counterfac-
tual as a linear combination of the control group districts for each treated district.
The resulting synthetic control unit is then used to extrapolate the counterfactual
evolution of job finding of the treated unit for the post-treatment period.
The linear combination is chosen such that the synthetic control unit resembles
the treated unit’s job-finding flow during the first half of the pre-intervention period
as closely as possible. We use the second half of the pre-treatment interval as a
validation period to confirm the model’s validity. ‘Closeness’ is measured as the
Mean Squared Prediction Error (MSPE). Predictions are based on observed stocks
and inflows of unemployed and vacancies, as well as the shares of young, old, and
foreign individuals among the total stock of unemployed. All data are demeaned
and seasonally adjusted.
Figure A.5 presents the resulting evolution of the average job-finding flow of
treated and synthetic control units. Across the entire pre-treatment period, the
job-finding flows in both groups are almost identical, suggesting the synthetic
control group successfully replicates the evolution of decentralized districts. With
the decentralization in 2012, job finding in affected districts declined significantly
relative to the synthetic control observations. After about one year, the job finding in
treated districts slowly converges to the synthetic control group again but stabilizes
at a lower level. On average, job finding in decentralized districts is around 10%
below synthetic levels, consistent with our DiD estimates.
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Figure A.5: Synthetic Control Approach
Notes.– Time-labels (x-axis) refer to January of a given year. Synthetic control
approach with seasonally adjusted job finding as the outcome variable, i.e
residuals from a regression of monthly job finding levels per district on
eleven month dummies and an intercept. Donor pools for synthetic control
units include all districts not decentralizing in 2012. Predictor variables
include all covariates from the baseline regression as well as the shares of
young, old, and foreign individuals among the total stock of unemployed.
The second half of the pre-treatment interval is used as a validation period.
Synthetic control was computed for each treated district individually and
then averaged across all decentralizing districts.
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A.6.3 Empirical Monte-Carlo Simulation
Figure A.6 refers to an empirical Monte-Carlo simulation following Huber et al.
(2013), where randomly chosen non-reforming districts receive placebo treatments
to confirm that our standard errors are correctly sized.
Figure A.6: Histogram of t-Statistics for Decentralization Coefficient from Placebo
Treatments
Notes.– T-statistics computed from 5,000 estimations of equation (2.1) where
Decentralized is a dummy equaling 1 for 41 randomly chosen districts with
centralized job centers and 0 otherwise. Regressions include the stocks and
flows of unemployed and vacancies as well as a full set of dummies for job
centers and months. Standard errors are two-way clustered on the job center
and the month level.
A.6.4 Sensitivity Analyses for ALMP Inflows and Sanction
Flows
(subsequent pages)
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B Appendix to Chapter 3: Fueling Fiscal
Interactions: Commodity Price Shocks
and Local Government Spending in
Colombia
B.1 Supplementary Figures and Tables
Figure B.1: Municipal Expenditures Per Capita on Sport and Recreation in Thou-
sand 2008 Real COP by Quartiles of the Pooled Sample, 2000–2010
(16.5, 501.7]
(9.9, 16.5]
(6.2, 9.9]
[0, 6.2]
No data
a. Year 2000
(16.5, 308.4]
(9.9, 16.5]
(6.2, 9.9]
[0, 6.2]
No data
b. Year 2010
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Table B.1: Variable Description
Variable Description
Total
Total amount of money invested in the different categories of each
municipality.
Health
Funds invested in health. Includes investment in new infrastructure,
maintenance of existing infrastructure, promotion programs, as well as
the salaries of the health centers’ employees.
Education
Funds invested in education. Includes investment in new infrastructure,
maintenance of existing infrastructure, promotion programs, as well as
the salaries of teachers.
Water
Municipal investment in aqueducts, sewage systems, garbage collection,
new sanitation infrastructure and maintenance of the existing one.
Housing
Accounts for subsidies to buy or improve houses for the poor and
expenditures to improve housing conditions of the general population.
Sport and recreation
Funds used to promote sport and leisure activities including
infrastructure, programs and instructors.
Agriculture
Payments made to improve the productivity of the agricultural sector
like infrastructure, experimental farms and consultants.
Community development
Investment in programs to support public engagement and active
citizenship.
Municipal equipment
Investment on municipal buildings, like public offices, market places,
cemeteries, public places and slaughter houses.
Vulnerable groups
Investments used for programs directed towards vulnerable groups,
including children, elderly, single mothers, displaced and disabled people.
Justice and security
Money used to pay the salaries of police officers and sheriffs, doctors,
social workers, and psychologists working for the family service agency.
Disasters prevention Investment used for disaster relief and prevention.
Source: Based on Acevedo and Bornacelly (2014).
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Table B.2: Results for All Non-earmarked Categories
W_y Total excl. y W_total excl. y AP F-statistic excl. inst.
Housing -2.091 0.498*** 1.043 3.631
(1.531) (0.047) (0.711)
Agriculture -2.690 0.371*** 1.083 0.791
(4.193) (0.103) (1.732)
Com. development 1.757 0.144*** -0.324 2.824
(1.650) (0.030) (0.305)
Sport & rec. 1.257** 0.555*** -0.702** 13.99
(0.576) (0.030) (0.303)
Equipment 0.606 0.488*** -0.336 33.75
(0.392) (0.035) (0.210)
Vuln. groups -2.600 0.353*** 1.100 0.513
(4.584) (0.053) (1.818)
Justice 1.873* 0.309*** -0.496* 4.591
(1.107) (0.033) (0.285)
Dis. prevention 1.097 0.333*** -0.421 3.811
(1.101) (0.028) (0.370)
Notes: Each row represents a separate estimation for different non-earmarked spending categories. IV specifica-
tion as in Table 3.3. Expenditures and transfers are real per capita values in 2008 COP. All continuous variables
in logs. The Angrist-Pischke (AP) first-stage F-statistic of the excluded instrument is also reported. Standard
errors given in parentheses are clustered on the municipality level. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
Table B.3: Spatial Lags as Instruments
Health Education Water Non-earmarked Sport & rec.
W_y 0.130 0.372*** 0.091 0.169 -0.100
(0.136) (0.073) (0.071) (0.124) (0.075)
Population 5.036 17.598*** -5.832** 0.828 0.902
(3.258) (4.442) (2.899) (2.988) (3.120)
Population squared -2.287 -7.621*** 2.618* -0.713 -0.684
(1.508) (2.035) (1.356) (1.384) (1.445)
Share of rural population -0.362** -1.171*** -0.021 -0.173 0.192
(0.166) (0.243) (0.155) (0.159) (0.145)
Transfers 0.012*** 0.020*** 0.017*** 0.028*** 0.010***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Total excl. y 0.265*** 0.424*** 0.592*** 0.110*** 0.531***
(0.035) (0.036) (0.033) (0.030) (0.026)
Observations 12,023 12,023 12,023 12,023 12,023
Number of municipalies 1,093 1,093 1,093 1,093 1,093
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Department - year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
AP F-statistic excl. inst. 46.46 198.4 189.2 42.95 168.3
Notes: In contrast to the main specification in Table 3.3, here, the spatial lags of all control variables are used as
excluded instruments (traditional spatial IV estimator). Expenditures and transfers are real per capita values in 2008
COP. All continuous variables in logs. The Angrist-Pischke (AP) first-stage F-statistic of the excluded instrument is
also reported. Standard errors given in parentheses are clustered on the municipality level. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; ***
p < 0.01.
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Table B.4: All Expenditure Categories as Separate Control Variables
Total Health Education Water Non-earmarked Sport & rec.
W_y -0.081 2.114 0.304 0.282 0.550 1.391***
(0.499) (3.036) (0.246) (0.537) (0.883) (0.469)
Health 0.312*** 0.318*** 0.070***
(0.019) (0.020) (0.014)
Education 0.326*** 0.211*** 0.089***
(0.022) (0.018) (0.016)
Water 0.296*** 0.181*** 0.184***
(0.029) (0.015) (0.014)
Sport & rec. 0.077*** 0.079*** 0.190***
(0.024) (0.013) (0.014)
Housing 0.000 0.017*** 0.032*** 0.044***
(0.012) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
Agriculture 0.065*** 0.071*** 0.076*** 0.109***
(0.020) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
Community development -0.021* 0.018* 0.038*** 0.031***
(0.012) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011)
Equipment 0.000 0.021*** 0.035*** 0.061***
(0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Vulnerable groups 0.007 0.008 0.075*** 0.063***
(0.017) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010)
Justice 0.036 0.025** 0.074*** 0.065***
(0.039) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012)
Disaster prevention 0.001 0.035*** 0.031*** 0.032***
(0.012) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010)
Observations 12,023 12,023 12,023 12,023 12,023 12,023
R-squared 0.045 -0.219 0.357 0.388 -0.041 -0.034
Number of municipalities 1,093 1,093 1,093 1,093 1,093 1,093
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Department - year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
AP F-statistic excl. inst. 16.26 1.139 82.96 13.96 5.186 19.67
Notes: In contrast to the main specification in Table 3.3, here, for each expenditure category on the left hand side, all other
spending categories and their respective spatial lags are included in the estimation as separate control variables. The respective
spatial lags of the spending categories on the right hand side are also included in the estimations but are not displayed in
the table for brevity. Expenditures and transfers are real per capita values in 2008 COP. All continuous variables in logs. The
Angrist-Pischke (AP) first-stage F-statistic of the excluded instruments is also reported. Standard errors given in parentheses
are clustered on the municipality level. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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B.2 Data Preparation and Imputation
From the total number of 1122 annual municipality observations, we drop twenty
units that maintain a special territorial status different from municipalities, being
situated in very remote and sparsely populated areas. We also delete four new
municipalities established after 2007, two remote islands and three municipalities
left without direct neighbors. This leaves us with 1093 municipalities in our sample.
Missing values in expenditure variables account for less than 3% of the total
municipality-year observations. For about 90% of the municipalities with missing
values, we still observe at least nine years. Therefore, we decide against listwise
deletion of municipalities with missing values and opt for imputation by linear
intrapolation. For covariates, this procedure is necessary in less than 0.01% of all
cases.
As a check of the data we compare the expenditure data with the Ejecuciones
Presupuestales Municipales data base provided by the Colombian National Planning
Department (DNP). While the overall consistency is very favorable, the comparison
leads us to make some minor outlier corrections. In particular, we impute linear
intrapolations for all values that are larger than twenty times a municipality’s
median in the same expenditure category and correct obvious decimal point errors.
These changes affect approximatively another 3% of the observations but lead
to an improvement of the data balance. Despite these needs for correction, the
resulting dataset as described in Table 3.1 still has an exceptional quality given the
developing country setting. One qualification remains: For the years 2006 and 2007,
a total of 73 municipality-year pairs exhibit zero expenditures.
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C Appendix to Chapter 4: Privatization
Decisions and Economic Efficiency
C.1 Supplementary Figures
Notes: Dots represent binned scatter plot where the observa-
tions are grouped into 20 equally sized bins. A simple linear
regression line indicates the direction of the correlation. Only
uses observations from 1991 where the THA was still the
owner.
Figure C.1: Privatization and Log Revenues per Worker, Treuhand-owned firms
from 1991 only
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Notes: Dots represent binned scatter plot where the observa-
tions are grouped into 20 equally sized bins. A simple linear
regression line indicates the direction of the correlation. Only
uses observations from 1991 where the THA was still the
owner.
Figure C.2: Privatization and Revenues per Hour, Treuhand-owned firms from 1991
only
Note: Dots represent binned scatter plot where the observa-
tions are grouped into 20 equally sized bins. A simple linear
regression line indicates the direction of the correlation.
Figure C.3: Privatization and Gross Value Added
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Note: Dots represent binned scatter plot where
the observations are grouped into 20 equally
sized bins. A simple linear regression line indi-
cates the direction of the correlation.
Figure C.4: Productivity and Govern-
ment Vote Shares
Note: Dots represent binned scatter plot where
the observations are grouped into 20 equally
sized bins. A simple linear regression line indi-
cates the direction of the correlation.
Figure C.5: Productivity and Closeness
of Election Results
Note: Dots represent binned scatter plot where
the observations are grouped into 20 equally
sized bins. A simple linear regression line
indicates the direction of the correlation.
Figure C.6: Privatization and State
Employment Shares with-
out Winsorization
Note: Dots represent binned scatter plot where
the observations are grouped into 20 equally
sized bins. A simple linear regression line
indicates the direction of the correlation.
Figure C.7: Privatization and State
Wage Bill Shares without
Winsorization
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Note: Dots represent binned scatter plot where the observa-
tions are grouped into 20 equally sized bins. A simple linear
regression line indicates the direction of the correlation.
Figure C.8: Productivity and Average Gross Wages
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Table C.1: Regression Results: Privatization and Alternative Productivity Indicators
(1) (2) (3)
Revenue per Worker 0.068***
(0.012)
Revenue per Hour 0.062***
(0.013)
Gross Value Added 0.072***
(0.005)
Industry FE X X X
State FE X X X
Survey FE X X X
R-squared 0.189 0.190 0.251
Observations 2,533 2,363 2,534
Notes.– * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Each column presents a different
estimation of equation (4.1). The outcome variable is a dummy equaling 1 if a
firm was privatized at the end of 1994 and 0 otherwise. Productivity variables
are in logs. Sample reduced to all firms with non-missing gross value added
information. Robust standard errors given in parentheses.
Table C.2: Logit Results: Privatization and Alternative Productivity Indicators
(1) (2) (3)
Revenue per Worker 0.465***
(0.083)
Revenue per Hour 0.420***
(0.089)
Gross Value Added 0.571***
(0.046)
Industry FE X X X
State FE X X X
Survey FE X X X
R-squared
Observations 2,327 2,172 2,327
Notes.– * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Each column presents a different
estimation of the logit equivalent of equation (4.1). The outcome variable is a
dummy equaling 1 if a firm was privatized at the end of 1994 and 0 otherwise.
Productivity variables are in logs. Sample reduced to all firms with non-missing
gross value added information. Robust standard errors given in parentheses.
113
C Appendix to Chapter 4: Privatization Decisions and Economic Efficiency
Table C.3: Regression Results: Privatization and Productivity Foundations
(1) (2) (3)
Revenue per worker 0.107*** 0.110*** 0.107***
(0.009) (0.011) (0.009)
Share of University Graduates -0.001
(0.001)
Share of R&D Workers 0.003***
(0.001)
Industry FE X X X
State FE X X X
Survey FE X X X
R-squared 0.209 0.216 0.210
Observations 4,655 3,231 4,464
Notes.– * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Each column presents a different estimation of
equation (4.1). The outcome variable is a dummy equaling 1 if a firm was privatized at
the end of 1994 and 0 otherwise. Productivity variables are in logs. Varying sample sizes
due to item non-response. Robust standard errors given in parentheses.
C.3 Privatization Decisions and Political
Ideology: Exploiting Close Elections for a
Potential Regression Discontinuity Design
Figure C.9 illustrates a potential regression discontinuity design to estimate the
effect of party ideology of the incumbent constituency representative on local
privatization. Close elections, where the succeeding candidate only won by a very
narrow margin, have been frequently used to exploit quasi-experimental variation
in the incumbent parties’ ideologies (Lee and Lemieux, 2010). Hence, close elections
could also provide a promising avenue to study political ideology as an additional
non-economic factor in privatization decisions. However, East Germany consisted
of only 61 electoral districts (excluding Berlin) at the federal election in 1990. The
conservative party (CDU) won the majority of these districts by large margins.
Thus, there is not a sufficient amount of district that experienced close elections
where it is plausible that winning such an election is a random outcome. Plotting
the given variation in election outcomes in Figure C.9 also does not indicate that a
discontinuity in privatization decisions exists around the threshold where first and
second-placed parties received similarly large vote shares.
C.4 The Treuhand Firm Surveys (Data Appendix)
This section provides an overview of the Treuhand survey dataset. It describes the
collection, the coverage, and preparation for the entirety of all Treuhand surveys.
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Figure C.9: Potential Regression Discontinuity Design
Note: Dots represent binned scatter plot where the observa-
tions are grouped into equally sized bins on each side of the
cutoff. Separate linear regression lines on each side of the
cutoff indicate the direction of the correlation.
It thereby goes beyond an incomplete series of reports which each summarize a
single wave of Treuhand firm surveys (Kühl et al., 1991, 1992b,a; Wahse et al., 1993,
1996).
C.4.1 Data Collection
The first survey was based on an agreement between the Bundesanstalt für Arbeit
and the Treuhand Agency.1 As Treuhand companies accounted for about one third
of East German employment, the survey was to act as an early warning system
for the expected job losses across industries and locations (Kühl et al., 1991). The
research institute of the Bundesanstalt, the IAB, commissioned the Berlin-based
Soestra institute to conduct the survey.
The Soestra institute launched the first survey among Treuhand-owned com-
panies in April 1991. Starting in October 1991, a related survey was conducted
with companies already privatized by the Treuhand. Both surveys were repeated
semi-annually until the Treuhand closed its operations in 1994. The survey of
former Treuhand companies continued in annual intervals from 1995 until October
2003 (with the exception of October 2001). A total of 23 surveys was conducted.
For each wave, all firms owned by the THA at this time received a mail-sent
questionnaire. Former THA firms received a questionnaire with mostly identical
but also distinct items. Survey items varied across years. Formally, participation
was not mandatory for firms. However, an official cover letter by the head of
1Leitlinien für eine Zusammenarbeit zwischen der Treuhandanstalt und der Bundesanstalt für
Arbeit, 11 April 1991
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Table C.4: Survey Characteristics by Date and Type of Survey
Survey No. of Responses No. of Variables
1991-Apr THA 5,261 30
1991-Oct Ex-THA 5,792 20
1991-Oct THA 5,792 27
1992-Apr Ex-THA 5,603 37
1992-Apr THA 5,603 42
1992-Oct Ex-THA 5,257 48
1992-Oct THA 5,257 56
1993-Apr Ex-THA 4,692 32
1993-Apr THA 4,692 35
1993-Oct Ex-THA 3,408 59
1993-Oct THA 3,408 61
1994-Apr Ex-THA 4,056 45
1994-Apr THA 4,056 45
1994-Oct Ex-THA 2,544 68
1994-Oct THA 2,544 70
1995-Oct Ex-THA 2,159 46
1996-Oct Ex-THA 818 25
1997-Oct Ex-THA 919 30
1998-Oct Ex-THA 965 14
1999-Oct Ex-THA 918 17
2000-Oct Ex-THA 824 17
2002-Oct Ex-THA 855 22
2003-Oct Ex-THA 750 16
N 44,821
Notes: THA refers to surveys of currently Treuhand-owned companies. Ex-THA refers to survey
directed to firms which left Treuhand ownership. For a few surveys, there are additional variables
available which were beyond the scope of this data preparation.
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the Treuhand accompanied the questionnaire, asking firms for a reply. Responses
were to be sent back to the THA. Table C.4 describes the number of responses
and variables covered by each survey wave. The number of responding Treuhand-
owned firms is high in the early 90s but rapidly declines as all firms had to be
privatized or liquidated by 1994. Inversely, the number of responses from former
Treuhand companies increased as more and more firms left the public ownership.
C.4.2 Firms Covered
Questionnaires were sent out to all firms currently or formerly managed by the
Treuhand between April 1991 and October 2003, except for privatized company
parts. Plants with more than 100 employees were surveyed separately. Treuhand
companies covered the entire industrial sector of the GDR as well as trading and
large agricultural companies. These firms account for about one third of total East
German employment. Not included were the former agricultural production coop-
eratives (LPGs), which went through a separate privatization process. Moreover,
the survey left aside the public sector, including hospitals, schools, government
administrations as well as non-civilian bodies.
C.4.3 Variables
The Treuhand questionnaires focus on the current and expected future employment
structure but also include a broader range of topics. The following list gives an
overview of the item categories repeatedly covered in the questionnaires.
• Employment: Overall current and expected future number of employees. In
total, by gender, and by age categories.
Overall number of employees can be categorized into the following groups
(with intersections):
– Apprentices: Number of current and expected future apprentices by
gender.
– Education and Qualification: Number of employees by degree of formal
education/qualification obtained or required, e.g. untrained workers,
trained specialists or university graduates.
– Operating Fields: Current and expected future number of employees by
gender and workplace, e.g. production, sales or controlling.
– Vocational Training: Current and expected future number of employees
participating in vocational training by gender, education/ qualification,
training scheme and training objective as well as expenses for vocational
training.
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Figure C.10: Structure of the Treuhand Survey Dataset
– New Hires: Number of employees that were newly hired by gender.
– Job Vacancies: Number of job vacancies by function or department.
– Short-time workers: Number of employees working short-time by gender
and degree of working hours reduction.
• Wages: Wage expenses by gender.
• Revenue: Current and expected future revenue.
• Investments: Current and expected future gross investments, investment
targets and investment impediments.
• Legal status: Legal status of the firm.
• Treuhand department: Department of the Treuhand that was in charge of the
firm.
• MBO, MBI: Indicator whether firm was privatized through management
buy-out or management buy-in.
• Privatization date: Year and month.
• Industry: The data differentiates 249 different industry sectors at the four-
digit level.
• Location: Municipality, district and state of the firm’s location.
Some survey items were only included in a single or few waves and therefore
are not included in this overview but may provide additional insights into more
specific research questions.
C.4.4 Raw Data Structure and Panel Creation
As illustrated in figure C.10, the original data consists of two data types: a list
with basic background information of all THA companies and 23 separate cross-
sectional survey data sets. The list of companies was provided by the THA itself
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to the Soestra institute to conduct the surveys. It is based on the Treuhand’s
internal administrative data. For 14,961 companies, the list contains basic firm
information, including industry code, location, privatization status, legal status,
and the Treuhand department assigned to each firm. The fieldwork institution
also used this list to record survey inclusion and participation. I drop the 1,385
firms from the list which were never considered for participation in any survey. An
inspection reveals that this may has happened for good reason as their legal status
is predominantly coded as “property title” (“Eigentumstitel”), implying that these
firms are not independent and economically active companies.
The 23 cross-sectional survey datasets contain the firms’ responses to the respec-
tive survey questionnaires. Recurring survey items may have different identifiers
every time they were included in the surveys. Hence, I harmonize these variable
identifiers manually across all surveys in order to obtain time-consistent variables.
My matching procedure advances in two steps. Using unique Treuhand firm
identifiers, I first append the cross-sectional surveys and merge them with the
list of THA companies. Second, I use survey observations which did not match
based on the Treuhand identifiers and match them based on their unique id
from the Federal Insurance Fund for Salaried Employees (BfA). This results in an
unbalanced panel of 13,576 firms where 10,167 companies (74.9%) match with at
least one survey response. 3,409 firms from the list of companies do not have any
matching responses, i.e. supposedly have never replied to a survey. On the other
hand, 949 survey responses (2.1% of all responses) do not match with the list of
companies. Plausible explanations for this finding are new firm owners, mergers,
or surveys answered by a subsidiary company.
Several data cleaning procedures help to improve the data quality. I drop values
outside of the plausible range in the district, region, legal status, and industry
variable. As these variables are available from both sources, the list of companies
and several surveys, I then combine these sources to fill missing values. I also exploit
the hierarchy underlying the municipality, district, region, and state variables to
impute missing higher-level geographic indications where lower-level information
is available.
C.4.5 Data Assessment
The analysis of a new panel survey requires a careful assessment of the overall data
quality. There are two major concerns. First, the list of companies used to conduct
the survey may not be representative of the entire population of Treuhand firms.
If representativeness is in doubt, any survey conducted using this list will be in
doubt too. Second, even if the companies initially approached to take part in the
study are representative, non-random response will threaten the surveys’ validity.
Both concerns require further analysis presented in the following sections.
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Figure C.11: Comparison of Treuhand Data and Official Statistics by State
Representativeness of the Company List
The list of companies includes basic firm variables with a very low degree of
missing values. Investigating the representativeness of the company list is generally
difficult as the Treuhand’s original firm database ISUD (“Informationssystem
Unternehmensdatenbank”) has not been made available to research and may suffer
from digital obsolescence as the necessary soft- and hardware providing access
is no longer available.2 However, it is possible to compare the list of companies
with aggregated official statistics published by the THA based on the ISUD. In this
section, I provide such a comparison by East German states, industries, and firm
status when the THA ceased operating in 1994.
Drawing upon official Treuhand data, the Gebhardt (1994) publishes the number
of THA companies by German states. According to this source, Saxony (SACH)
was home to 4,384 companies, the largest count among all East German states.
On the other hand, (East) Berlin only accounted for 1,136 companies. Figure C.11
shows the comparison with the respective geographical distribution of firms in the
company list (right-hand side). The figure reveals that the data from the company
list closely matches the official statistics for all East German states, which is a first
confirmation of the data’s representativeness.
The Bundesanstalt für vereinigungsbedingte Sonderaufgaben (1994) offers offi-
cial statistics for the distribution of firms by 3-digit industry and their status in
December 1994. Figure C.12 summarizes the official number of firms by industry to
the company list data. The three most frequent industries, mechanical engineering,
2This concern refers to a corresponding oral statement by a research fellow of the Institut für
Zeitgeschichte München-Berlin, who is involved in the historical investigation of the THA archives.
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Figure C.12: Comparison of Treuhand Data and Official Statistics by Industry
Figure C.13: Comparison of Treuhand Data and Official Statistics by Firm Status
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trade, and services, are all represented in very similar numbers in both sources.
The same holds true for all smaller industries except for agriculture, an industry
which constitutes a special case of privatization as laid out in section C.4.2. Re-
garding the firms’ status in 1994, the Abschlußstatistik distinguishes among firms
being privatized, liquidated, restituted to former owners, or municipalized. Figure
C.13 shows the distribution of these outcomes in comparison to an analogously
constructed variable based on the company list data. As can be seen, privatization
is by far the most common outcome with more than 6,500 cases in both sources.
Liquidations, restitutions, and municipalizations occurred less often but at similar
frequencies in both sources.
An exact match of the two sets of figures would be an unrealistic standard
as partitions, mergers, and differing reporting dates impede direct comparisons.
Despite of these challenges, the company list data closely resembles the numbers
from original THA reports. Comparing data sources based on the distributions
in three variables does of course not proof representativeness, yet it provides
solid evidence for employing it as an acceptable working assumption. Whether
representativeness can be assumed after taking survey response behavior into
account will be explored in the next sections.
Rates of Survey Response
The second major concern regarding the external validity of the survey is non-
random response. Firms may not participate in the survey for various reasons, such
as insolvency, recent merger, lack of time, or privacy concerns. If these reasons are
related to survey outcomes of interest, the resulting analysis will be biased. Ideally,
the group of firms returning their questionnaires should mimic the population of
all Treuhand companies. The Treuhand survey authors Kühl et al. (1991) assume
structural equivalence of responding and non-responding firms due to the high
response rate but do not provide an analysis to support their claim. I provide an
overview of the overall number of responses across firms and surveys. In the next
step, I study differences in the populations of surveyed and responding firms.
I define the response rate as the number of firms responding to the respective
survey divided by the total number of firms surveyed. Figure C.14 presents the
response rates by survey type. Overall, response rates were between 20 to 65 %.
These figures are higher for the earlier waves of the survey and lower for later
ones. Taking together all surveys from October 1991 to 2003, the total response
rate amounts to 35.6%. Overall, the median firm is observed twice in the matched
data set. 25% of the firms are responding in at least five surveys. Restricting the
panel to the years 1991 to 2000, i.e. removing the least favorably responded survey
years, the median number of firm observations rises to three. 25% of the 11,105
firms show up in at least six surveys.
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Figure C.14: Response Rates by Survey Type
These response rates favorably compare to similar company surveys. A one-
time firm survey of Treuhand companies by Dyck (AER 1997) in 1992 reached an
effective response rate of 23%. The German KfW/ZEW Start-up Panel realized a
response rate of 26% (Fryges et al., 2009), the Survey on the Access to Finance of
Enterprises (SAFE) by the European Central Bank achieved 14%, and the IAB’s
Establishment Panel reaches rates of up to 40% for first-time respondents (Janik
and Kohaut, 2012). However, the response rate itself is only a weak indicator of
distortion from firms’ sorting into survey responses. To detect non-random sorting,
it is necessary to study the deviation of firm characteristics between the resulting
sample and the original population. This is the topic of the following section.
Non-response Bias
A non-response analysis is feasible as the list of companies plausibly provides
a quasi-census for Treuhand firms. It records which firms were included in the
surveys and offers a basic set of auxiliary variables available for all companies. The
first Treuhand survey from April 1991 is the only exception where firms’ inclusion
was not recorded. Linking the list with the cross-sectional surveys thus allows for a
direct comparison of deviations in firm characteristics between respondents and
the population of firms included for all surveys starting from October 1991. To
study non-response bias, I adopt the convention by Sakshaug and Huber (2016)
and define the Non-Respone Biasi,s for characteristic i and survey s as follows
Non-Response Biasi,s = Y¯i,s − Y¯∗i,s
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where Y¯i,s − Y¯∗i,s is the difference between the share of responding firms and the
share of all firms included in the respective survey which satisfy the respective
characteristic. Below, I present firm characteristics and non-response biases for the
surveys of currently Treuhand-owned companies and subsequently for the surveys
of former Treuhand companies.
Table C.5 presents characteristics of the firms participating in the surveys of
current Treuhand firms. Each column refers to a separate survey, allowing a com-
parison within surveys and over time. The typical firm in the survey of October
1991, for example, is a corporation in the mechanical engineering or vehicles in-
dustry from a rural area in Saxony which will be privatized or liquidated at equal
probabilities (46%) by the end of 1994. Given that firms endogenously leave Treu-
hand ownership and thereby fall out from this survey type, firm characteristics are
remarkably stable over time. The typical firm in the October 1994 survey is still a
corporation in the mechanical engineering or vehicles industry yet from a rural
district in Saxony-Anhalt.
The respective non-response biases for the same variables and surveys are
summarized in Table C.6. For instance, firms responding to the April 1991 survey
are one percentage point (pp) more frequently registered as a corporations. Across
all surveys and variables, non-response biases below five percentage points are
the norm. The only remarkable exception is the survey from October 1993 whose
respondents are nine percentage points more likely to be in industries developing
more favorably between 1991 and 1994 than the population of firms included in
the survey. Similarly, these firms also are more often privatized and less often
privatized at the end of the year 1994. While non-response biases exhibit low
magnitudes overall, over-representation of economically more promising firms is
a concern for this particular survey wave. Therefore, at a minimum, any analysis
based on these surveys should provide a robustness check omitting this wave.
Table C.7 shows firm characteristics for respondents of the former THA company
surveys’. For instance, the typical responding firm in the October 1991 survey is a
privatized corporation in the building industry from a large city in Saxony. As more
firms leave THA ownership, the respondents’ sample composition changes over
time. The building industry, for example, accounts for 18% of all respondents in
October 1991 but only for 8% 12 years later in 2003. Conversely, the share of firms
from energy, mechanical engineering, logistics, and services modestly increases
over the same period.
A systematic non-response analysis for former THA companies yields favorable
results as Table C.8 reveals. The non-response bias measures never exceed a dif-
ference of five percentage points across all variables for the initial nine surveys. A
larger difference emerges only in 1997: Responses from large cities are 8 percentage
points less frequent compared to the total firm population surveyed with similar
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Table C.5: Characteristics of Responding Firms in Surveys of Current Treuhand
Companies (Shares)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
THA91H THA92F THA92H THA93F THA93H THA94F THA94H
Legal Status
Corporation 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.98 0.99
Other Legal Status 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01
Industry
Agriculture 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01
Energy, Water, Mining 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.05
Chemicals, Synthetics 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.06
Wood, Ceramics, Glass 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.03
Metal 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.12 0.07 0.18
Mech. Engineering, Vehicles 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.22 0.17 0.20
Electronics, Optics 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.04
Textiles, Paper, Prints 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.13 0.15 0.05
Food 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.01
Building, Construction 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.01
Logistics, Trade 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.10 0.18 0.06
Services 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.16 0.15 0.30
Rel. empl. change 91-94 0.45 0.44 0.44 0.46 0.57 0.48 0.60
Post-Privatization Status
Privatized 0.46 0.43 0.31 0.24 0.44 0.13 0.59
Management buy-out 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00
Management buy-in 0.10 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.00
Liquidated 0.46 0.49 0.63 0.71 0.47 0.84 0.16
Restituted 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00
Municipalized 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
State
Brandenburg 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.17 0.16 0.19
Mecklenburg-West Pom. 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
Berlin 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.10 0.11
Saxony 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.36 0.28 0.34 0.21
Saxony-Anhalt 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.22 0.15 0.25
Thuringia 0.15 0.16 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.13
District
Large cities 0.29 0.29 0.30 0.31 0.24 0.31 0.30
Urban areas 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.13 0.12
Rural areas w urban hubs 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.28 0.29 0.27 0.36
Rural areas 0.30 0.31 0.29 0.28 0.33 0.29 0.22
Notes.– Shares of all responding firms satisfying the respective characteristic given. Rel. Empl. Incr. 91-94 denotes the share
of firms from industries with an above-median employment development between October 1991 and October 1994. Post-
Privatization Status refers to a company’s ownership situation after the Treuhand ceased to exist at the turn of the year
1994/1995. The district classification stems from the German Federal Institute for Research on Building, Urban Affairs and
Spatial Development (BBSR).
tendencies in the following waves. However, such differences do not appear for
other variables. A particular concern is again the sorting of economically more
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Table C.6: Non-Response Bias in Surveys of Current Treuhand Companies (pp/100)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
THA91H THA92F THA92H THA93F THA93H THA94F THA94H
Legal Status
Corporation 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.03
Other Legal Status -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03
Industry
Agriculture -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00
Energy, Water, Mining 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01
Chemicals, Synthetics 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.01
Wood, Ceramics, Glass -0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
Metal 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 -0.01 0.03
Mech. Engineering, Vehicles 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.01
Electronics, Optics 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.03 0.00 -0.01
Textiles, Paper, Prints 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.02
Food 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.00 -0.00
Building, Construction -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.00
Logistics, Trade -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.00 -0.06 -0.00 -0.06
Services -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.00 0.04
Rel. empl. incr. 91-94 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.09 -0.01 0.05
Post-Privatization Status
Privatized -0.03 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.22 -0.04 -0.03
Management buy-out 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.00 -0.00
Management buy-in -0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 -0.01
Liquidated 0.05 -0.02 -0.01 -0.04 -0.27 0.04 0.00
Restituted -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 0.01 -0.00 -0.01
Municipalized -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00
State
Brandenburg 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02
Mecklenburg-West Pom. -0.01 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.01
Berlin -0.01 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.02 -0.00 -0.01
Saxony 0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.01 -0.06 -0.01 -0.03
Saxony-Anhalt 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.02 0.04 -0.01 0.02
Thuringia -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
District
Large cities -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.06 -0.01 -0.02
Urban areas 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.00
Rural areas w urban hubs 0.01 0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03
Rural areas 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.00 0.03 0.00 -0.00
Notes.– Shares of all responding firms satisfying the respective characteristic given. Rel. Empl. Incr. 91-94 denotes the share
of firms from industries with an above-median employment development between October 1991 and October 1994. Post-
Privatization Status refers to a company’s ownership situation after the Treuhand ceased to exist at the turn of the year
1994/1995. The district classification stems from the German Federal Institute for Research on Building, Urban Affairs and
Spatial Development (BBSR).
viable firms into the survey. The indicator most closely related to economic per-
formance, the share of firms from industries developing favorably between 1991
and 1994, demonstrates that the difference between respondents and the survey
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C.4 The Treuhand Firm Surveys (Data Appendix)
population never exceeds three percentage points. Hence, the analysis supports the
assumption that non-response bias is not a major concern for the data of former
THA companies.
Combining the results from the analysis of both survey types, I conclude that the
survey responses provide a useful picture of the pool of firms included in the survey.
Four caveats remain. First, the argument holds for the variables under examination
but may not do so for factors unobserved in this study. Second, the absence of major
non-response bias within each survey does not imply representativeness across
surveys. Survey results from 1996 may not be representative for the population of
the initial Treuhand firms in 1990. Instead, representativeness is only given for the
subset of surviving companies. Third, given the study excluded privatized company
parts, the survey results only represent companies that were privatized as a whole.
Fourth, lacking records prohibit a non-response analysis for April 1991. However,
due to the particularly high number of responses available, representativeness is
also plausible for this wave.
I close the data quality analysis with a few reflections on item non-response. The
availability of basic firm information is favorable. Industry information is given for
95% of all firms, districts for 89%, legal status for 89%, the end of the Treuhand
administration for 87%, and the federal employment agency for 69% of all cases.
Disregarding the surveys after 2000, these values increase to 99%, 91%, 89%, 88%,
and 91% respectively.
C.4.6 Particularities
There are several particularities that researchers working with the data need to be
aware of.
• Several items in the surveys of 2002 and 2003, such as revenues, investments,
and profits refer to the year prior to the survey. The same survey items in
previous surveys refer to the respective current year.
• Important items such as revenues and investments are only included in the
questionnaires starting in April 1992.
• Financial variables are not adjusted for inflation but are given in values of the
current year.
C.4.7 Conclusion
The Treuhand survey data provides a major step towards analyzing the Treuhand
privatizations, one of the world’s most ambitious privatization programs. This
step is significant as no major firm-level data source has been available covering
these events. Being a major advantage of the Treuhand surveys, companies were
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surveyed from 1991 to 2003 – that is almost from the start of the privatization
efforts. Due to the survey origin of the data, I assess the data quality in more
detail and generate two major insights. First, the list of company underlying the
survey collection corresponds to the full population of THA companies. Second,
exploiting auxiliary firm information originally provided by the THA, I find that
the responses to individual surveys are hardly harmed by non-random response
problems. Hence, the data enables studies on a wide range of interesting topics to
gain a deeper understanding of privatizations processes and German economic
reunification.
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